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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive 
Compensation 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk† 
Jesse M. Fried†† 
David I. Walker††† 
This Article develops an account of the role and significance of managerial 
power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal con-
tracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic 
research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that 
aims to maximize shareholder value. In contrast, the managerial power ap-
proach suggests that boards do not operate at arm’s length in devising executive 
compensation arrangements; rather, executives have power to influence their 
own pay, and they use that power to extract rents. Furthermore, the desire to 
camouflage rent extraction might lead to the use of inefficient pay arrangements 
that provide suboptimal incentives and thereby hurt shareholder value. The au-
thors show that the processes that produce compensation arrangements, and the 
various market forces and constraints that act on these processes, leave manag-
ers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining 
the large body of empirical work on executive compensation, the authors show 
that managerial power and the desire to camouflage rents can explain signifi-
cant features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that have 
long been viewed as puzzling or problematic from the optimal contracting per-
spective. The authors conclude that the role managerial power plays in the de-
sign of executive compensation is significant and should be taken into account in 
any examination of executive pay arrangements or of corporate governance 
generally. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Executive compensation has long attracted a great deal of atten-
tion from academics, the media, Congress, and the public at large. 
During the extended bull market of the 1990s, stock option programs 
adopted by public companies yielded unprecedented gains for senior 
executives.1 These gains were accompanied by a parallel rise in aca-
demic work on the subject.2 Indeed, it appears that the rate of growth 
in such academic work has outpaced even the growth rate of execu-
tive compensation. 3 
This Article questions the dominant approach in the academic 
work on executive compensation. It also seeks to put forward a sys-
tematic and comprehensive account of an alternative approach to the 
study of executive compensation—the “managerial power ap-
proach”—that focuses on the role of managerial power in shaping 
executive compensation practices. The substantial influence of 
managerial power on executive compensation, we argue, is suggested 
both by a realistic analysis of the processes that produce executive 
pay and by an examination of the substantial body of empirical evi-
dence on the subject.  
The dominant approach to the study of executive compensation 
among academics has for some time been what we call “the optimal 
contracting approach.”4 Under this approach, executive compensation 
practices in large, publicly traded companies are viewed as designed 
to minimize the agency costs that exist between senior executives 
(the agents) and shareholders (the principals). The board is viewed as 
                                                                                                                           
1 The median compensation of S&P 500 CEOs increased by approximately 150 percent from 
1992 to 1998, and option-based compensation provided the largest share of the gains. See Tod Perry and 
Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?, 
35 Wake Forest L Rev 123, 145 (2000).  
2 Recent surveys of this voluminous literature include Perry and Zenner, 35 Wake Forest L Rev 
123 (cited in note 1); John M. Abowd and David S. Kaplan, Executive Compensation: Six Questions that 
Need Answering, 13 J Econ Perspectives 145 (1999); and Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 
Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds, Handbook of Labor Economics 2485 (Elsevier 1999). A note-
worthy survey from an earlier era is Michael C. Jensen and Jerold L. Zimmerman, Management Com-
pensation and the Managerial Labor Market, 7 J Acct & Econ 3 (1985). 
3 See Murphy, Executive Compensation at 2487 (cited in note 2). He demonstrates graphically 
that the increase in academic papers on the subject of CEO pay outpaced the increase in total CEO pay 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
4 This is the leading view among financial economists, who have done most of the scholarship in 
this area. Indeed, as we discuss later in the Article, there is a large body of work in financial economics 
that seeks to come up with an explanation, within an optimal contracting framework, for almost every 
feature of the executive compensation landscape. The optimal contracting view is also taken by an im-
portant line of legal scholarship. See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and In-
vestors’ Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 Del J Corp L 540 (1984); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate 
Governance Movement, 35 Vand L Rev 1259 (1982); Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate Law, 
34 U Miami L Rev 959 (1980); Robert Thomas, Is Corporate Executive Compensation Excessive?, in 
M. Bruce Johnson, ed, The Attack on Corporate America 276 (McGraw Hill 1978). 
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seeking to maximize shareholder value, with the compensation 
scheme being designed to serve this objective. Financial economists, 
both theorists and empiricists, have largely worked within this model 
in attempting to explain the various features of executive compensa-
tion arrangements as well as the cross-sectional variation in compen-
sation practices among firms. 
We seek to contrast this optimal contracting approach to the 
study of executive compensation with an approach that we label “the 
managerial power approach.” Analysis from this perspective focuses 
on the ability of executives to influence their own compensation 
schemes. According to the considered approach, compensation ar-
rangements approved by boards often deviate from optimal contract-
ing because directors are captured or subject to influence by man-
agement, sympathetic to management, or simply ineffectual in over-
seeing compensation. As a result of such deviations from optimal 
contracting, executives can receive pay in excess of the level that 
would be optimal for shareholders; this excess pay constitutes rents.5 
More importantly, to camouflage or facilitate the extraction of rents, 
managerial power can lead to the use of inefficient pay structures that 
weaken or distort incentives and that thus, in turn, further reduce 
shareholder value. Although recognition of the role of managerial 
power lies at the heart of much of the public criticism of compensa-
tion levels and practices, this role has attracted relatively little atten-
tion and analysis in the academic literature.6 
                                                                                                                           
5 Executives can extract rents in ways other than through their executive compensation arrange-
ments. See, for example, Lucian A. Bebchuk and Christine Jolls, Managerial Value Diversion and 
Shareholder Wealth, 15 J L, Econ, & Org 487, 487–90 (1999) (analyzing the costs of permitting manag-
ers to extract value other than through their formal compensation arrangements); Jesse M. Fried, Reduc-
ing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S Cal L Rev 303, 
348–64 (1998) (explaining how corporate insiders continue to be able under existing rules to make prof-
its from trading on inside information); Jesse M. Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Re-
purchase Tender Offers, 67 U Chi L Rev 421, 453–70 (2000) (showing that managers are likely to use 
repurchase tender offers to engage in insider trading). It would be possible, of course, to define compen-
sation schemes as including benefits that managers obtain in any way as a result of their position, in-
cluding benefits from insider trading, the taking of corporate opportunities, and so forth. In this Article, 
however, our focus is solely on the benefits that executives get and the rents they extract from arrange-
ments that are formally defined and ordinarily viewed as compensation.  
6 Many practitioners, investors, shareholder activists, and media commentators have expressed 
views that are close to the view we put forward more systematically in this work. See, for example, 
Graef S. Crystal, In Search of Excess (Norton 1991); Shawn Tully, Raising the Bar, Fortune 272 (June 8, 
1998) (reporting some of Warren Buffett’s views on executive compensation); Robert A.G. Monks and 
Nell Minow, Corporate Governance, 221–25 (2d ed Blackwell Business 2001).  
Although academics commonly hold what we have called the “optimal contracting” view, see note 
4, there is some academic work that is close in spirit to ours. A number of legal scholars have been skep-
tical about claims that executive compensation arrangements are designed to maximize shareholder 
value. See, for example, Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to 
Controlling Executive Pay, 68 Ind L J 59 (1992); Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Com-
pensation and a Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L Rev 201 (1996); Detlev Vagts, Chal-
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Although the managerial power approach is conceptually quite 
different from the optimal contracting approach, the former is not 
proposed as a complete replacement for the latter. One can take the 
view that compensation arrangements are shaped both by managerial 
power and by what would be optimal. The managerial power ap-
proach merely implies that compensation practices cannot be ade-
quately explained by optimal contracting alone. Rather, practices 
might be adopted that deviate significantly from those suggested by 
optimal contracting. Under the managerial power approach, compen-
sation practices can be fully understood only with careful attention to 
the role of managerial power.  
Our analysis indicates that managerial power and rent extraction 
are indeed likely to play a significant role in executive compensation 
in the United States. At the level of theory, we argue that a realistic 
analysis of the compensation-setting process indicates that its out-
comes are likely to be much influenced by managerial power and by 
managers’ interest in extracting rents. As an empirical matter, we ar-
gue that the extensive empirical evidence on executive compensation 
is consistent with the predictions of the managerial power approach. 
Indeed, this approach can better explain certain significant features of 
the executive compensation landscape, including ones that have been 
long regarded as puzzling. 
Part I begins by providing an account of the standard optimal 
contracting approach, and it then provides a detailed analysis of the 
limitations and shortcomings of this approach. Optimal compensation 
contracts could result from effective arm’s length bargaining between 
the board and the executives, from market constraints that induce 
players to adopt such contracts even in the absence of arm’s length 
bargaining, or from shareholders’ ability to directly shape executive 
compensation arrangements. Our analysis indicates that none of these 
forces can be expected to constrain executive compensation effec-
tively. Bargaining with the board is in fact far from arm’s length. 
Market forces are not sufficiently strong and fine-tuned to eliminate 
substantial deviations from optimal contracting. And shareholders 
have little practical ability to prevent such deviations.  
                                                                                                                           
lenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J Corp L 231 (1983); Carl T. Bo-
gus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate Democracy, 41 Buff L Rev 1 
(1993); Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions—Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for Perform-
ance, 75 Notre Dame L Rev 271 (1999). And several empirical papers by financial economists have re-
cently suggested that some of their findings are consistent with, or indicative of, “appropriation” or 
“skimming” by executives. Part III discusses such studies by Bertrand and Mullainathan; Benz, Kucher, 
and Stutzer; Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer; and Yermack. No work, however, has thus far 
attempted to put forward a full account of a managerial power approach—including both a theoretical 
framework for such an approach and an examination using this approach of the large body of empirical 
evidence on executive compensation—as we aim to do in this Article.  
756 The University of Chicago Law Review [69:751 
After analyzing the shortcomings of the optimal contracting ap-
proach, we turn in Part II to providing an account of the managerial 
power approach. The very reasons for questioning optimal contract-
ing’s ability to explain adequately compensation practices also sug-
gest that executives will have substantial influence over their own 
pay. These reasons also suggest that the greater managers’ power, the 
greater their ability to influence pay and to extract rents.  
One important building block of the managerial power approach 
is that of “outrage” costs and constraints. That executives can exert 
influence on their pay does not imply that there are no constraints on 
their ability to do so. Although the need for board approval and the 
presence of market forces cannot be expected to produce compensa-
tion arrangements consistent with optimal contracting, they can and 
commonly do provide some constraints. The tightness of these con-
straints depends, in part, on the outrage that a particular compensa-
tion arrangement is expected to generate. Outrage can be costly to di-
rectors and managers by causing embarrassment or reputational 
harm, as well as by reducing the willingness of shareholders to sup-
port incumbents in control contests. The more outrage a compensa-
tion arrangement is expected to generate, the more reluctant directors 
will be to approve the arrangement, and the more hesitant managers 
will be to propose it in the first instance. Thus, whether a compensa-
tion arrangement that is favorable to executives but suboptimal for 
shareholders is adopted will depend on how the arrangement is per-
ceived by outsiders and, in particular, on how much outrage (if any) it 
is expected to produce.  
The potential significance of outrage costs explains the impor-
tance of “camouflage,” yet another building block of the managerial 
power approach. Because outrage resulting from outsiders’ recogni-
tion of the presence of rent extraction provides a possible check on 
managers’ power to extract rent, managers have an incentive to ob-
scure and legitimize—or, more generally, to camouflage—their ex-
traction of rents. Indeed, the extensive use of compensation consult-
ants, which might be viewed as an attempt to optimize incentives un-
der the optimal contracting approach, can itself be seen as a means of 
justifying and legitimizing pay under the managerial power approach. 
This concept of camouflage will turn out to be quite useful in ex-
plaining many of the patterns and puzzles provided by the executive 
compensation landscape.  
The desire to camouflage might lead to the adoption of ineffi-
cient compensation structures that, compared with optimal contract-
ing arrangements, fail to provide desirable incentives, or even supply 
perverse incentives. In our view, the reduction in shareholder value 
caused by these inefficiencies, rather than the excess rent captured by 
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managers, might well be the biggest cost arising from the influence 
of managerial power on compensation practices. Thus, improvement 
in this area may provide considerable benefits to shareholders from 
better managerial incentives and performance.  
Part III identifies and discusses a significant number of compen-
sation practices and patterns that can be explained by the managerial 
power approach and that suggest that managerial power influences 
pay. Some of the practices and features that we analyze in this Part 
are ones that have long been regarded as puzzles by researchers 
working within the optimal contracting approach.  
We first turn to firms’ failure to use option schemes that filter out 
stock price rises that are due largely to industry and general market 
trends and thus are unrelated to the managers’ performance. Such fil-
tering could be done by using what we call “reduced-windfall” op-
tions—options designed to reduce executives’ ability to make gains 
unrelated to their managerial performance. Such options could be de-
signed using indexing, benchmarking, or some other feature that has 
a similar effect.  
When option compensation is based on changes in the absolute 
share price, even poorly performing managers might make significant 
profits. The substantial compensation dollars that are currently spent 
on rewarding managers for general market rises could be either used 
to enhance incentives (by, for example, giving managers a larger 
number of reduced-windfall options) or saved. As we show, the al-
most complete absence of any form of reduced-windfall options is 
rather difficult to explain from an optimal contracting approach. We 
explore a number of alternative ways to filter out general market and 
sector rises, and we show how unlikely it is that not using any form 
of filtering is generally optimal.  
The absence of any filtering of general market or industry effects 
is not puzzling, however, under the managerial power approach. Un-
der this approach, compensation schemes are designed with an eye to 
benefiting executives while reducing outrage costs by staying within 
the range of legitimacy and acceptability. Given that the use of con-
ventional options is well established and generally considered a le-
gitimate form of compensation, and that indexing or benchmarking is 
likely to be costly or inconvenient for managers, the lack of any real 
movement toward reduced-windfall options is consistent with the 
managerial power approach.  
Part III next considers the nearly uniform use of at-the-money 
options. An optimally designed option scheme would seek to provide 
risk-averse managers with the strongest cost-effective incentives to 
exert effort and make value-maximizing decisions. The optimal exer-
cise price under such a scheme should depend on a multitude of fac-
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tors that are likely to vary from executive to executive, from com-
pany to company, and from time to time. Such factors might include 
the degree of managerial risk aversion (which in turn might be af-
fected by the manager’s age and wealth), the project choices avail-
able to the company, the volatility of the company’s stock, the ex-
pected rate of inflation, and the length of the executive’s contract, 
among other things. There is no reason to expect that the same exer-
cise price formula would be optimal for all executives at all firms in 
all industries at all times. The fact that options are almost uniformly 
issued at-the-money is thus rather difficult to explain from an optimal 
contracting perspective.  
The uniform use of at-the-money options is not puzzling, how-
ever, when examined under the managerial power approach. Given 
that executives benefit from lower exercise prices, there will be a de-
sire to push exercise prices as far down as is possible without gener-
ating too much outrage. There is thus little reason for designers of 
plans to award out-of-the-money options—that is, to raise the exer-
cise prices above the market price at the time the options are issued—
given that some justification is available for at-the-money options. 
On the other hand, in-the-money options might be regarded as a 
windfall and thereby generate outrage costs. Furthermore, the grant 
of in-the-money options would trigger a charge to accounting earn-
ings, and this might undermine one of the excuses for not using re-
duced-windfall options—that the use of such options would give rise 
to an accounting charge. Because in-the-money options might thus be 
difficult or costly for managers to obtain, and at-the-money options 
are the ones most favorable to managers within the remaining range 
of possibilities, a uniform use of at-the-money options is quite con-
sistent with the managerial power approach.  
Another problem for the optimal contracting approach—and one 
that has been little noticed by researchers despite its importance— 
concerns managers’ widespread freedom to undo the financial incen-
tives provided to them by their compensation arrangements. Under 
optimal contracting, when value is spent on providing managers with 
incentives, it might well be desirable to place substantial limits on 
managers’ freedom to unwind them. But existing practice fails to do 
so.  
Stock options generally vest only after a specified period, which 
ensures that the executive cannot walk out with the underlying shares 
without first serving the company for the specified period. Although 
an executive becomes entitled to the awarded options once their vest-
ing period is over, the compensation contract could preclude the ex-
ecutive from “cashing out” the vested options—that is, from exercis-
ing the options and then selling the acquired shares. Such a limitation 
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would maintain incentives for an additional period and thus avoid the 
need to grant new options to replace the ones that have been cashed 
out. There is no reason to expect that optimal contracts would gener-
ally make the vesting date and the cash-out date the same. Yet, the 
two dates are almost always the same.  
An optimal contract also might prohibit managers receiving an 
option grant from weakening (if not eliminating) the incentive effects 
of the option grant by selling an equivalent number of shares they al-
ready own. Standard practice fails to do so, however, and executives 
receiving new options often respond by heavily selling already-
owned shares. Contracts generally also do not prohibit executives 
from hedging vested or even unvested options, and executives often 
hedge their exposure to the firm when disposal is either not possible 
or too costly from a tax perspective.  
Furthermore, even if it were optimal in some cases to grant an 
executive broad freedom to cash out and unwind incentives in order 
to serve the executive’s liquidity or diversification needs, there would 
be little reason to give the executive unrestricted control over the tim-
ing of stock sales. Liquidity and diversification needs hardly call for 
permitting the executive to cash out positions on any given day that 
the executive chooses. Although some firms use “trading windows,” 
many firms place no limits on the freedom of executives to time the 
cashing out or hedging of their equity positions. The evidence indi-
cates that executives’ freedom to engage in such timing, coupled with 
inside information, enables executives to make substantial trading 
profits (at the expense of public shareholders).  
The lack of restrictions on the amount and timing of stock sell-
ing, while difficult to explain from an optimal contracting perspec-
tive, is easily explained under the managerial power approach. Under 
this approach, the design of compensation plans is partly influenced 
by managerial power. Avoiding such restrictions on unwinding bene-
fits managers and does so in a way that thus far has been largely un-
der the radar screen. 
Part III also examines the phenomena of option repricing and re-
loadable options. Repricing refers to the lowering of the options’ 
strike price when the stock price falls below the original exercise 
price. The possibility that the exercise price will be lowered ex post if 
the stock price declines dilutes ex ante incentives. To be sure, such 
downward repricing can, in theory, be useful for retaining and pro-
viding incentives to good managers when the stock price falls for 
reasons beyond managers’ control. However, indexing would also 
solve the incentive problem that arises when the market price falls 
much below the exercise price of the options due to a general market 
or sector decline. The lack of indexing on the upside and the use of 
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repricing on the downside ensures that managers receive both the full 
value of stock price increases that are due to market or sector rises 
and protection against market and sector declines on the downside.  
Reloadable option plans are plans under which an executive who 
exercises options pays the exercise price by handing over firm shares 
that he already owns, and receives a new option for each share ten-
dered with the same expiration date as the old options being exer-
cised. These plans allow executives to profit from share price volatil-
ity even if the long-term share performance is flat. The only possible 
justification that can be given for reloadable options is that—given 
executives’ freedom to unwind incentives—it might be desirable to 
have a mechanism that will replenish those incentives. But this prob-
lem could have been, of course, more easily and effectively ad-
dressed by placing limits on executives’ freedom to unwind incen-
tives. The puzzling combination of freedom to unwind incentives and 
reloading options aimed to correct it, we argue, can best be explained 
under the managerial power approach. 
Another significant practice examined by Part III is that of “gra-
tuitous” acquisition-related payments. CEOs of acquired firms in 
many cases receive payments from their firm or the acquiring firm 
that are “gratuitous” in that they are not required under the terms of 
the CEO’s compensation contract (including the golden parachute, if 
any). These payments take a number of different forms, including in-
creases in the contractual golden parachute payout and separate cash 
payments. Such gratuitous payments, we show, are much more diffi-
cult to explain under the optimal contracting approach than under the 
managerial power approach.  
Finally, and importantly, we show in Part III that the managerial 
power approach can help explain cross-company as well as cross-
country differences in executive pay. The managerial power approach 
predicts that managers will be paid more in firms in which they have 
relatively more power. This prediction, we show, is confirmed by 
empirical studies. Surveying the empirical literature on CEO com-
pensation in the U.S., we find that pay is higher in firms where the 
CEO is more powerful vis-à-vis the board, in firms with antitakeover 
provisions that protect incumbents from hostile takeovers, in firms 
with a smaller institutional investor presence, and in firms where 
there is no large outside shareholder. We also explain how the mana-
gerial power approach can shed light on differences in pay between 
U.S. and non-U.S. companies. 
The conclusion that managerial power and rent extraction play a 
significant role in executive compensation has important implications 
for the study, regulation, and practice of corporate governance. We 
plan to explore fully these implications in subsequent work. Here, 
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however, we focus on a prior and important step: to put forward a 
systematic framework for the study of this subject and, furthermore, 
to show that the evidence supports the view that managerial power 
and rent extraction play an important role in executive compensation. 
I.  THE OPTIMAL CONTRACTING APPROACH AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
Our analysis focuses on public companies that lack a controlling 
shareholder. Managers of these companies have substantial power 
and discretion but generally own only a small fraction of the firm’s 
equity.7 The interests of the shareholder-principals and manager-
agents are not perfectly convergent, and thus there exists an agency 
problem. The two approaches to the study of executive compensation 
that we discuss both start with the recognition that there is an agency 
problem, but they take that recognition in different directions. This 
Part discusses the approach that is more conventional among aca-
demics: that executive compensation arrangements can generally best 
be understood as instruments that the board uses in the shareholders’ 
interest to address the agency problem.  
Part I.A describes the optimal contracting approach to executive 
compensation. In Part I.B, we discuss the limitations and shortcom-
ings of this approach. An optimal principal-agent contract would 
generally be chosen if (i) the board were bargaining with the execu-
tives at arm’s length; (ii) the directors or executives were constrained 
by market forces from deviating from optimal compensation con-
tracts; or (iii) shareholders could use the courts or another mechanism 
to force managers to adopt compensation contracts that maximize 
shareholder value. We argue in Part I.B that none of these proposi-
tions commonly holds, and thus there are reasons to doubt whether 
the optimal contracting approach can fully or even largely explain the 
executive compensation landscape.  
A. The Optimal Contracting Approach 
There is no contract that would perfectly align the interests of 
managers and shareholders. The optimal contract is therefore the one 
that minimizes agency costs (that is, the sum of contracting costs, 
monitoring costs, other costs incurred in achieving a certain level of 
compliance with the principal’s interest) and the costs of the residual 
divergence.8 Under the optimal contracting approach, this is exactly 
                                                                                                                           
7 In 1996, for example, CEOs of S&P 500 manufacturing companies owned an average of fewer 
than 1 percent of their firms’ shares, while median ownership was only 0.11 percent. See Murphy, Ex-
ecutive Compensation at 2490–93 (cited in note 2).  
8 A thorough review of the optimal contracting literature is beyond the scope of this Article. Im-
portant works on the subject include Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s 
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what executive compensation packages are designed to do. The 
board, attempting to maximize shareholder wealth, seeks to establish 
optimal incentives for the executives. This approach is captured in 
various formal models that view the board of directors as selecting an 
optimal compensation program for shareholders. As we will discuss, 
a great deal of empirical work has been done from this perspective. 
The designer attempting to optimize an executive compensation 
program would be concerned with: (1) attracting and retaining high 
quality executives, (2) providing executives with incentives to exert 
sufficient effort and to make decisions that serve shareholders’  inter-
ests, and (3) minimizing overall costs. We will consider briefly these 
elements of an optimal contract. 
1. Inducing the executive to take and retain the position. 
A successful CEO of a large public company undoubtedly pos-
sesses a rare combination of skills and instincts. The CEO must man-
age an organization with a large number of employees, provide the 
strategic direction for the firm, and decide when or whether the com-
pany should acquire other firms or be acquired. Individuals who pos-
sess the necessary attributes might be scarce9 and competition among 
firms, particularly for rising stars, might be intense. Of course, com-
pensation is not the only factor in attracting and retaining talent at the 
very top of the corporate pyramid, but it is an important one.  
To induce an executive to take and retain a position, then, a firm 
must offer an overall package of benefits that meets or exceeds the 
executive’s opportunity cost. Call this opportunity cost the execu-
tive’s “reservation value.” An executive’s reservation value is in part 
a function of her appetite for risk. A firm that requires a risk-averse 
executive to accept risky elements of compensation will have to pro-
vide more total compensation on an expected value basis to offset 
risk-bearing costs. For example, if a CEO candidate currently works 
for a firm that pays her a cash salary of $500,000, another firm wish-
ing to hire her and pay her in part with options will have to provide 
                                                                                                                           
Problem, 63 Am Econ Rev 134 (1973); J.A. Mirrlees, The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority 
within an Organization, 7 Bell J Econ 105 (1976); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 
10 Bell J Econ 74 (1979); Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Rela-
tionship, 10 Bell J Econ 55 (1979); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 Bell J Econ 324 
(1982); Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, 51 
Econometrica 7 (1983); and Dilip Mookherjee, Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents, 51 Rev 
Econ Stud 433 (1984).  
9 See Charles P. Himmelberg and R.G. Hubbard, Incentive Pay and the Market for CEO’s: An 
Analysis of Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity at 20, working paper (1999), available online at 
<http//:www.columbia.edu/~cph15/> (visited May 4, 2002) (arguing that there is not an unlimited sup-
ply of CEOs who are able to run large companies). 
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her—if she is risk-averse—compensation with an expected value 
greater than $500,000.  
Under the optimal contracting approach, inducing the executive 
to take and retain a position only provides a lower bound on compen-
sation. A firm cannot pay less than the executive’s reservation value, 
but it might wish to pay more in order to provide better incentives. 
2. Incentives to manage well.  
There are two dimensions to the executive incentive problem. A 
firm must provide incentives that induce the executive to expend ef-
fort as well as incentives that motivate the executive to make deci-
sions that advance shareholders’ interests. 
As in any agency relationship, there is the risk that the agent will 
expend too little effort on the principal’s behalf. That is, executives 
might have an incentive to work less than is optimal for shareholders 
as a group. This distortion arises because executives enjoy all of the 
benefits of their leisure time (or other non-work activities) but cap-
ture only a fraction of the value their work generates for the firm.  
The second agency problem in most public companies is that ex-
ecutives might make decisions that maximize their own utility but 
that fail to maximize shareholder value. Such decisions might include 
the erection of lavish office buildings to house corporate staff or 
other excessive perquisite consumption; the selection of low-risk 
business strategies; attempts to block value-adding takeover attempts; 
the failure to reorganize and reduce the scope of operations when 
downsizing is called for; and the refusal to fire an incompetent sub-
ordinate because he is a close friend. The variety of critical decisions 
that may be faced by a CEO is extremely large, and the compensation 
device that properly aligns incentives in one case may be less effec-
tive in another. Moreover, the nature of the key decisions in the com-
ing years often will be unforeseeable, thus complicating further the 
design of the optimal compensation plan.  
3. Costs.  
The executive’s reservation value places a lower bound on the value 
of a compensation package and thus its cost to the company. But a 
firm may wish to pay executives much more than their reservation 
value to create incentives for behavior that increases shareholder 
value. Under the optimal contracting approach, shareholders should 
continue to give value to executives until the incremental cost of do-
ing so outweighs the incremental benefit of the incentives produced. 
A compensation plan designer attempting to maximize shareholder 
value would consider alternative structures both in terms of their in-
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centive benefits and their costs to the company. No scheme would be 
chosen, of course, if an alternative scheme could produce the same or 
better incentives at a lower cost to the company. 
B. The Limitations of the Optimal Contracting Approach 
There are three mechanisms that might produce executive com-
pensation programs that are optimal for shareholders: (1) the board, 
acting at arm’s length, selects the compensation arrangement that 
maximizes shareholder value; (2) although the board acts under the 
influence of management, executives are constrained by market 
forces to select the compensation arrangement that best serves share-
holder interests; or (3) shareholders can use their rights under corpo-
rate law to block pay arrangements that are not optimal for share-
holders, which forces executives to adopt arrangements that maxi-
mize shareholder value. Below we analyze in turn each of these 
mechanisms and show that they are unlikely to be sufficiently power-
ful to ensure that compensation arrangements closely follow the 
model suggested by optimal contracting. Before proceeding, it is 
worth stressing that our view is not that these mechanisms are useless 
in constraining executive compensation. As will be explained, these 
mechanisms, particularly the board of directors and market forces, do 
impose some constraints on executive compensation. However, these 
mechanisms are generally not strong enough to prevent large devia-
tions from optimal contracting in directions that favor managers’ in-
terests.  
1. Limitations of the arm’s length model of boards. 
The optimal contracting literature assumes explicitly or implic-
itly that, in setting executives’ compensation, directors take an adver-
sarial (or at least independent) position vis-à-vis the executives. It is 
acknowledged that management plays a role in supplying data and 
proposals. However, the board is viewed as serving shareholder in-
terests exclusively in this process and bargaining with management in 
an arm’s length fashion. Although some students of corporate gov-
ernance have recognized the limitations of this view,10 their full force 
has not been generally appreciated in the literature on executive 
compensation.  
In exploring these limitations it will be helpful to begin with a 
brief description of the process of setting executive pay. In a large 
public corporation, the board of directors is responsible for determin-
                                                                                                                           
10 See, for example, Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Vil-
lage?, 95 Harv L Rev 597 (1982).  
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ing the compensation of the CEO and other top executives. Typically, 
the board will adopt a multi-year compensation program for execu-
tives, including an option plan that provides bounds on the total 
amount of stock-based awards that can be made to senior executives 
and lower-level employees. The option plan might be put to a share-
holder vote and ratified by shareholders.11 Operating within the plan, 
however, the board has full authority to fix the compensation of any 
given senior executives on a periodic basis.12  
The directors of essentially all large U.S. public companies have 
established compensation committees to which they delegate this re-
sponsibility.13 A compensation committee typically is composed of 
three or four directors.14 In most firms, all or almost all of the direc-
tors serving on the committee are “independent.”15 
Three primary factors have led to the increasing use of compen-
sation committees composed entirely of (at least nominally) inde-
pendent directors. First, investor advocacy organizations have long 
pushed for this improvement in corporate governance.16 Second, the 
tax code now provides corporations with a strong incentive to estab-
lish such committees. Since 1994, CEO and top officer pay in excess 
of $1 million annually per executive has not been deductible by a 
publicly held corporation unless the excess compensation consists of 
options or is based upon the achievement of performance goals that 
have been established by a compensation committee composed solely 
                                                                                                                           
11 Ratification of these option plans is virtually certain. Incumbent managers face a meaningful 
chance of losing a vote only if there is an active proxy contest for control of the board. See Lucian A. 
Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy towards Proxy Contests, 78 Cal L 
Rev 1071, 1074 (1990). The question of ratifying stock-based awards is not sufficiently weighty to in-
duce a challenger to wage a campaign to replace the board. For a discussion of shareholder voting on 
option plans, see Part I.B.3.b.  
12 See Stacey R. Kole, The Complexity of Compensation Contracts, 43 J Fin Econ 79, 101 (1997) 
(finding that shareholder-approved option plans in companies that are larger, more diversified, and more 
research-intensive tend to provide directors greater flexibility). 
13 See Kenneth A. Bertsch, Rachel Leahey, and Hawie Haun, Board Practices (1998): The Struc-
ture and Compensation of Boards of Directors at S&P Super 1500 Companies 19 (Investor Responsibil-
ity Research Center 1998). 
14 See id at 6 (reporting that the average committee size ranged from 3.3 directors among S&P 
Small Cap 600 firms to 4.2 directors among S&P 500 firms). 
15 Bertsch, Leahey, and Haun report that in 1998 the average percentage of independent directors 
on compensation committees ranged from 83.5 percent among S&P Small Cap 600 firms to 91.9 percent 
among S&P 500 firms. See id. Directors are defined in their study as independent if they are not em-
ployed by the firm or “affiliated.” A director is considered “affiliated” if she is a former employee, a 
relative, a representative of a charity that receives contributions from the firm, a service provider, a sup-
plier, a customer, or an interlocking director. 
16 The current Teachers Insurance and Annuities Association/College Retirement Equities Fund 
(“TIAA/CREF”) policy, for example, states that compensation committees should be independent, 
knowledgeable, and willing to use an outside compensation consultant in negotiating CEO compensa-
tion. See Fund Toughens on Executive Pay, Investor Rel Bus (Apr 3, 2000).  
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of independent outside directors.17 Third, the use of an independent 
compensation committee would, in the event of a legal challenge, re-
sult in more deferential review of the compensation program.18 
Despite the nominal independence of most compensation com-
mittees, there are several reasons to be skeptical that the process of 
setting executive compensation approximates the arm’s length ideal. 
The key problem is the pervasive influence of management, particu-
larly the CEO, on all facets of the pay-setting process.19 Below we will 
discuss several reasons to expect large deviations from arm’s length 
outcomes. First, managers influence the appointment of independent 
directors, which in many cases enables them to block the appointment 
of directors who are likely to try to bargain with the managers at arms’ 
length. Secondly, once appointed, independent directors are influ-
enced by board dynamics that make it difficult for them to deal with 
managers in a truly arm’s length way, especially if other directors 
have no interest in confronting the managers over their pay. Finally, 
even if directors were otherwise inclined to challenge managers on the 
issue of executive compensation, they would likely have neither the 
financial incentive nor sufficient information to do so. We will discuss 
each of these problems in turn. 
 a) Management influence over director appointment. Man-
agement’s domination of the compensation process begins with the 
selection of the corporation’s directors, who form the pool of candi-
dates for the compensation committee. Traditionally, the CEO has 
dominated the director nomination process.20 While most boards em-
                                                                                                                           
17 See Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) § 162(m), codified at 26 USC § 162 (Supp 2001). The em-
ployees whose compensation is covered by this rule include the CEO, or individual acting in that capac-
ity, and the four most highly compensated officers other than the CEO, whose compensation must be re-
ported under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 26 CFR § 1.162-27(c)(2) (2002) (defining the 
employees covered under IRC § 162(m)). Non-employee directors who serve as consultants or who oth-
erwise receive direct or indirect remuneration from the firm in a capacity other than as a director do not 
qualify as outside directors for the purposes of Section 162(m). See 26 CFR § 1.162-27(e)(3). 
The enactment of Section 162(m) has appeared to reduce some salaries and salary growth rates and 
increase the sensitivity of pay to performance. See Tod Perry and Marc Zenner, Pay for Performance?: 
Government Regulation and the Structure of Compensation Contracts, 62 J Fin Econ 453–88 (2001).  
18 See Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law § 6.1 at 194 (Little, Brown 1986).  
19 Even the timing of stock option awards may be influenced to favor senior management. Yer-
mack finds that that the timing of CEO option awards tends to precede immediately favorable move-
ments in company stock prices. See David Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and 
Company News Announcements, 52 J Fin 449, 450 (1997). Managers can also release bad news prior to 
the grant date of options in order to reduce the strike price of the options (which is almost always set to 
the grant-date market price). See Keith W. Chauvin and Cathy Shenoy, Stock Price Decreases Prior to 
Executive Stock Option Grants, 7 J Corp Fin: Cont, Gov & Org 53 (2001) (reporting abnormal stock 
price declines during the 10-day period preceding the grant date). 
20 See Brian G.M. Main, et al, The CEO, the Board of Directors, and Executive Compensation: 
Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 11 Indus & Corp Change 293, 302–03 (1995); Brudney, 95 
Harv L Rev at 610 n 39 (cited in note 10); Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, Endoge-
nously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO, 88 Am Econ Rev 96, 97 (1998). 
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ploy a nominating committee, the CEO often formally serves on the 
committee. 21 A 1998 survey found that only 27 percent of S&P 1500 
firms had fully independent nominating committees.22 And even when 
the CEO does not sit on the nominating committee, his influence on 
the nomination process is still generally thought to be considerable.23 
The CEO can use his power and influence to encourage the appoint-
ment -and reappointment of independent directors who are not likely 
to challenge his compensation. 
b) Board dynamics. Most directors believe that their primary re-
sponsibility is to monitor the CEO’s performance and, if necessary, 
fire him and hire a suitable replacement.24 Outside of this unfortunate 
circumstance, however, the directors are expected to support the 
CEO. Those who cannot do so in good faith are expected to step 
down.25 Overall, board meetings and processes are characterized by 
an emphasis on courtesy, politeness, and deference to the CEO.26  
(i) The “support or fire” model. The role of the board of di-
rectors, as it is normally conceived, is to focus on the big picture and 
ensure that the personnel and strategies necessary for the company’s 
success are in place. Although setting executive compensation clearly 
is a board responsibility, scrutinizing the level or form of executive 
compensation proposed by an effective CEO (or his compensation 
consultant) runs counter to the predominant “support or fire” model 
of the board of directors.27 Independent directors are thus likely to be 
                                                                                                                           
For a review of the economic literature on boards of directors, see Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. 
Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic 
Literature at 10–12, NBER Working Paper No 8161 (2001), available online at 
<http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8161.pdf> (visited Apr 27, 2002).  
21 See Anil Shivdasani and David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board 
Members: An Empirical Analysis, 54 J Fin 1829, 1834 (1999) (reporting that 78 percent of 341 publicly 
traded Fortune 500 firms in 1994 had a nominating committee, and that in 33 percent of those firms the 
CEO was a member of the nominating committee).  
22 See Bertsch, Leahey, and Haun, Board Practices at 18 (cited in note 13). In the study, directors 
are classified as employees, affiliated, or independent. A director is deemed affiliated if, as disclosed in 
the proxy statement, he or she is a former employee, a relative of an executive, a representative of a 
charity that receives contributions from the firm, or a designated interlocking director. Id at 9–10.  
23 See Main, 11 Indus & Corp Change at 293, 302–03 (cited in note 20) (suggesting that director 
nominations are “dominated by the CEO”).  
24 See Crystal, In Search of Excess (cited in note 6); Jay W. Lorsch and Elizabeth M. MacIver, 
Pawns or Potentates?: The Reality of America’s Corporate Boards 64 (Harvard Business School 1989). 
25 See Main, 11 Indus & Corp Change at 304 (cited in note 20) (documenting the social pressure 
on directors not to actively challenge the CEO). 
26 See Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal 
Control Systems, 48 J Fin 831, 863 (1993) (noting that the board’s “politeness and courtesy” comes at 
the expense of “truth and frankness”).  
27 There is evidence indicating that boards do in fact sometimes fire poorly performing CEOs. 
See David J. Denis and Diane K. Denis, Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals, 
50 J Fin 1029, 1055 (1995) (finding that forced CEO resignations are rare and that two-thirds of those 
that occur are caused by factors other than board monitoring, such as blockholder pressure or a takeover 
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reluctant to confront an effective CEO regarding the amount of his 
pay and perquisites. This reluctance might stem from a notion that 
their effort and scrutiny are better focused on policy matters, or inde-
pendent directors’ perception that they are not as knowledgeable 
about compensation issues as the management or the compensation 
consultant. 
(ii) Social dynamics. Although the use of a compensation 
committee comprised solely of independent directors mitigates 
somewhat the influence of the CEO on executive compensation, it is 
no panacea. The social dynamics of the board, the members of which 
have been selected in large part by the CEO or with his input,28 play 
an important role in deterring objection to executive compensation 
programs.  
It is well known that individuals working within a group feel 
pressure to placate group members, often at the expense of interests 
that are not directly represented at the table.29 The relationship be-
tween the CEO and the board is also likely to produce additional dy-
namics specific to that particular setting. Main, O’Reilly, and Wade 
have found that directors are influenced by notions of reciprocity, au-
thority, and similarity in their deliberations concerning executive 
compensation.30 Specifically, they find that compensation committee 
chairmen who are appointed after the CEO takes office tend to recip-
rocate by awarding higher CEO compensation.31 They also find a sig-
nificant association between the compensation level of outsiders who 
serve on the compensation committee and CEO pay.32  
                                                                                                                           
attempt); Mark R. Huson, Robert Parrino, and Laura T. Starks, Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and 
CEO Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective, 56 J Fin 2265, 2279 (2001) (finding that 23.4 percent of turn-
overs in large public U.S. firms during the period 1989–1994 were involuntary). Not surprisingly, firms 
with outsider-dominated boards are significantly more likely to remove the CEO on the basis of poor 
stock performance than are firms with insider-dominated boards. See Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Di-
rectors and CEO Turnover, 20 J Fin Econ 431, 453–54 (1988). See also Warren Boeker, Power and 
Managerial Dismissal: Scapegoating at the Top, 37 Admin Sci Q 400 (1992) (finding that the likelihood 
that a poorly performing CEO of semiconductor firm will be replaced decreases as the percentage of in-
side directors increases).  
28 See Main, 11 Indus & Corp Change at 302–03 (cited in note 20) (reporting the CEO domina-
tion of board member selection). 
29 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Compensation of Chief Executive Officers and Directors of Pub-
licly Held Corporations, SE39 ALI-ABA 103, 117–18 (1999). 
30 Main, 11 Indus & Corp Change at 304 (cited in note 20). For other research on small group dy-
namics, see generally J.S. Coleman, Constructed Organizations: First Principles, 7 J L, Econ, & Org 7 
(1991); R.B. Cialdini, Influence: The New Psychology of Modern Persuasion (Morrow 1993).  
31 Main, 11 Indus & Corp Change at 307–08 (cited in note 20). Similarly, CEO pay tends to be 
higher and the CEO is more likely to have a golden parachute when more of the outside directors have 
been appointed by the CEO.  
32 Id at 319–20; Charles A. O’Reilly, et al, Overpaid CEO’s and Underpaid Managers: Equity 
and Executive Compensation at 24, working paper (1998) (on file with authors). The relative social 
status of the CEO also affects his pay. See Maura A. Belliveau, Charles O’Reilly, and James B. Wade, 
Social Capital at the Top: Effects of Social Similarity and Status on CEO Compensation, 39 Acad Mgmt 
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(iii) Self-serving cognitive dissonance. It has been suggested 
that a CEO benefits when a well-paid CEO of another firm sits on the 
compensation committee.33 If so, this phenomenon could be viewed 
as pure self-interest: by approving high compensation for the evalu-
ated CEO, the outside CEO increases the compensation baseline. Al-
ternatively, it may be seen as a form of cognitive dissonance wherein 
the outside CEO internally justifies his high pay and that of the sub-
ject CEO by viewing the compensation data in the most favorable 
light. In 1998, 25 percent of compensation committee members were 
CEOs, and a number of highly compensated CEOs served on several 
compensation committees.34  
c) Insufficient incentives. CEO control over the board nomina-
tion process and board dynamics militate against effective executive 
compensation oversight by independent directors. Unfortunately, out-
side directors generally lack the economic incentive to overcome 
these forces. The benefits of attempting to curb excessive executive 
compensation are low, while the potential costs are high. 
(i) Economic benefits. Although stock-based compensation 
for outside directors is on the rise—81 percent of S&P 500 firms 
awarded directors stock or options in 199735—the direct benefit to in-
dependent directors of reducing the CEO’s compensation remains in-
significant in almost all cases.36 Even if excessive CEO pay results in 
somewhat higher compensation throughout the managerial ranks, the 
impact is unlikely to be felt by a director who holds options to pur-
chase only a very small fraction of the company’s shares.37 Further, as 
we will discuss below, the incremental compensation cost incurred by 
a company with less than vigilant directors is unlikely to reduce the 
                                                                                                                           
J 1568, 1581–84 (1996) (finding no support for the proposition that social similarity between the CEO 
and the chair of compensation committee increases CEO compensation, but finding that CEOs with rela-
tively high social status versus other CEOs and CEOs with high social status versus chairmen of the 
compensation committees do receive higher compensation). 
33 See Crystal, In Search of Excess at 227 (cited in note 6) (referring to the well-paid 
CEO/director as a “social reference” for the CEO). 
34 Bertsch, Board Practices at 20 (cited in note 13). 
35 Id at 37. 
36 See George P. Baker, et al, Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory, 43 J Fin 593, 
614 (1988) (arguing that directors fail to create proper executive pay arrangements because the directors 
bear a large share of the nonpecuniary costs of creating the arrangements and receive little monetary 
benefit from improved compensation practices).  
37 Independent directors with more substantial equity interests would have more incentive to limit 
executive compensation. See Richard Cyert, et al, Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure, and 
CEO Compensation at 17–20, working paper (1997) (on file with authors) (finding that CEO pay is 
negatively related to the level of equity holdings of compensation committee members). A case for in-
creasing stock grants to independent directors is forcefully presented in Charles M. Elson, Executive 
Over-Compensation—A Board-Based Solution, 34 BC L Rev, 937, 981–83 (1993) (arguing that granting 
stock to outside directors would better align their interests with that of shareholders). 
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stock price sufficiently to spark a hostile takeover attempt and 
threaten the independent directors’ positions on the board.  
(ii) Economic costs. While the benefit to independent direc-
tors of reducing the CEO’s salary is minimal, the cost of trying to do 
so could be considerable. As explained previously, CEOs have sig-
nificant influence on the appointment and reappointment of outside 
directors. This influence makes director compensation activism 
costly in two ways. First, and most importantly, the CEO has an in-
centive to throw an uncooperative director off the board (or not reap-
point the director when his term expires). In many cases, the CEO 
will have the power, through his relationships with other board mem-
bers, to do so. If the director is expelled or his directorship is not re-
newed, the director will lose his compensation38 and other economic 
and noneconomic benefits he gets from his board position, including 
prestige and business and social connections.39 The risk of losing 
one’s directorship as a result of challenging the CEO’s compensation 
must be orders of magnitude greater than the increase in risk of a 
takeover resulting from the CEO’s higher salary.40  
Second, there is likely to be a reputational cost of trying to re-
duce the CEO’s compensation. In particular, other CEOs are unlikely 
to appoint or reappoint to their boards a director with a reputation for 
challenging executive compensation. Thus, attempting to reduce the 
CEO’s compensation might jeopardize not only the director’s salary 
and perks associated with that board position, but also the salary and 
perks associated with membership on other boards. Finally, reducing 
the CEO’s compensation would indirectly hurt the independent direc-
tor if the director is a CEO whose pay is linked broadly to that of 
other CEOs.41  
                                                                                                                           
38 In addition to equity-based compensation, directors usually receive a cash salary. See 
Eisenberg, SE39 ALI-ABA at 132 (cited in note 29) (reporting that the average Fortune 500 director’s 
fee increased from $30,000 in 1980 to $50,000 in 1994). 
39 It is reasonable to think that in many cases a CEO would be able to rally a majority of board 
members to his side to replace the problem director when the director’s term expires. Inside directors 
can be mobilized by the CEO because they are beholden to the CEO. Outside directors may well go 
along with the CEO to protect their own positions, to curry favor with the CEO, who has influence over 
board compensation, or simply to make board meetings less fractious and unpleasant.  
40 A study of the determinants of CEO compensation in Australia finds that CEO compensation is 
decreasing as the amount of equity held by outside directors and increasing as the salary paid outside di-
rectors rises. See Robert Evans and John Evans, The Influence of Non-Executive Director Control and 
Rewards on CEO Remuneration: Australian Evidence at 18–19, working paper (2000), available online 
at <http://www.efmaefm.org/jevans2.pdf> (visited Apr 27, 2002). The first finding suggests that outside 
directors are more likely to curb CEO compensation when the benefits of reducing CEO compensation 
are higher. The second suggests that outside directors are less likely to curb CEO compensation when 
the potential costs (the loss of position and salary) are higher.  
41 See Yermack, 52 J Fin at 461–62 (cited in note 19).  
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(iii) The market for directors. Fama and Jensen have argued 
that independent directors have an incentive to develop reputations as 
experts in decision control, which they can do by safeguarding share-
holder interests.42 Their idea is as follows: Independent directors nor-
mally are CEOs or other decision managers in their primary jobs, and 
the value of their human capital depends on their decision manage-
ment reputation. Effective independent directors signal to the mana-
gerial labor market that they are indeed experts in decision control. 
Thus, Fama and Jensen might argue that—in addition to possibly in-
creasing the value of the director’s options—attempting to reduce 
CEO compensation yields reputational benefits. 
While this mechanism may work in certain cases, we are skepti-
cal about its effect on many, if not most, directors. First, the signal 
provided by independent directorships is likely to be quite noisy, par-
ticularly when the board is large and responsibilities are diffuse. Sec-
ond, and relatedly, the managerial labor market is more likely to fo-
cus on the manager’s performance in his primary role rather than in 
his independent directorships. Third, there are likely to be a consider-
able number of independent directors who are interested less in estab-
lishing reputations as “expert decisionmakers” than in keeping their 
current board seats and perhaps joining other boards. As we noted 
above, CEOs have considerable influence in the choice of independ-
ent directors and will tend to prefer candidates who are unlikely to 
challenge their compensation.43 Thus, for a director aspiring to addi-
tional board positions, the “market” for directors creates incentives 
not to challenge the CEO on the issue of his compensation but rather 
to accommodate the CEO’s wishes. 
Given the process of director selection and retention, board and 
committee processes and dynamics, and the lack of an effective in-
centive structure, it is unlikely that Fama and Jensen’s “decision con-
trol expert” story will result in independent directors engaging in ef-
fective arm’s length bargaining with the CEO over his compensation. 
Indeed, reputation is likely to limit the degree to which the independ-
ent directors are willing to challenge management in this area. 
d) Information disparities. We have just shown that directors, in-
cluding independent directors, are likely to have neither the inclina-
tion nor the incentive to engage in arm’s length bargaining with the 
                                                                                                                           
42 Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J L & Econ 
301, 315 (1983). 
43 To be sure, one could argue that market forces will prevent CEOs from appointing directors 
who are too pliant and instead will force them to appoint directors willing and able to engage in arm’s 
length bargaining with the CEO. This is a variant of the argument that even if the CEO has influence 
over the board, market forces will force the board to negotiate with the CEO at arm’s length. We will 
address this argument shortly. 
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CEO. We now wish to point out that even if directors have the incli-
nation and incentive to negotiate for CEO compensation that maxi-
mizes shareholder value, they will usually lack the information to do 
so effectively.  
The CEO, by way of his personnel department, controls much of 
the information that reaches the committee. TIAA/CREF has recom-
mended that compensation committees be “willing” to employ an in-
dependent compensation consultant,44 but normally the firm (in other 
words, management) employs the consultant that provides the data to 
the committee.45 Even if the consultant’s compensation data are per-
fectly accurate, there is a great deal of flexibility and discretion in-
volved in choosing the companies that are used for comparison, de-
termining the economic scenarios that will be presented to the com-
mittee, and in general deciding what data will be presented and how.46 
Because managers choose which compensation consultants to hire, 
the consultants have a clear incentive to make recommendations fa-
vorable to managers.  
To be sure, the consultant is somewhat constrained by reputa-
tional considerations—she cannot propose a pay package that is ob-
viously excessive. But within the range of flexibility and discretion, 
the consultant has an incentive to provide information in a way that is 
most beneficial to managers. Thus, the information presented and the 
way it is framed will be chosen with an eye toward maximizing man-
agers’ compensation.  
Of course, independent directors are not required to follow the 
compensation consultant’s recommendation. They could attempt to 
solicit other proposals or come up with a package on their own. But 
as a practical matter, independent directors have only limited time 
and resources available to devote to increasingly complex compensa-
tion issues.47 Thus, directors will rely heavily, if not almost exclu-
sively, on the information and proposal provided by the compensa-
tion consultant. 
e) Larger and smaller departures from the arm’s length model. 
We wish to emphasize that the various factors undermining the 
board’s ability to engage in arm’s length bargaining—management 
control over director appointment, board social dynamics, directors’ 
insufficient and distorted economic incentives, and informational bar-
riers—are stronger in some cases and weaker in others. Thus, firms 
                                                                                                                           
44 See Fund Toughens on Executive Pay, Investor Rel Bus (cited in note 16).  
45 See Crystal, In Search of Excess at 229–30 (cited in note 6). 
46 See id. 
47 See Main, 11 Indus & Corp Change at 305 (cited in note 20); Brudney, 95 Harv L Rev at 609 
(cited in note 10); Jensen, 48 J Fin at 863 n 35 (cited in note 26). 
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can differ in the extent to which the compensation-setting process 
deviates from arm’s length bargaining.  
For example, CEO influence over director appointment and the 
strength of the personal relationships between the CEO and board 
members will vary from firm to firm. As a result, some CEOs will 
have more power than others. Nevertheless, in most companies, at 
least some of the factors undermining the board’s willingness and 
ability to engage in arm’s length bargaining over executive compen-
sation are present. Therefore, some departure from optimal contract-
ing is to be expected.  
It is worth noting in this connection the trend among firms in the 
last decade or so to increase the number and power of “independent 
directors.”48 There are data suggesting that outside directors have in-
creasing influence over the composition of board committees49 and 
that they constitute a majority of most board committees, including 
the nominating committee.50 Thus, corporate governance experts have 
concluded that boards have become more effective monitors of CEO 
performance.51 
This trend may have reduced the power of the CEO in certain 
companies. In some companies, directors are more independent from 
the executives and are thus more willing to fire executives when they 
perform particularly poorly. In fact, during the last twenty years CEO 
tenure has declined and CEO terminations have increased52—trends 
that are attributed to boards becoming more independent.53 
                                                                                                                           
48 See, for example, Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship between 
Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus Law 921, 922 (1999). 
49 Korn/Ferry International, Korn/Ferry’s 28th Annual Board of Directors Study Finds CEO, 
Board Evaluations on Upswing, Outsiders Deciding Committee Membership, Compensation Static, 
available online at <http://www.kornferry.com/pr/pr_01_0904_board_evaluations.asp> (visited Apr 14, 
2002) (reporting survey results indicating that the percentage of firms in which the CEO chooses com-
mittee chairs and members has declined from 57 percent in 1996 to 37 percent in 2001). 
50 Korn/Ferry International, 27th Annual Board of Directors Study 2000. See also Anil Shivdasani 
and David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis, 
54 J Fin 1829, 1851 (1999) (reporting that the influence of CEOs over the selection of board members 
has declined). 
51 See, for example, Ira M. Millstein and Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and 
Performance of the Large Publicly-Traded Corporation, 98 Colum L Rev 1283 (1998); Melvin A. 
Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 Colum L Rev 1253, 1268 (1999); Mark J. Loewen-
stein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 Wake Forest L Rev 1, 15 (2000). 
52 Tom Neff, Anatomy of a CEO, Chief Exec 3032 (Feb 1, 2001) (reporting that the median tenure 
of CEOs in office declined from seven years in 1980 to five years in 2000); Denis B.K. Lyons, CEO 
Casualties: A Battlefront Report, Directors & Boards 43 (Summer 1999) (reporting that the percentage 
of Fortune 100 companies whose CEOs have tenure of five years or less has increased from 46 percent 
in 1980 to 58 percent in 1998).  
53 Lyons, CEO Casualties, Directors & Boards at 43 (cited in note 52) (listing “increasingly inde-
pendent boards” as an important factor contributing to the increase in CEO turnover).  
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However, although boards are more likely to fire CEOs who are 
performing particularly poorly, the formulation of executive pay 
packages is not likely to be characterized by arm’s length bargaining 
in the great majority of firms. Even in those firms where a majority 
of the directors are sufficiently “independent” to fire the CEO in the 
event of dismal performance, the directors will generally not have an 
economic incentive and sufficient information to attempt to negotiate 
down the compensation of a CEO who is performing sufficiently well 
not to be fired. Such a CEO is likely to stay in his position for some 
time, and thus could retaliate against a director who sought to limit 
his compensation.  
To be sure, in the future there could be changes of a more fun-
damental nature that bring us closer to an arm’s length model. There 
is good reason to believe, however, that currently negotiations be-
tween executives and the board over executive compensation tend to 
be far from that model.  
2. Limitations on the power of market forces.  
Directors are unlikely to bargain with management over their 
compensation in a manner that approaches the arm’s length ideal. 
However, we must consider whether the CEO and more junior execu-
tives will be induced by market forces not to push for anything other 
than optimal compensation contracts.  
There is an important school of thought in corporate law and fi-
nance scholarship that takes the view that markets for managerial la-
bor, corporate control, capital, and products effectively align manag-
ers’ and shareholders’ interests.54 As one of us has argued in earlier 
work, however, these market mechanisms cannot be relied upon to 
align managers’ and shareholders’ interests with respect to signifi-
cantly redistributive actions—actions by which the managers can 
transfer to themselves value that is substantial relative to the resulting 
loss to shareholders.55 The payment of executive compensation, which 
                                                                                                                           
54 See Easterbrook, 9 Del J Corp L at 543–53 (cited in note 4); Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to 
the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 Nw U L 
Rev 913, 916–20 (1982); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J Polit Econ 
288, 289 (1980). 
55 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Com-
petition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv L Rev 1437, 1461–67 (1992) (arguing that market forces cannot 
ensure that managers’ reincorporation decisions are those that are optimal for shareholders); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter 
Amendments, 102 Harv L Rev 1820, 1840–46 (1989) (arguing that market forces cannot ensure that 
managers’ decisions concerning charter amendments are those that are best for shareholders); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 
Stan L Rev 127, 142–53 (1999) (arguing that market forces cannot ensure that managers and controlling 
shareholders move to whatever ownership structure becomes efficient as legal rules change). 
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approaches a direct transfer from shareholders to management, would 
seem to be an especially clear case of a significantly redistributive 
action for which market forces will provide insufficient discipline. 
We will briefly review the market forces that bear upon managerial 
behavior activity and discuss why they are unlikely to impose signifi-
cant restraints on executive compensation. 
a) Managerial labor markets. Several labor market mechanisms 
tend to align the interests of executives with those of shareholders. 
The most important mechanisms are executives’ compensation plans 
and their equity holdings. The typical CEO’s compensation package 
is composed of a base salary, an annual bonus, stock options and/or 
restricted shares, and often other long-term incentive elements.56 Each 
of these components is sensitive to firm performance to a greater or 
lesser degree. To the extent executives retain the stock acquired by 
exercising their options (or acquired through restricted stock pro-
grams), they will have an additional incentive to generate shareholder 
value.  
Over the past two decades, the increasing use of stock options 
has boosted the sensitivity of the average CEO’s wealth to firm per-
formance by an order of magnitude. However, given the enormous 
size of large U.S. companies, the absolute sensitivity of CEO wealth 
to performance remains small. For a $1000 change in firm value, the 
wealth of the average CEO of a large public corporation currently 
changes by only about $10.57 All else being equal, a CEO who wrote 
himself a check for an extra $1000 would thus net about $990 after 
taking into account the impact of the change in firm value on his 
shares and options.  
To be sure, all else is not equal. Although there appears to be a 
widening gap between the compensation of U.S. CEOs and junior 
executives,58 there is some evidence that when CEOs are overpaid (or 
underpaid), a diminishing echo effect is felt throughout the organiza-
                                                                                                                           
56 See Murphy, Executive Compensation at 2497–2517 (cited in note 2). 
57 Perry and Zenner report that in 1997 the median S&P 1500 CEO stood to gain or lose $11.50 
per $1000 of shareholder gain or loss. See Perry and Zenner, 35 Wake Forest L Rev at 149 (cited in note 
1). Similarly, Hall and Liebman have estimated that 1998 CEO wealth-to-shareholder-value sensitivity 
was approximately $11 per $1000, based on a firm with $1 billion market capitalization. See Brian J. 
Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation at figure 1, NBER Working Pa-
per No 7596 (Mar 2000), available online at <http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7596.pdf> (visited Apr 27, 
2002). These figures exclude an adjustment for risk of dismissal. CEO wealth-to-shareholder-value sen-
sitivity had been lower in the past. Using 1974–1986 data, Jensen and Murphy had calculated a median 
CEO wealth-to-shareholder-value sensitivity of $3.25 per $1000, a figure that included a $0.30 per 
$1000 adjustment for risk of dismissal. See Michael Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and 
Top-Management Incentives, 98 J Polit Econ 225, 261 (1990). 
58 See John M. Abowd and Michael L. Bognanno, International Differences in Executive and 
Managerial Compensation, in R. Freeman and L. Katz, eds, Differences and Changes in Wage Struc-
tures 67, 83 (Chicago 1995). 
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tion.59 Moreover, a large gap between the compensation of the CEO 
and that of his subordinates has been shown to be associated with 
higher rates of managerial turnover.60 Hence, a CEO might also take 
these factors into account before awarding himself a pay raise. Nev-
ertheless, the sensitivity of their wealth to firm value, by itself, would 
dissuade few CEOs from seeking to increase their compensation.  
Of course, compensation is just one element of the managerial 
labor market. Executives are also concerned with the possibilities of 
promotion or being tapped for higher-level positions by other firms. 
However, for the CEO—the person driving the executive compensa-
tion process—internal promotion is, of course, impossible. External 
promotion is always a possibility: she could become the CEO of a 
larger or more prestigious firm. But most CEO positions are filled in-
ternally.61 For the CEO, there are likely to be few other jobs that are 
both available and more desirable than her current one. Not surpris-
ingly, the overwhelming majority of CEOs do not go on to become 
CEOs of other firms.62  
In any event, the ability to get another CEO job will depend on 
the CEO’s overall performance at her current firm, not on the amount 
of rent extracted. Thus, the possibility of being hired for another CEO 
position is unlikely to deter a CEO from extracting rents. Indeed, 
when CEO do get new jobs,63 the initial hiring grants for the new jobs 
are highly correlated with the value of the unvested options and re-
stricted stock the CEOs leave behind.64 Thus, if the prospect of being 
hired elsewhere has any effect on the pay level desired by CEOs, the 
effect will likely be in the direction of increasing this level.  
Executives will also be concerned about the possibility of dis-
missal. But the risk of being fired also depends more upon overall 
performance than on the CEO’s level of compensation. In any event, 
                                                                                                                           
59 See O’Reilly, et al, Overpaid CEO’s at 24 (cited in note 32) (noting that overcompensation of 
the CEO leads to overcompensation in the lower ranks of employees). 
60 See id at 25. Vertical pay inequity within an organization might also be associated with poorer 
product quality. See Douglas M. Cowherd and David I. Levine, Product Quality and Pay Equity be-
tween Lower-Level Employees and Top Management: An Investigation of Distributive Justice Theory, 37 
Admin Sci Q 302, 316 (1992). 
61 See C. Edward Fee and Charles J. Hadlock, Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market for 
CEO Talent at 13, working paper (2001), available online at <http://www.afajof.org/Pdf/ 
meeting/2002/fee_paper.pdf> (visited Apr 27, 2002) (reporting that in a sample of 1200 CEO hires dur-
ing the period 1990–98, 73.5 percent were internal hires). 
62 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 Colum L Rev 1461, 1495 
(1989). 
63 The probability of being hired as CEO for another firm (which is low) is positively related to 
the stock price performance at one’s current firm. See Fee and Hadlock, Raids, Rewards, and Reputa-
tions at 21–25 (cited in note 61). 
64 See id at 36 (finding a positive correlation between forfeited equity positions and a CEO’s new 
compensation package). 
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this risk is small. In their seminal 1990 study, Jensen and Murphy 
calculated that the median CEO suffers an expected dismissal-related 
wealth reduction of $0.30 per $1000 reduction in shareholder value.65 
It seems highly unlikely that the small added threat of dismissal 
would dissuade a CEO from granting himself and perhaps other ex-
ecutives increased compensation. 
b) Market for corporate control. The market for corporate con-
trol is also viewed as a strong force aligning the interests of manage-
ment and shareholders.66 A company whose share price sags should 
become more vulnerable to a hostile takeover, which would likely 
cause the executives to lose their positions, pay, and perquisites.  
The takeover threat, however, is unlikely to discourage managers 
from seeking to boost their compensation. Consider an executive of a 
$10 billion company who contemplates increasing executive com-
pensation by an amount with a present value of $100 million. Obvi-
ously, the direct benefit to the executive is very large. The cost to the 
executive is the enhanced risk of takeover and ouster. However, the 
increase in takeover risk resulting from a 1 percent reduction in firm 
value is bound to be quite limited.67 
Even the commentators who believe most fervently in the disci-
plining force of takeovers admit that control transactions are very 
costly and useful only as a response to substantial performance short-
falls.68 Excessive compensation might be a symptom of more perva-
sive management shortcomings, but the limited evidence available 
does not support the proposition that overcompensation increases 
takeover risk substantially.69  
To be sure, the market for corporate control does impose some 
constraint on increasing compensation. At a certain point, sharehold-
ers might become sufficiently outraged to be willing to support out-
side challengers or bidders in a control contest. The main point, how-
                                                                                                                           
65 See Jensen and Murphy, 98 J Polit Econ at 242 (cited in note 57). 
66 See Easterbrook, 9 Del J Corp L at 564–70 (cited in note 4); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the 
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control transaction. See Easterbrook, 9 Del J Corp L at 567 (cited in note 4). 
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ever, is that management pay could substantially exceed the amount 
that would be consistent with optimal contracting without creating 
much additional risk of a takeover.  
c) Market for additional capital. Another source of market dis-
cipline might arise from the possibility that the firm will need to re-
turn to the market for additional equity capital in order to support ex-
pansion. The prospect of needing to sell shares to the public might 
cause a value-maximizing management team to maintain restraint 
and develop a reputation as conservative self-compensators.  
The failure of managers to limit tightly their pay, however, is 
unlikely to impede the firm’s access to equity capital. Instead, a pat-
tern of excessive self-compensation will raise only slightly a firm’s 
cost of capital. Taking managers’ excessive compensation into ac-
count, future investors will pay something less for the firm’s shares in 
a secondary offering than they would otherwise. Thus, more shares 
would have to be issued to raise a given amount of capital. Of course, 
this effect leads to a reduction in value that is borne by all existing 
shareholders, including the executive team. But again, the impact of 
this reduction in share value on managerial wealth and on the likeli-
hood of ouster via takeover will be considerably less than the direct 
benefit of taking additional compensation. 
d) Product markets. A final potential external constraint on man-
agement behavior is the one created by competition in product mar-
kets. In a competitive market, it is argued, inefficient behavior pro-
duces competitive disadvantage, shrinking profits, and business con-
traction or failure.70 Although this effect may discourage management 
from acting in ways that decrease productivity, the redistribution of 
firm profits from shareholders to executives has no significant effect 
on the operational efficiency of the company, and hence this factor 
will not inhibit excessive compensation.71 
e) Overall force. Even in the aggregate, the foregoing market 
forces are unlikely to impose tight constraints on executive compen-
sation. To be sure, they might impose some constraints and deter 
managers from deviating extremely far from optimal contracting ar-
rangements. The analysis indicates that the incentives for restraint 
provided by the executives’ stock and option holdings outweigh any 
other incentives to restrain pay and that even these direct incentives 
are far from sufficient to induce managerial self-discipline with re-
gard to such a significantly redistributive matter as executive com-
pensation. The conclusion that market forces do not impose tight 
constraints on executive compensation is supported by evidence indi-
                                                                                                                           
70 See Easterbrook, 9 Del J Corp L at 557 (cited in note 4). 
71 See Eisenberg, 89 Colum L Rev at 1489 (cited in note 62). 
2002] Managerial Power and Executive Compensation 779 
cating that non-market factors, including the CEO’s power vis-à-vis 
the board, are important determinants of CEO compensation. 72 
3.  Limitations on the power of shareholders. 
Although neither market forces nor bargaining between the 
board and the CEO is likely to ensure optimal contracting, in theory 
such contracting could arise if shareholders had the power to block 
executive compensation arrangements that they did not believe to be 
optimal. Shareholders have one or two mechanisms at their disposal 
that, in principle, could be used to challenge executive compensation 
arrangements: derivative litigation and, in some cases, the ability to 
vote against employee stock option plans. As we explain below, how-
ever, neither of these mechanisms imposes much of a constraint on 
executive compensation. 
a) Derivative litigation. Even though corporate boards and mar-
ket forces cannot ensure that executive compensation arrangements 
are close to those suggested by optimal contracting, optimal pay ar-
rangements might arise if shareholders could use the courts to throw 
out compensation packages that do not maximize shareholder value. 
In fact, corporate law permits shareholders to challenge a particular 
compensation package under a variety of doctrines. However, the ob-
stacles to the success of such a lawsuit all but ensure that courts 
never review the substantive merits of management compensation ar-
rangements. Thus, as a practical matter, judicial review fails to im-
pose any constraint on executive pay.73 
To overturn a board’s decision to grant a particular pay package, 
shareholders would be required to show that the board had violated 
its duty of care, committed “waste,” or breached its duty of loyalty. 
As we will explain, it is all but impossible to prove any of these vio-
lations. Before describing each of these legal standards, however, it 
will be useful to examine the procedural barriers that make it ex-
tremely unlikely that shareholders will even get to the stage where 
such claims are heard.74  
Excessive compensation does not hurt shareholders directly, but 
rather indirectly through their equity interests in the firm. Thus, 
shareholders cannot sue the board directly for claims relating to ex-
ecutive pay. To challenge board decisions involving executive com-
                                                                                                                           
72 See, for example, John E. Core, et al, Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compen-
sation, and Firm Performance, 51 J Fin Econ 371, 388 (1999). This evidence that executive pay is af-
fected by executive power is presented and discussed in detail in Part III.G. 
73 See Barris, 68 Ind L J at 82 (cited in note 6) (reporting that in almost all cases since 1900 in-
volving publicly traded firms, courts have refused to overturn board compensation decisions).  
74 This discussion of derivative litigation focuses primarily on the corporate law of Delaware, the 
state in which the most large publicly traded firms are incorporated. 
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pensation, shareholders generally must file a derivative suit—a suit 
brought on behalf of the corporation—that alleges that the corpora-
tion has been hurt by the board’s decision (in this case, to grant ex-
cessive pay to management).  
Because shareholders generally do not make decisions on behalf 
of the corporation—the board is charged with making such decisions 
—the courts severely restrict shareholders’ ability to proceed with a 
derivative suit. The most important procedural restriction is the “de-
mand requirement.” Under this requirement, shareholders first must 
“make demand” on the board to investigate the problem and take 
whatever steps are necessary to correct it. If there is a failure to make 
demand, the board can usually have the case dismissed.75 An excep-
tion is made, however, when shareholders can show that such a de-
mand would be “futile.”  
If the shareholders make demand on the board to pursue the liti-
gation (which, as the reader should recall, is against one or more 
members of the board itself), the board will take control over the 
lawsuit.76 The board will then almost always seek to dismiss the suit.77 
If the board appears to have acted independently, and to have con-
ducted a reasonable investigation of the allegations, the court will re-
spect the board’s decision to terminate the litigation and allow dis-
missal, ending the legal challenge to the board’s compensation deci-
sion. Because demand almost always leads to the termination of the 
lawsuit, shareholders must claim that demand on the board is futile.  
Establishing demand futility requires the plaintiff to offer “par-
ticularized facts” that create a reasonable doubt that (1) the directors 
are disinterested and independent and (2) the board’s decision (ap-
proval of the compensation package) is not otherwise protected by 
the “business judgment rule”—the doctrine that shelters almost all 
board decisions from review. Creating a reasonable doubt about ei-
ther can be difficult for shareholders to accomplish early in the litiga-
tion, especially because the plaintiff has not had the opportunity to 
conduct discovery.78  
Consider the first approach: creating a reasonable doubt as to the 
independence of the board. To create such a doubt, one would gener-
ally need to show that the directors on the board have a direct finan-
cial interest in the compensation decision, or that they are beholden 
                                                                                                                           
75 See Randall S. Thomas and Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Ex-
ercise in Futility?, Wash U L Q 569, 579 (2001).  
76 See id at 576 & n 33.  
77 See id at 576. The failure of the board to deal with the demand in good faith or to conduct a 
reasonable investigation could constitute a wrongful refusal of demand, giving control over the litigation 
back to the shareholders. See id at 576–77. 
78 See id at 577.  
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to the controlling person through personal or other relationships.79 
Thus, by staffing the compensation committee with nominally inde-
pendent directors, firms can make it practically impossible for share-
holders to satisfy the demand-futility requirement by creating a rea-
sonable doubt as to the independence of the board.80  
The second approach to establishing demand futility—creating a 
reasonable doubt that the board’s decision is protected by the busi-
ness judgment rule—requires the plaintiff to allege facts indicating 
that the board failed to fulfill either its “procedural due care” or its 
“substantive due care” duties. A board fails to fulfill its “procedural 
due care” duties by being uninformed.81 A board fails to fulfill its 
“substantive due care” duties by making an irrational decision and 
thereby committing “waste” or by making a “gift” unsupported by 
any consideration.82 However, the board can easily fulfill both types 
of duties. The board can satisfy its procedural duties by reading some 
materials and asking some questions. Similarly, the board can easily 
meet its substantive due process duties by coming up with a justifica-
tion for the executives’ salary. Support can be marshaled for even the 
most patently unreasonable plans.83  
If shareholders were to satisfy the demand futility requirement—
either by showing that the board was not independent or that the 
board likely violated its duty of care—they might still face additional 
obstacles before they could get to trial. To begin, the board can ap-
point a “special litigation committee” of independent directors to ad-
vise the board on whether it is in the best interest of the firm to ter-
minate the litigation. If the committee recommends dismissal, and the 
firm asks the court to dismiss the litigation, the court might well 
oblige. 
In addition to (or after) arguing that the suit should be dismissed 
for failure to make demand or because a special committee recom-
mends dismissal, the board might also move to dismiss the suit for 
failure to state a legally recognized claim. If these fail, the board 
could move to dismiss through a summary judgment motion, arguing 
that the suit should be dismissed because plaintiffs have misinter-
preted the law. And even once these procedural hurdles are over-
                                                                                                                           
79 It is not sufficient to show, for example, that an executive whose pay is being challenged owns 
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473 A2d 805 (Del 1983).  
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82 Id at 262–63. 
83 Consider Loewenstein, 50 SMU L Rev at 214–15 (cited in note 6) (reporting that there have 
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compensation on the theory of gift or waste).  
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come, the shareholders must actually win on the merits at trial and 
survive appeal—both daunting tasks. 
b) Voting on option plans. Shareholders can also attempt to 
shape executive compensation when they vote on stock option plans. 
There are a number of situations in which shareholders might vote on 
an option plan. First, there are situations in which state corporate law 
or stock exchange rules require that shareholders vote on stock option 
plans. Under the corporate laws of some states—including New 
York—shareholders must approve all stock option plans, and under 
the corporate statutes of all states shareholders must approve stock 
option plans whenever the charter must be amended to increase the 
number of authorized shares.84 The stock exchange on which the 
firm’s shares trade might also have rules requiring shareholder ap-
proval of certain kinds of stock option plans.85  
Second, firms that wish to deduct option compensation when an 
executive’s total annual compensation exceeds $1 million must put 
the option plan to shareholder vote. Section 162(m) of the Internal 
Revenue Code disallows deductions of compensation paid to an ex-
ecutive in excess of $1 million per year unless the compensation in 
excess off $1 million is “performance-based.” For an option plan to 
be “performance-based,” it must receive shareholder approval.  
However, even if shareholders were to vote on every stock op-
tion plan, such voting could not produce outcomes equivalent to 
arm’s length bargaining. To begin, the stock option plans on which 
shareholders vote do not specify the design of a particular executive’s 
compensation but rather set out general parameters for the use of 
stock options to compensate employees—such as the total number of 
options that can be issued under the plan. Thus, shareholders cannot 
use the vote to reject or approve a particular executive’s pay package.  
To be sure, shareholders could repeatedly refuse to approve the 
option plan until the CEO’s compensation is acceptable. But the fail-
ure of shareholders to approve a plan is unlikely to make sharehold-
ers better off. The failure would force managers to modify the CEO’s 
compensation and resubmit the option plan for shareholder approval 
at some future time. In the meantime, the absence of any option plan 
and the possibility that shareholders might again vote against the op-
tion plan could easily lead to the departure of good executives who 
wish to be compensated with options.  
                                                                                                                           
84 Even if the corporate statute does not require a shareholder vote, the board of directors gains 
substantial protection from fiduciary duty suits if shareholders approve the stock option plan. See Ran-
dall S. Thomas and Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans, 
35 Wake Forest L Rev 46–51 (2000).  
85 See id at 48. 
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The cost of these departures to shareholders might be quite high 
and perhaps much higher than the gain from reducing the CEO’s 
compensation. Thus, most of the shareholders voting on the plan are 
unlikely to oppose it unless the CEO’s compensation is so high that 
the expected benefit of rejecting the plan exceeds the expected cost 
associated with the personnel instability that might result. In fact, 
shareholders rarely fail to approve these plans. In short, shareholder 
voting on option plans is unlikely to lead to optimal contracting over 
executive compensation.86  
II.  THE MANAGERIAL POWER APPROACH  
This Part puts forward the managerial power approach to execu-
tive compensation. Part II.A explains how managers with power use 
their power to influence the level and structure of their pay, and that 
managers with more power can be expected to do so to a greater ex-
tent. Managers with power are able to extract “rents”—value in ex-
cess of that which they would receive under optimal contracting—
and managers with more power can extract more rents. Part II.B ex-
amines an important element of the managerial power approach—
outrage costs and constraints. Rent extraction might give rise to out-
rage on the part of observers about whose views directors and man-
agers care. This outrage can in turn impose costs on directors and 
managers, thereby discouraging the adoption of some arrangements 
favorable to managers. Part II.C examines another important element 
of the managerial power approach—“camouflage”—managers’ at-
tempts to hide, obscure, and justify various aspects of their compen-
sation in order to reduce outrage.  
Part II.D discusses the role of compensation consultants and how 
they can be used to camouflage rent extraction. Part II.E discusses 
how, even though the use of options might itself be beneficial to 
shareholders, the particular design of option compensation plans 
might deviate from that suggested by optimal contracting, due to 
                                                                                                                           
86 In some cases shareholders offer nonbinding (precatory) resolutions requesting more specific 
limitations on executive compensation. See Brian R. Cheffins and Randall S. Thomas, Should Share-
holders Have a Greater Say over Executive Pay?: Learning from the U.S. Experience, 1 J Corp L Stud 
227–315 (2001). These resolutions have no legal effect and usually attract very few votes. 
One might infer from the failure of these resolutions that institutional shareholders believe there is 
no problem with executive compensation. But this is unlikely to be the right inference. We agree with 
Kahan and Rock that institutions have decided to focus their limited power on certain problems and not 
others. See Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: 
Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U Chi L Rev 871, 898 (2002). The institutions seem to have 
made the judgment that it would be more important for them to address the problems of entrenchment 
and takeover defenses rather than that of executive compensation. This “bargain” might make sense 
given the pragmatic considerations of institutional investors, but it hardly indicates that executive com-
pensation arrangements are optimal.  
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managerial power. Finally, Part II.F considers an alternative explana-
tion for deviations from optimal contracting—that they are caused by 
boards’ tendency to conform to norms; we argue that, although norms 
are likely to play a role in executive compensation practices, they 
cannot by themselves provide a full explanation for the development 
and persistence of arrangements that deviate considerably from what 
would be expected under optimal contracting.  
A. Managerial Power and the Extraction of Rents  
Like the optimal contracting approach, the managerial power 
approach starts with recognition of the shareholder/management 
agency problem. However, under the managerial power approach ex-
ecutive compensation is not seen solely as a remedy to this agency 
problem. Rather, certain features of executive compensation are seen 
as part of the problem itself. Under the optimal contracting approach, 
the board designs compensation arrangements exclusively for the 
purpose of alleviating the agency problem between shareholders and 
executives. In contrast, under the managerial power approach part of 
the agency problem is that executives use their compensation to pro-
vide themselves with rents.  
The managerial power approach picks up with our analysis of 
the limitations of the optimal contracting approach. That analysis in-
dicates that corporate managers have considerable power. Even 
nominally independent directors are often connected to executives by 
bonds of interest, collegiality, or affinity. These directors might rise 
up and displace a particularly poorly performing CEO. However, if 
the CEO is performing adequately, they generally will be inclined to 
defer to and support the CEO’s judgment. Given the considerable in-
fluence of the CEO and the CEO’s management team over the board, 
bargaining over executive compensation does not usually approach 
the arm’s length ideal. Rather, executives frequently use their power 
to increase their compensation, and directors cooperate with man-
agement at least to some extent. 
The excess pay that executives are able to extract because of 
their positional power constitutes rents. Specifically, the amount of 
rents that an executive extracts is the excess of the pay obtained by 
him over what he would have received under a contract that maxi-
mizes shareholder value. Because rent extraction is associated with 
managerial power, the managerial power approach suggests that there 
is a correlation between managerial power and rents. Executives gen-
erally have at least some power and therefore can extract at least 
some rents, but the particular characteristics of a firm, especially its 
ownership and board structure, give its executives more or less 
2002] Managerial Power and Executive Compensation 785 
power. Under the managerial power approach, the greater the CEO’s 
power, the higher the rents will tend to be.  
The power of the CEO will depend in large part on the owner-
ship structure of the firm. The more shares owned by the CEO, the 
greater will be her influence on director elections and her ability to 
thwart or discourage a hostile takeover attempt. The more shares 
owned by unrelated parties, the less will be the CEO’s influence on 
director elections and the more vulnerable the CEO will be to a hos-
tile takeover attempt. Thus, the power of the CEO will tend to in-
crease with the percentage of shares he owns, and will tend to de-
crease with the percentage of shares owned by outside blockholders.  
The CEO’s power will also depend on the organization and 
composition of the board. The CEO’s power will depend on the num-
ber of inside directors and the number of independent directors. Also 
critical is the number of directors over whom the CEO has some kind 
of influence. For example, an independent director might follow a 
CEO’s wishes because he is a longtime friend of the CEO or because 
he is grateful that the CEO has placed him on the board. And because 
a classified board makes a hostile takeover more difficult, a CEO’s 
power will tend to be greater if the board is classified. 
In Part III.G, we discuss the correlation between managerial 
power and rent extraction in more detail, as well as present evidence 
of such a correlation. For now, however, it is worth pointing out that 
this aspect of the managerial power approach can explain much of 
what is observed in the world of executive compensation. 
It is important to emphasize that the cost to the shareholders re-
sulting from the extraction of rents might well be higher than the 
amount of the rents themselves. To the extent that rent extraction in-
volves efficiency costs—due, in particular, to the adoption of ineffi-
cient compensation arrangements—the shareholders’ losses will be 
larger than the rents extracted by managers.  
Although our discussion of power and rent extraction often fo-
cuses on the CEO, we should point out that other officers are also 
likely to receive rents. Although in many companies power is con-
centrated in the hands of the CEO, in some companies power might 
be distributed among two or more officers (say, the CEO and the 
president), each of whom has the power to extract rents. And even 
when the CEO has all of the power, the CEO might use his power not 
only to extract rents for himself, but also to extract rents for high-
ranking members of his management team.87 Our discussion regard-
                                                                                                                           
87 A CEO might provide rents to his management team in order to narrow the gap between his 
compensation and theirs. Narrowing the gap might make the CEO’s rent extraction less noticeable to 
outsiders and thereby reduce “outrage costs,” the subject of the next section. Narrowing the gap might 
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ing rent extraction will refer to the rents captured by the powerful 
CEO and, in certain cases, by other officers as well. 
The managerial power approach is in the spirit of the economics 
literature that focuses on the power certain agents obtain in organiza-
tions and those agents’ ability to use this power to extract rents.88 Un-
fortunately, financial economists working in the particular context of 
executive compensation have largely followed the optimal contract-
ing approach and paid little attention to the role of managerial 
power.89 
B. “Outrage” Costs and Constraints 
The managerial power model does not imply that there are no 
constraints at all on compensation and the rents that executives can 
capture. At some point, even directors who have been appointed by 
the CEO and feel loyal to him will refuse to approve a compensation 
package, or shareholders might seek to replace the CEO. An impor-
tant factor affecting executives’ ability to increase their compensation 
is the amount of “outrage” their proposed pay package would create. 
If an executive’s compensation arrangement goes far beyond what 
could be justified under optimal contracting and is perceived that way 
by outsiders, those outsiders might become angry and upset. If this 
outrage is sufficiently widespread and intense, it limits the extent to 
which compensation can be increased in a number of ways.  
First, outrage can affect the ability of the CEO to get the board’s 
approval of his pay package. We have argued that boards do not, as 
optimal contracting theorists believe, secure compensation arrange-
ments that are as close to optimal as reasonably possible. That is, the 
need to get the board’s consent to executives’ pay packages does not 
produce the same outcome as arm’s length bargaining. However, 
even though boards are willing to give executives more favorable 
treatment than what they would get under arm’s length bargaining, 
there are obviously limits to how far they would be willing to go. 
Whether a board is willing to approve a particular compensation ar-
rangement depends at least in part on the extent to which the ar-
                                                                                                                           
also reduce the other officers’ resentment, if any, of the CEO’s high pay, and thereby facilitate a better 
working relationship between the officers and the CEO. Finally, in cases where the CEO and other offi-
cers are friends, the CEO might provide the officers with rents on account of their friendship. 
88 See, for example, Jack Hirshleifer, Conflict and Rent-Seeking Success Functions: Ratio vs. Dif-
ference Models of Relative Success, 63 Pub Choice 101, 101–12 (1989); Jack Hirshleifer, Competition, 
Cooperation, and Conflict in Economics and Biology, 68 Am Econ Rev 238, 238–43 (1978); Raghuram 
G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q J Econ 387, 387–432 (1998); 
Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origin and 
Growth of Firms, 116 Q J Econ 805, 817–18 (2001).  
89 Noteworthy exceptions are the studies listed in note 6. 
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rangement can be expected to generate outrage. At some point, direc-
tors would be expected to draw the line because the outrage produced 
by going further would be too costly for them. In other words, out-
rage imposes constraints through its effect on the board. 
Outrage might produce various social and reputational costs to 
directors. Professional reputation is very important to outside direc-
tors who generally do not join a board solely for the pay. Many out-
side directors join boards for the prestige and connections that the 
posts give them.90 Hence, outside directors would be loath to approve 
a compensation plan that would embarrass them or compromise their 
reputations. Outside directors would be concerned about how such 
plans might be viewed by the media or various social or professional 
groups whose opinions are important to the directors. As a result, 
they would support management only insofar as the compensation 
proposal does not impose too much outrage cost. In certain cases, the 
same fear of embarrassment that might discourage directors from ap-
proving an outrageous compensation package might also affect man-
agers directly and thereby discourage them from seeking such a pack-
age in the first instance. 
In addition, outrage might affect the market forces discussed ear-
lier that could, in theory, limit executive compensation. These forces, 
we have argued, are usually not sufficiently strong to prevent sub-
stantial deviations from optimal contracting. However, outrage might 
strengthen one or more of the various market forces in a way that 
makes them more of a constraint.  
 Consider the market for corporate control. Although the reduc-
tion in shareholder value due to excessive compensation is unlikely 
by itself to trigger a challenge to managers’ control, outrageous in-
creases in compensation might increase significantly the likelihood of 
such an attempt. For example, institutional investors might view such 
compensation as a signal that the executives or directors are espe-
cially insensitive to shareholder interests and thus be less willing to 
support the incumbents in a control contest. If support for manage-
ment weakens, a contest for control, through either a proxy battle or a 
takeover bid, might be more likely to arise.  
It is worth emphasizing that for outrage to impose significant 
costs it must be sufficiently widespread among the relevant groups of 
people. Although a small group of observers—be they sophisticated 
market participants or researchers—might identify a compensation 
scheme as involving an especially egregious amount of rents, the re-
sulting outrage by itself would not necessarily generate significant 
costs for the directors and executives. For executives or directors to 
                                                                                                                           
90 See Lorsch and MacIver, Pawns or Potentates? at 23–31 (cited in note 24). 
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be adversely affected in a material way the outrage must be felt by 
relevant groups—such as institutional investors en masse, the media, 
and/or social and professional groups—about whose views the execu-
tives and directors care. Therefore, whether significant outrage costs 
can be expected to arise would depend on the extent to which rent ex-
traction is clearly apparent to outsiders, not just (or even mainly) 
upon how much rents are extracted.  
A testable prediction of the influence of outrage costs is that 
criticism by outside observers will have an effect on executive com-
pensation. Evidence consistent with this prediction is in fact provided 
by recent studies. One study finds that firms receiving negative cov-
erage of their executive compensation policies in Business Week, 
Forbes, Fortune, and Institutional Investor during the years 1992–
1994 experienced smaller increases in total compensation than other 
firms during the years 1993–1994.91 These firms also subsequently 
increased the sensitivity of cash compensation to firm performance.92 
Another study provides evidence that shareholder precatory resolu-
tions criticizing executive compensation as excessive lead to some 
reduction in executive pay—even though these resolutions are non-
binding and rarely receive enough votes for passage.93  
Another testable implication is that designers of compensation 
arrangements will seek to avoid or reduce outrage by designing, 
packaging, and justifying compensation arrangements in a way that 
camouflages managers’ rents and conceals their magnitude. This 
brings us to the role of camouflage under the managerial power ap-
proach.  
C. The Critical Role of “Camouflage” 
As we have discussed, excessive compensation will not by itself 
impose significant outrage costs. A large amount of outrage will oc-
cur only if there is widespread recognition that the level of compen-
sation does not result from a contract designed to maximize share-
holder value, but rather reflects a large extraction of rents. Thus, out-
rage costs depend on the extent to which the rent extraction can be 
easily and distinctly identified. A large extraction of rents will not 
cause the executives or directors harm if it can be dressed, packaged, 
                                                                                                                           
91 See Marilyn F. Johnson, Susan Porter, and Margaret B. Shackell, Stakeholder Pressure and the 
Structure of Executive Compensation at 4, working paper (1997), available online at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/id=41780> (visited May 4, 2002) . 
92 Id. 
93 Randall S. Thomas and Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive 
Compensation, 67 U Cin L Rev 1021, 1065 (1999). But see Johnson, et al, Stakeholder Pressure at 4 
(cited in note 91) (reporting that shareholder proposals do not have a significant effect on either the 
amount of executive compensation or its sensitivity to performance). 
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or hidden—in short, camouflaged—so that it is not readily apparent 
as such.  
Accordingly, under the managerial power approach, managers 
will prefer compensation structures and processes that enable the ex-
traction of rents to be camouflaged as optimal contracting. As we dis-
cuss below, outrage costs and constraints and the resulting camou-
flage motive might explain why firms rely so heavily on compensa-
tion surveys and consultants. In Part III, we will show that many 
other aspects of existing compensation practice can be explained by 
considerations of camouflage.  
One might ask how any observer can tell that rent extraction is 
taking place if it is camouflaged. To be sure, rent extraction will 
sometimes be undetectable by outside observers. However, the pres-
ence of camouflage does not imply that rent extraction will be uni-
dentifiable to every observer. As noted earlier, camouflage is success-
ful as long as it prevents rent extraction from being easily identifiable 
to certain large groups of outside observers. Thus, it is in no way a 
contradiction for a researcher to view a certain compensation practice 
as being likely to include camouflaged rents. Such a judgment simply 
reflects the conclusion that the researcher has found to her own satis-
faction that the compensation package or program is likely not to 
serve shareholders’ interests, but rather to represent rent extraction.  
A testable implication of the managerial power approach is that, 
when compensation arrangements and practices deviate from those 
that are optimal, they tend to do so in a way that minimizes the 
amount of managerial rents easily visible to outsiders. As will be seen 
in Part III, this testable prediction appears to be borne out by the way 
in which actual practices deviate from what would be expected under 
optimal contracting.  
D. Compensation Consultants and Camouflage 
U.S. public companies typically employ outside consultants to 
provide input into the executive compensation process.94 Their use 
can be explained within the optimal-contracting framework in the 
following way: Compensation consultants contribute to improving 
executive pay practices for two distinct reasons. First, they contribute 
expertise on the design of compensation packages. Second, they con-
duct compensation surveys and provide access to industry pay data 
                                                                                                                           
94 See John M. Bizjack, Michael L. Lemmon, and Lalitha Naveen, Has the Use of Peer Groups 
Contributed to Higher Levels of Executive Compensation? at 10, 44, working paper (2000), available 
online at <http://papers.ssrn.com/id=252544> (visited May 4, 2002) (reporting that at least 65 percent of 
firms use compensation consultants). 
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that would not be shared directly among companies.95 These data, in 
turn, might be used to improve the design of compensation packages.  
Although we agree that compensation consultants can and some-
times might play such a useful role, we think it is important to under-
stand that they also might play a role in camouflaging rent. In par-
ticular, the process through which pay consultants are retained—and 
some evidence regarding their use—suggest that managers use com-
pensation consultants primarily to justify executive pay, rather than to 
optimize it.96  
The compensation consultant has a strong incentive to please the 
CEO. Typically, compensation consultants are hired through a com-
pany’s human resources department, and anecdotal evidence suggests 
that some CEOs are heavily involved in the process.97 Even if the 
CEO is not normally involved in the selection of the compensation 
consultant, the threat of his involvement the next time—should the 
consultant suggest a package not to his liking—is likely to keep the 
consultant in line. Moreover, executive pay consultants often work 
for consulting firms that have other, larger assignments with the hir-
ing company. This tends to undermine their objectivity.98  
Pay consultants can gain the favor of the CEO by generating a 
mass of compensation data that can be used to justify “objectively” 
the desired pay plan. For example, they can design surveys to focus 
on comparative data that help make the case for higher pay.99 It is 
widely understood that the methodology of compensation consultants 
and boards in devising compensation plans results in a “ratcheting 
up” of salaries.100  
Once the compensation consultant has collected the “relevant” 
comparative data on peer compensation, the board almost always de-
cides that it wants the firm to be at the fiftieth percentile of CEO sal-
ary or higher.101 Bizjack, Lemmon, and Naveen report that in a review 
of the 1997 compensation committee reports of one hundred firms in 
the S&P 500 index, ninety-six firms indicated that they use peer 
groups in determining management compensation, and that the “vast 
                                                                                                                           
95 These data are provided in summary form only, of course. Firms participate in compensation 
surveys with the understanding that individual firm data will be kept confidential by the consultant.  
96 For an insider’s account of the use of compensation consultants to justify executive pay, see 
Crystal, In Search of Excess (cited in note 6). 
97 See id at 220. 
98 See id at 219 (suggesting that employee benefits and other assignments often produce more 
revenue for a consulting firm than the executive compensation consulting assignment). 
99 See id at 221 (describing the different rationalizations used by CEOs for pay increases). 
100 See Murphy, Executive Compensation at 2517–18 (cited in note 2); Crystal, In Search of Excess 
at 219 (cited in note 6). 
101 See Crystal, In Search of Excess (cited in note 6) (reporting that 35 percent of firms surveyed 
aimed to pay at the seventy-fifth percentile, while 65 percent aimed for fiftieth percentile pay). 
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majority” of firms that use peer groups set compensation at or above 
the fiftieth percentile of the peer group.102 This leads to an ever in-
creasing ratcheting-up of compensation, including the compensation 
of poorly performing executives.103 Examining approximately 1500 
publicly traded firms during the period 1992–1998, Bizjack, Lem-
mon, and Naveen found that CEOs who are paid below the median 
amount receive much larger increases (in both percentage and abso-
lute terms) than CEOs who are paid above the median, even when 
these firms have worse accounting and stock price performance. 
Wade, Porac, and Pollack provide some evidence that companies 
use pay consultants and surveys strategically in justifying executive 
compensation to outsiders. They find that companies that pay their 
CEOs larger base salaries and firms with more concentrated and ac-
tive outside ownership are more likely to cite the use of surveys and 
consultants in justifying executive pay in their proxy reports to 
shareholders.104 The authors also find that accounting returns are em-
phasized when they are high and that market returns are de-
emphasized when they are volatile.105 These findings are again consis-
tent with a view that executives use compensation consultants to gen-
erate and justify higher compensation. 
E. The Design of Stock Option Plans: The Devil Is in the Details 
During the 1980s and 1990s, executive stock options became an 
increasingly important element of corporate compensation schemes.106 
The increasing use of options has been a primary factor driving the 
tenfold increase in CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity over the last 
two decades.  
This trend was responsive to the longstanding demand of man-
agement experts and shareholder activists for a shift away from fixed 
compensation to performance-responsive pay.107 Another factor in the 
                                                                                                                           
102 Bizjack, Lemmon, and Naveen, Has the Use of Peer Groups Contributed to Higher Levels of 
Executive Compensation? at 2 (cited in note 94). 
103 See Tully, Raising the Bar, Fortune at 272 (cited in note 6).  
104 See James B. Wade, Joseph F. Porac, and Timothy G. Pollock, Worth, Words, and the Justifica-
tion of Executive Pay, 18 J Org Beh 641, 657 (1997). 
105 See id at 658. 
106 Murphy reports that option grants in manufacturing firms increased from 27 percent to 36 per-
cent of total compensation between 1992 and 1996 alone. See Murphy, Executive Compensation at 2490 
(cited in note 2). Yermack finds that, on average, option awards accounted for 20 percent of CEO com-
pensation in 1984 and 30 percent in 1991. See David Yermack, Do Corporations Award CEO Stock Op-
tions Effectively?, 39 J Fin Econ 237, 238 (1995).  
107 Insensitivity of executive compensation to firm performance reportedly was one criterion em-
ployed by T. Boone Pickens’s United Shareholders of America in its 1986–1993 campaign to improve 
corporate governance. See Deon Strickland, et al, A Requiem for the USA: Is Small Shareholder Moni-
toring Effective?, 40 J Fin & Econ 319, 320 (1996). 
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rise of options was the enactment of Section 162(m) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, which disallows a deduction for executive compensa-
tion paid to an executive in excess of $1 million per year unless the 
excess compensation is “performance-based.”108  
The managerial power approach does not question the desirabil-
ity of using options to compensate executives. Options provide man-
agers with greater incentive to create shareholder value, and thus the 
use of options in executive compensation might well be beneficial to 
shareholders. Rather, the managerial power approach focuses on 
whether the magnitude and design of a particular option-based pay 
package is close to that which would arise under optimal contracting.  
In other words, the question is not whether a particular option 
plan makes shareholders better or worse off than no option plan, but 
whether the “details” of the plan that is adopted—the number of op-
tions granted to the executives and, more importantly, the way in 
which those options are structured—are optimal. The devil is in these 
details, which are very important. A badly designed option plan might 
produce significantly less value for shareholders than a plan con-
structed to maximize shareholder wealth.109 
Interestingly, the only recent study that considers the effect of 
options on shareholder value suggests that the option plans designed 
by boards do not reflect optimal contracting. In particular, the study 
examines publicly traded U.S. firms between 1992–1997. It finds that 
boards give CEOs too many options: the marginal incentive benefit 
of the last option is less than the cost to shareholders. In other words, 
shareholder value would increase if the number of options held by 
                                                                                                                           
108 See note 17.  
109 There is an extensive literature on the design of optimal compensation arrangements and re-
lated issues. Recent contributions to this literature include Jorge G. Aseff and Manuel S. Santos, Stock 
Options and Managerial Optimal Contracts, working paper (2001), available online at 
<http://www.cob.asu.edu/pubs/files/aseff-santos.pdf> (visited Apr 27, 2002); John Core and Wayne 
Guay, When Contracts Require Risk-Averse Executives to Hold Equity: Implications for Option Valua-
tion and Relative Performance Valuation, working paper (2001), available online at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/id=271123> (visited May 4, 2002); Tom Nohel and Steven Todd, Executive 
Compensation, Reputation, and Risk-Taking Incentives, working paper (2001); Tom Nohel and Steven 
Todd, Optimal Compensation for Risk-Averse Executives with Career Concerns, working paper (2001); 
Yisong S. Tian, Optimal Contracting, Incentive Effects, and the Valuation of Executive Stock Options, 
working paper (2001); Lisa K. Meulbroek, The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Understand-
ing the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options, 30 Fin Mgmt 5 (Summer 2001); Frank Moers 
and Erik Peek, Managerial Risk Aversion and Executive Compensation: Measurement Issues and an 
Empirical Test, working paper (2000) (on file with authors); Tom Nohel and Steven Todd, Executive 
Compensation, Managerial Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Risky Projects, working paper (2000) (on 
file with authors); George Baker, Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts at 22, working pa-
per (2000), available online at 
<http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/research/workshops/wto/PDF/Distortion_and_Risk_15.pdf> (visited May 
4, 2002); Li Jin, CEO Compensation, Diversification and Incentives at 25, working paper (2000), avail-
able online at <http://papers.ssrn.com/id=254260> (visited Apr 27, 2002). 
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CEOs were reduced, holding everything constant.110 Thus, the most 
relevant empirical data suggest that the design of option programs is 
consistent with the presence of managerial power and rent extrac-
tion.111  
We will focus on the design of option plans in Part III, where we 
argue that many of the most prominent features of option grants—
such as the use of non-indexed options, at-the-money strike prices, 
and the lack of restrictions on unwinding incentives—are better ex-
plained by the managerial power approach, and thus that managerial 
power likely plays a significant role in the design of option plans and 
practices. 
F. A Note on Conforming to Norms 
In the last ten years there has been much interest among legal 
scholars in the existence and evolution of “norms” and their effect on 
behavior in a wide variety of contexts. Recently, legal scholars have 
focused their attention on the effect of norms in the context of corpo-
rate law and corporate governance.112 It is thus natural to ask whether 
norms—and, in particular, the pressure to conform to norms—might 
play a role in executive compensation.  
In legal scholarship, the term “norms” has been used generally to 
refer to nonlegal rules of conduct and behavior. Some norms simply 
reflect patterns of behavior that have arisen and tend to persist pri-
marily because actors observe one another behaving in a particular 
way and believe that there is a potential cost to deviating from that 
behavior. Suppose, for example, that every year the partners of ABC 
                                                                                                                           
110 Michel A. Habib and Alexander P. Ljungqvist, Firm Value and Managerial Incentives at 17, 
working paper (2000), available online at <http://papers.ssrn.com/id=252375> (visited May 5, 2002).  
111 The only other study focusing exclusively on options also suggests that option plans might not 
be designed optimally. An analysis of companies that adopted executive stock option plans between 
1978 and 1982 determined that cumulative abnormal returns declined subsequently for two-thirds of the 
sample, that ROA declined absolutely and adjusted for industry, that R&D expenditure decreased, and 
that perquisite consumption increased. See Richard A. DeFusco, Robert R. Johnson, and Thomas S. 
Zorn, The Association between Executive Stock Option Plan Changes and Managerial Decision Making, 
20 Fin Mgmt 36, 40 (1991). There have been a number of other studies that find that the use of options 
increases stock price and cash flow volatility. See, for example, Richard A. DeFusco, Robert R. Johnson, 
and Thomas S. Zorn, The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders, 45 J 
Fin 617, 626 (1990); Anup Agrawal and Gershon N. Mandelker, Managerial Incentives and Corporate 
Investment and Financing Decisions, 42 J Fin 823 (1987); Shivaram Rajgopal and Terry Shevlin, Early 
Evidence on the Informativeness of the SEC’s Market Risk Disclosures: The Case of Commodity Price 
Risk Exposure of Oil and Gas Producers, 74 Acct Rev 251 (1999); Catherine Schrand and Haluk Unal, 
Hedging and Coordinated Risk Management: Evidence from Thrift Conversions, 53 J Fin 979 (1998); 
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law firm use firm funds to give each of their secretaries a Christmas 
bonus. Beth, a partner at ABC law firm, learns that every other part-
ner at ABC law firm is going to give his or her assistant $500 in cash. 
She must decide how much to give her assistant. If she gives less 
than this amount, her assistant might feel insulted. If she gives more, 
other partners might feel obligated to give a larger bonus next year 
lest their assistants feel insulted, and this may cause the other part-
ners to resent Beth for “wasting” the firm’s funds and reducing their 
profits. Thus, Beth will have an incentive to stick to the established 
pattern of giving assistants a Christmas bonus of $500 in cash. 
The pressure to conform probably plays an important role in ex-
ecutive compensation. At any given point in time, this pressure is 
likely to affect both the amount and structure of executive compensa-
tion arrangements recommended by compensation committees and 
approved by boards. As we noted earlier, compensation committees 
recommend pay arrangements based in large part on the compensa-
tion packages they see at other firms. There is clearly a desire on the 
part of such committees and the board to conform to “the norm,” or 
at least to be seen as conforming to the norm. 
At a minimum, the desire to conform makes any movement from 
one equilibrium to another much slower and more gradual. Compen-
sation committees’ preference for conforming to the “norm” and fear 
of deviating substantially from it means that the evolution of com-
pensation arrangements will take more time. Thus, whatever the na-
ture of the current equilibrium, movement from it will be “sticky” 
due to the desire to conform to established patterns. 
The main point we wish to emphasize is that the desire to con-
form to established patterns cannot provide a basis for a full account 
of executive compensation. The stickiness arising from the tendency 
to conform implies only that movement from one equilibrium to an-
other will be very slow. It cannot explain why we are in a particular 
equilibrium to begin with. More importantly, given that patterns of 
executive compensation change over time, norms cannot tell us much 
about the new equilibrium to which we are heading, however slowly. 
To provide a full account of executive compensation, norms must be 
combined with another theory such as optimal contracting or mana-
gerial power.  
A theory combining norms with the optimal contracting ap-
proach would predict that the evolution of executive compensation 
over time, although slowed down by the tendency to follow estab-
lished practices, would be largely shaped by the forces of optimal 
contracting. That is, as changing circumstances make the existing 
equilibrium suboptimal, boards induced by market pressure will 
move toward what would be the new optimal arrangement. Although 
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the stickiness introduced by the desire to conform would prevent ad-
justment from being instantaneous, the forces of optimal contracting 
should be sufficiently strong to ensure that executive compensation 
does not deviate for a long time from what participants recognize to 
be the optimal arrangement.  
In contrast, the managerial power approach predicts that the evo-
lution of executive compensation over time is shaped at least in part 
by the desire of executives to extract more rents from their firms. 
When changing circumstances create an opportunity to extract addi-
tional rents—either by changing outrage costs and constraints or by 
giving rise to a new means of camouflage—managers will seek to 
take full advantage of it and will push firms toward an equilibrium in 
which they can do so. However, the stickiness due to norms will slow 
this movement somewhat. 
Thus, even though we recognize the importance of the pressure 
to conform we need another theory (or other theories) to explain why 
we are at the current equilibrium and what forces will move us to the 
next as circumstances change. The question is whether optimal con-
tracting is the only other theory needed, or whether managerial power 
must also be taken into account.  
III.  EVIDENCE BETTER EXPLAINED BY THE MANAGERIAL  
POWER APPROACH 
This Part discusses important elements of the empirical evidence 
on executive compensation that are difficult to understand within an 
optimal contracting framework but that are consistent with and can 
be explained by the managerial power approach. Some of the com-
pensation practices and patterns we consider—for example, the ab-
sence of any significant attempt by firms to design option plans that 
at least partly filter out stock price gains due to industry or general 
market trends—have long puzzled researchers adhering to the opti-
mal contracting approach. Others have so far received little attention 
in the executive compensation literature (for example, managers’ 
broad freedom to unwind incentives and to choose the time of such 
unwinding).  
We believe that the managerial power approach can better ex-
plain these and other features of the executive compensation land-
scape. But accepting our thesis does not depend on accepting our in-
terpretation of each and every one of these practices and patterns. 
What is important is the picture emerging from these patterns and 
practices in the aggregate. In the aggregate, we suggest, these prac-
tices and patterns provide a solid basis for concluding that managerial 
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power is likely to play a significant role in the design of executive 
compensation. 
A. Rewarding Executives for General Market Rises 
This section examines a compensation practice that has long 
been regarded as odd by optimal contracting theorists—the practice 
of compensating executives for increases in firm value and the stock 
price that are not in any way due to their own efforts. For example, 
conventional options reward managers for absolute increases in the 
share price even when those increases are due solely to factors be-
yond managers’ control, such as interest rate declines.  
Compensation dollars could be much better targeted if execu-
tives received these dollars only to the extent that the increase in their 
firm’s share price was due to firm-specific performance, rather than 
sector or general market performance. To be sure, it is not feasible to 
filter out perfectly the effects of sector or general market trends. As 
will be explained, however, there are a number of ways of limiting 
managers’ windfalls from that part of the stock price increase that 
would have occurred in any event. Some of these approaches involve 
“indexing” the exercise price of options. For example, as Alfred Rap-
paport has recently proposed in the Harvard Business Review, stock 
options could be designed with an exercise price that rises or falls 
with either sector or broader market movements.113 There are other 
approaches as well. For example, the vesting of options could be 
made dependent on the share price exceeding a certain benchmark. 
“Moderate” versions of such vesting schemes might bar vesting only 
if the firm is one of the worst performing firms in its sector (say, in 
the bottom 20 percent). Each of the possible alternative mechanisms 
would tie an executive’s reward more closely to firm-specific per-
formance, over which he has considerable control. 
Yet, as this Part explains, firms almost never employ any version 
(however moderate) of what we call “reduced-windfall options”—
options with features (such as an indexed exercise price) that screen 
out effects beyond managers’ control. Optimal contracting theorists 
have tried to explain the failure of all but a handful of companies to 
employ reduced-windfall options but, as we will see, their efforts 
have not been very successful. The widespread failure of firms to 
adopt mechanisms that filter out sector and market effects from man-
agers’ option compensation has led some prominent researchers in 
                                                                                                                           
113 See Alfred Rappaport, New Thinking on How to Link Executive Pay with Performance, Harv 
Bus Rev 91, 101 (Mar-Apr 1999). See also Mark A. Clawson and Thomas C. Klein, Indexed Stock Op-
tions: A Proposal for Compensation Commensurate with Performance, 3 Stan J L, Bus & Fin 31, 31–50 
(1997). 
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the field of executive compensation to conclude that “the near com-
plete absence [of such mechanisms] seems to be a puzzle.”114 As we 
will show, however, this failure can be explained under the manage-
rial power approach. 
1. The suboptimality of rewarding managers for market rises. 
The optimal principal-agent contract should compensate the 
agent based on the achievement of objectives within the scope of his 
control. Since managerial effort essentially is unobservable and ac-
counting results are noisy and fail to reflect the current value of 
growth opportunities, the share price of a firm provides a useful tool 
for evaluating executive performance.  
However, compensation based on absolute share price perform-
ance rewards managers even when the managers’ efforts have not 
contributed to the share price increase. In particular, the share price 
increase might be driven solely by factors external to the firm—such 
as changes in the economy that benefit the firm’s industry or interest 
rate declines that benefit the market as a whole. One study of U.S. 
stock prices over a recent ten-year period reports that only 30 percent 
of share price movement reflects corporate performance, with the 
remaining 70 percent driven by general market conditions.115 Because 
of such external factors, even managers who perform poorly—and 
whose actions therefore make shareholders relatively worse off—can 
profit when their compensation is linked to changes in the absolute 
share price. 
To be sure, when managers’ compensation is linked to the abso-
lute share price, even managers who add value will not profit if their 
firm’s stock price nevertheless declines because of changes in the 
economy or the firm’s sector. But such negative shocks are unlikely 
to hurt managers as much as positive shocks will benefit them. At 
worst, negative shocks make the options worthless. Positive shocks, 
on the other hand, can increase the value of the options by an unlim-
ited amount. Thus, on an expected-value basis, the contribution of ex-
ternal market and sector forces to the value of the options is always 
positive.  
From shareholders’ perspective, an option plan should be de-
signed to maximize incentives given the amount of dollars spent, or 
to achieve a certain amount of incentives at the lowest possible cost. 
When managers are rewarded for market- and sector-wide price 
                                                                                                                           
114 Brian J. Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q J Econ 
653, 683 n 34 (1998).  
115 See Simon Patterson and Peter Smith, How to Make Top People’s Pay Reflect Performance, 
Sunday Times § Bus at 12 (Aug 9, 1998). 
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movements that have nothing to do with their efforts, the money is 
poorly spent. This raises the possibility that the firm could either cre-
ate the same incentives for less money or use the same amount of 
money to create even more powerful incentives.  
The latter possibility is worth spelling out. If the firm gives the 
managers one thousand options to buy stock at the current market 
price of one hundred dollars, some of the expected value of the op-
tions—and therefore some of the expected cost of the options to other 
shareholders—comes from the fact that the stock price might in-
crease for reasons having nothing to do with the managers’ efforts but 
rather, say, because of unexpected reductions in interest rates. To the 
extent industry- and market-wide effects boost the stock price, the 
manager will be “rewarded” for these increases when he exercises the 
options and shareholders will pay for this reward, even though this 
reward has no effect on the manager’s incentives.  
If we could design a scheme to remove or reduce the undeserved 
reward component of the option’s value—that is, create a reduced-
windfall option—we could at the same cost give the manager a larger 
number of differently structured options that would provide better in-
centives by linking the payoff more closely to the manager’s efforts. 
Thus, significant benefits could be obtained from “reduced-windfall” 
schemes that remove some or all of the reward that has nothing to do 
with the manager’s contribution to the stock price increase.  
2. Alternative ways of designing reduced-windfall options.  
There are a number of ways that windfall gains from options 
could be reduced. One approach that has received a great deal of 
support from academics and other commentators is that of “indexing” 
the exercise price of the option to the performance of the sector or the 
market to filter out changes in the stock price that are not due to the 
manager’s efforts. To the extent the indexed option could not be used 
to capture the expected increase in the stock price due to non-firm-
specific effects, its expected value—and its expected cost to share-
holders—would be lower. We first consider indexing, and then exam-
ine other methods of reducing option-based windfalls. 
a) Indexing. By giving managers options that reward them only 
for increases in stock price that are firm-specific and thus more likely 
to result from the managers’ own efforts, a firm could, at the same 
cost, give more options to the managers and thereby increase their 
reward for creating value themselves.116 This in turn should induce 
                                                                                                                           
116  See, for example, Shane A. Johnson and Yisong S. Tian, The Value and Incentive Effects of 
Non-Traditional Executive Stock Option Plans, 57 J Fin Econ 3, 25–26 (2000) (arguing that indexed op-
tions create more powerful incentives per dollar value than traditional options). For a detailed analysis 
2002] Managerial Power and Executive Compensation 799 
more effort and lead managers to do more things that are unpleasant 
for them but good for shareholders, such as firing loyal but incompe-
tent subordinates.  
Returning to our example, one might be able to give—at the 
same expected cost as one thousand conventional options—1500 op-
tions whose strike price is $100 (the current market price) multiplied 
by, say, a market index. Under such a scheme, if the market has risen 
30 percent since the options were granted, the exercise price would 
be $100 x (1.30) or $130. Although such a scheme would have the 
same expected cost to the firm, it would provide stronger incentives. 
Of course, the index need not reflect the average performance of the 
market as a whole—it could reflect the average performance of firms 
in the same industry. Using this narrower index would screen out not 
only broad market effects, but also effects associated with the firm’s 
industry.117  
We should emphasize that standard indexing of exercise prices 
(indexing either to the market average or to the average of a basket of 
peer firms) is not the only possibility. Suppose, for example, that one 
opposes indexing options to the average performance of peer firms 
because one believes that there are problems specific to the firm, not 
attributable to the CEO, that will limit the firm’s performance in the 
short run. Or suppose the firm has no such problems but one is con-
cerned that the CEO will have insufficient incentive to generate value 
if, in the middle of the vesting period, the CEO finds his firm ranked 
at the bottom of the industry and believes there is little he can do to 
bring his options into the money. A person with these concerns might 
prefer a more “moderate” form of indexing where the exercise price 
is indexed not to the average performance of the industry (or the 
wider market) but to a certain fraction of it. Alternatively, one could 
tie the exercise price to the performance of the companies in say, the 
bottom quartile of the industry.  
Note that such full or partial indexing may lead to the exercise 
price being lower than the grant-date market price. It is worthwhile, 
therefore, to consider the case in which one wants the exercise price 
never to fall below the grant-date market price. In such a case, one 
could still index the exercise price but do so only on the upside. This 
                                                                                                                           
of the incentive effects and valuation of indexed options, see Shane A. Johnson and Yisong S. Tian, In-
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could be done by using an exercise price that is the greater of (a) the 
grant-date market price and (b) the index-adjusted price. Any index 
could be used. Therefore, one could tie the exercise price to the per-
formance of the broader market, the industry, or some other set of 
firms, using average performance or any other metric, such as per-
centiles. The only situation in which this semi-indexed scheme would 
yield different results than a conventional option is that in which the 
index is in positive territory. In such cases, the payouts would be 
lower. However, by employing the semi-indexed scheme, the ex-
pected savings from not rewarding the manager for changes in the 
sector and the market beyond his control could be used to increase 
the number of options given at the grant date and thereby boost per-
formance incentives. 
We want to stress that it is not our intention here to reach firm 
conclusions on the optimal design of reduced-windfall options. In-
deed, it is unlikely that one size would fit all. The optimal design 
might well vary from industry to industry and perhaps even from 
firm to firm. Our main point is that using some form of windfall-
reduction is likely to be optimal for at least a significant fraction of, if 
not all, companies.118 
b) Other methods of reducing windfalls. Although tying the ex-
ercise price of options to market or sector indexes is the best known 
and perhaps the most effective way of reducing managers’ gain from 
windfalls beyond their control, other approaches could be used. 
One other approach that has been used to reduce managers’ re-
wards from windfalls is performance-conditioned vesting of options. 
Under this approach, managers who do not meet certain performance 
targets forfeit their options. The exercise price is usually set to the 
market price on the date of grant. Thus, if the executive is permitted 
                                                                                                                           
118 There are other possible benefits to indexing that we have not addressed. For example, it has 
been argued that indexing the exercise price of options could reduce the executive’s exposure to market 
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to exercise the options, he can profit to the full extent of the stock 
price appreciation. However, the options do not vest (become exer-
cisable) unless certain performance targets are met.119  
These performance targets might involve an index. For example, 
the executives might be required to generate share price increases 
that beat the market or a basket of similar stocks. This approach is 
like an indexed option in that there is no payout unless the share price 
exceeds a certain benchmark. Thus, to the extent that the increase of 
a firm’s stock price merely reflects market- or sector-wide changes, 
the managers do not receive a reward. It is unlike an indexed option 
in that the payout, if made, corresponds to the absolute share price 
increase rather than the amount by which the stock price exceeds 
some benchmark.  
The performance targets can also use other benchmarks. For ex-
ample, vesting could be conditional on the firm’s earnings per share, 
net asset value, return on capital, and/or cash generation. Such meas-
ures might not screen out sector-wide effects (for example, the effect 
of an increase in oil prices on an oil drilling firm) but might screen 
out market-wide effects (such as a decline in interest rates). Another 
approach is to provide cash or shares to executives who beat the mar-
ket or the sector (depending on the particular plan) over a three-, 
four-, or five-year period.  
3. The rare use of reduced-windfall options. 
Only a small fraction of companies use reduced-windfall options 
even though options, as we have noted, now represent the largest sin-
gle component of the average executive’s compensation package.120 
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one publicly traded firm 
that indexes its options: Level 3 Communications, a computer net-
working firm, which ties the exercise price of executive options to 
the S&P 500 index. Not surprisingly, Level 3 Communications has 
attracted considerable attention from the financial press and has gar-
nered widespread praise for its shareholder-friendly approach to ex-
ecutive compensation.121 
                                                                                                                           
119 Another variation of performance vesting, which is more favorable to executives, enables ex-
ecutives to accelerate the vesting of their options if they meet specified performance targets. Because 
this form of performance vesting makes the option more valuable to a manager than a conventional op-
tion (with the same strike price and initial vesting period), it does not reduce the reward from windfalls.  
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There are also a small number of firms—such as Monsanto and 
Citigroup—that reduce option windfalls to executives by condition-
ing option-vesting on the firm meeting certain performance targets. 
For example, Monsanto will not allow the CEO’s options to vest 
unless he generates shareholder returns of at least 10.5 percent per 
annum over a five-year period.122 Like Level 3 Communications, 
these firms are widely praised by the business press and by promi-
nent market personalities such as Warren Buffett.123 However, the use 
of performance-conditioned vesting is rare. Only 5 percent of the 250 
largest publicly traded firms condition option vesting on perform-
ance.124  
Accordingly, the overwhelming majority of executives are re-
warded for absolute share price increases, even though such increases 
might be purely a function of broad market or sector movements. 
Thus, an executive whose firm’s stock price has increased because of 
favorable sector- or market-wide developments can make a large 
profit by exercising her options and selling the acquired stock even 
when she was not in any way responsible for the share price increase. 
Indeed, during the 1990s stock market boom, an executive might 
have made a large amount of money even if her firm’s performance 
was worse than that of every other peer firm. Remarking on the situa-
tion, Warren Buffett has said, “There is no question in my mind that 
mediocre CEOs are getting incredibly overpaid. And the way it’s be-
ing done is through stock options.”125  
4. Is there an adequate optimal contracting explanation?  
Why then do we not observe more reduced-windfall options? Fi-
nancial economists have tried to come up with explanations. As we 
show below, however, none of the suggested explanations can ade-
quately explain the rare use of such options.  
a) Design costs. It has been suggested that it might be too costly 
to design schemes that filter out the industry or market noise that 
                                                                                                                           
public corporation takes such a daring approach to equity compensation”). 
122 See Tully, Raising the Bar, Fortune at 272 (cited in note 6). 
123 Id. 
124 See Alan Levinsohn, A Garden of Stock Options Helps Harvest Talent, 82 Strategic Fin 81, 81 
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125 Tully, Raising the Bar, Fortune at 272 (cited in note 6). 
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gives rise to windfalls.126 However, the economic cost of filtering does 
not seem to be a plausible explanation for the absence of reduced-
windfall options. A wide variety of sector and broader market indices 
are reported daily in The Wall Street Journal and are available online 
from numerous sources. Moreover, the SEC’s executive compensa-
tion disclosure regulations already require public corporations to se-
lect and present industry, line-of-business, or peer-group stock price 
performance data.127 Firms are thinking about the relevant indices and 
tracking these data already. Incorporating this information into their 
option plans would be trivial. 
b) Avoiding distortions in managers’ decisions to enter other in-
dustries. It has also been suggested that the optimal agency contract 
might not involve filtering out industry noise. Shareholders, it is pos-
tulated, might prefer incentives that prompt executives to adapt to 
poor industry conditions by shifting company resources into more 
profitable sectors.128 Providing such incentives requires rewarding 
managers not only for their own efforts in a given sector, but also for 
sector-driven rises beyond their control.  
This sector-shifting explanation is unlikely to explain the lack of 
reduced-windfall options, however. To begin, it is not clear that in-
vestors want established firms to shift between industries. Investors 
can diversify across industries as they choose. Having decided to in-
vest in an industry and to accept the sector-specific risk, diversified 
investors might simply want their firms to outperform the others in 
that sector. Second, and more importantly, even if investors are seek-
ing maximum absolute performance rather than maximum perform-
ance within a sector, one could still easily reduce certain windfalls 
without adversely affecting managers’ incentives. In particular, a firm 
that wished to encourage managers to shift into more profitable sec-
tors and reduce windfalls could employ a relatively broad index, such 
as the S&P 500 (rather than an industry-specific index) to screen out 
market-wide (rather than sector-wide) rises that are beyond the man-
agers’ control. The failure of all but a handful of firms to use any 
form of reduced-windfall options, then, suggests that sector-shifting 
considerations cannot explain the absence of these options. 
c) Softening industry competition. Strategic considerations un-
derlie one explanation for the near-absence of reduced-windfall op-
                                                                                                                           
126 See Surya N. Janakiraman, Richard A. Lambert, and David F. Larcker, An Empirical Investiga-
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tions.129 There is evidence that executive compensation is positively 
related to the performance of rival firms, particularly in industries 
that are subject to high levels of product competition, and it has been 
suggested that implicitly linking pay to rival firm performance in 
such cases serves shareholders by softening competition and making 
supra-competitive returns possible.130  
Once again, however, while fostering collusion among firms in 
competitive markets might explain the failure to filter out sector-wide 
price increases, the theory does not explain why these companies fail 
to filter out broader price increases. In addition, the limited evidence 
concerning the use of explicit relative performance evaluation cuts 
against these strategic explanations: In annual incentive plans where 
we do observe such explicit evaluation, industry peer group compari-
son is overwhelmingly favored over broad-based comparison.131 
Therefore, the implicit collusion theory does not appear to offer 
strong support for firms’ almost complete failure to use reduced-
windfall options. 
d) Retaining CEOs during market booms. Himmelberg and 
Hubbard offer an explanation for firms’ failure to filter out broad 
market effects based on the scarcity of talented managers.132 They find 
evidence that CEO compensation is positively correlated with market 
returns and that the market effect on compensation is stronger in lar-
ger firms. They argue that this evidence can be explained by inelas-
ticity in the supply of individuals qualified to run large firms.133 On 
their theory, the demand for executives rises when the economy is 
robust and companies need to pay CEOs more to retain them. Allow-
ing stock option rewards to increase with increasing market levels 
during boom periods responds to this need. CEO talent is more im-
portant and the supply less elastic in the case of large firms, they sug-
gest, and for this reason large firms need to make executive pay even 
more sensitive to broad stock market levels.134  
                                                                                                                           
129 See Rajesh K. Aggarwal and Andrew A. Samwick, Executive Compensation, Relative Perform-
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130 See id.  
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2002] Managerial Power and Executive Compensation 805 
To begin, it is not clear that a CEO is likely to take a new job 
outside his current industry. If such a move is unlikely, the CEO’s 
compensation need not be tied to broader market movements. Rather, 
his pay needs to be linked only to the performance of his own indus-
try. The CEO could then be paid with options designed to reduce 
market-based but not sector-based windfalls. The “market boom” 
theory therefore cannot explain the use of conventional options in 
situations where CEOs are unlikely to be offered a job in a different 
industry.  
In addition, the market boom theory appears to assume that the 
CEO and the firm cannot renegotiate his salary if he gets a better of-
fer. However, there is no reason to believe that in most cases the CEO 
and his firm would not be able to adjust his compensation in the face 
of a higher outside offer. When renegotiation is possible, it would 
make sense for a firm to pay the CEO with options that screen out 
sector and broader market rises and then retain the CEO by counter-
ing any outside offer with one that is even more attractive. The ad-
vantage of this approach compared to the use of windfall-rewarding 
options is that the firm saves money by not paying the executive ex-
tra compensation unless and until he receives an attractive outside of-
fer. 
Finally, even if renegotiation were difficult and CEOs were 
likely to be hired by firms in other sectors, the market boom theory 
still fails to adequately explain standard practices that tie executive 
compensation to broad stock price increases. Consider a company 
that signs a three-year contract with its CEO. The CEO is given op-
tions that vest gradually over the three-year period. Suppose that the 
company seeks to address a scenario in which, after two of the three 
years, the economy booms, the stock market rises, and the executive 
is tempted to switch to a higher-paying firm. At this point, increasing 
the value of unvested options to reflect the hypothesized increased 
demand for CEOs might assist in retention. Two-thirds of the options 
would have vested, however, and increasing the value of any of the 
vested options that are still unexercised would further increase the 
executive’s compensation without increasing the executive’s oppor-
tunity cost of departing. If a company is concerned about retention in 
the foregoing scenario, establishing a mechanism through which ex-
ecutives are issued additional reduced-windfall options in the event 
of a market boom would be superior to granting conventional op-
tions. 
e) Discouraging excessive risk alteration. Saul Levmore has of-
fered a “super-risk alteration” explanation for the lack of indexing 
(which, we should note, would also apply to other types of reduced-
windfall options). According to Levmore, indexed options would en-
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courage managers to differentiate their firms from the index in order 
to increase the likelihood that their options would be in-the-money.135 
This in turn could cause managers to forgo the best projects in favor 
of lower-value projects that have higher volatility (relative to the in-
dex).136  
But even if indexing affects managers’ choice of projects, it is 
not clear that indexing would overall worsen managers’ decisionmak-
ing. Indeed, it could have the opposite effect. It is well understood 
that risk-averse managers tend to prefer low volatility projects, even 
when they do not maximize the present value of the firm’s assets. 
Options, which increase the reward to managers for choosing projects 
with more volatile distributions, give managers an incentive to 
choose riskier projects. Indeed, that is one of the reasons managers 
are given options in the first instance. However, there is no reason to 
believe that ordinary options completely overcome the effects of 
managerial risk aversion. Managers might still avoid some high-
value but high-volatility projects. In such a case, if indexing were to 
affect managers’ project choice in the manner suggested by Levmore, 
it could overall improve the quality of projects chosen.  
In addition, even if Levmore is correct that indexing would 
overall worsen the quality of projects selected by managers, it does 
not automatically follow that this effect would be sufficiently large to 
overcome the potential benefits of indexing—namely, the increased 
incentive to exert effort and boost shareholder value, given whatever 
project has been selected. Finally, even if the adverse effect sug-
gested by Levmore were sufficiently large to outweigh the benefits of 
indexed options in most cases, there is no reason to believe that in-
dexed options would create worse overall incentives in the over-
whelming majority of publicly traded firms. The potentially adverse 
risk-alteration effects of indexed options are thus unlikely to account 
for their almost complete absence. 
f) Saving taxes. David Schizer has identified a potential tax ad-
vantage of conventional options over indexed options that could, it is 
argued, be a partial explanation for the absence of indexing.137 As 
                                                                                                                           
135 Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U Pa L Rev 1901, 1922–
23, 1930 (2001). Options with performance-conditioned vesting could have similar effects. 
136 Id at 1923, 1930. Levmore acknowledges that the problem with indexed options he identifies 
cannot explain the failure to give indexed options to employees who either (1) do not have control over 
the firm’s project choice or (2) are easily monitored. See id at 1931. To explain the failure to give in-
dexed options to these categories of employees, Levmore argues that a norm of “non-conflicting for-
tunes” prevents firms from distributing options in such a way that some employees’ options would be in-
the-money and others’ would be out-of-the-money. Id at 1931–32. Thus, the need to give some employ-
ees (including the CEO) conventional options requires that every other employee get conventional op-
tions. See id at 1932–35.  
137 See David M. Schizer, Tax Constraints on Indexed Options, 149 U Pa L Rev 1941, 1942–43 
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noted in Part II.B.1, since 1994 the annual pay of a CEO or top offi-
cer in excess of $1 million has not been deductible by a publicly held 
corporation unless the excess compensation is performance-based: 
namely, the compensation is based upon the achievement of perform-
ance goals established by a compensation committee composed 
solely of independent directors.138 Both conventional and indexed op-
tions qualify as performance-based.139 However, because a conven-
tional option does not screen out market or industry effects, the op-
tion provides some value to managers that is not performance-based. 
Thus, a conventional option offers non-performance-based pay that is 
exempt from the $1 million deductibility cap. The tax benefit identi-
fied by Schizer would be useful to a tax-paying firm that wishes to 
give a manager non-performance-based pay in excess of $1 million 
and desires to give that pay in the form of a call on the market. 
However, indexed options were extremely rare even before this 
rule took effect in 1994. Moreover, many firms do not pay any taxes 
because they are not yet profitable, and almost all of these firms do 
not use indexed options.140 Thus, as Schizer acknowledges, this tax 
advantage cannot entirely explain the almost complete absence of in-
dexed options. 
g) Reducing managerial risk-bearing cost. It has been argued 
that standard indexed options (options whose exercise price is in-
dexed to the sector or market average) would impose too much addi-
tional risk of nonpayment on risk-averse executives. Kevin Murphy 
reports that the probability that a given stock will earn returns in ex-
cess of a value-weighted index is below 50 percent, while a typical 
ten-year conventional option that is (like most conventional options) 
granted at-the-money has a probability of expiring in-the-money of 
over 80 percent.141 Presumably, risk-averse executives given standard 
                                                                                                                           
(2001). As the discussion should make clear, one could also argue that the tax advantage of conventional 
options is a partial explanation for the lack of options with performance-conditioned vesting. 
138 See 26 USC § 162m (1994).  
139 See Schizer, 149 U Pa L Rev at 1942 (cited in note 137). 
140  It is not clear that, in an optimal contracting framework, even a tax-paying firm would ever 
wish to give a manager this type of non-performance-based pay. Schizer suggests that this form of pay 
might be valuable to risk-averse managers who do not want their pay tied entirely to firm-specific per-
formance. But if managers are risk-averse they would place more value on cash than on a call option 
with the same expected value. Thus, from an optimal contracting perspective, it would not make sense 
to give a manager a call on the market with an expected value of $1 unless the risk-adjusted value of the 
call to the CEO, $x < $1, is greater than the after-tax cost of the call to the firm, $(1 – t). If $x < $(1 – t), 
it would be cheaper for the firm to give the manager $x of nondeductible cash than a call option with an 
expected value of $1 that costs the firm $(1 – t). Put differently, conventional options are not a useful 
form of non-performance-based compensation unless the CEO discounts this risky form of pay by less 
than the firm’s marginal tax rate. 
141 See Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Per-
ceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U Chi L Rev 847, 863 (2002).  
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indexed options rather than conventional options would demand in-
dexed options that have a higher expected value than the conven-
tional options they would be replacing. The same claim could be 
made with respect to options subject to performance-conditioned 
vesting. 
There are at least two problems with this argument. First, and 
most importantly, a reduced probability of payout is not an inevitable 
consequence of indexing. To be sure, indexing to sector or market 
averages would generally reduce the probability of a payout. But as 
we have emphasized, standard indexing is not the only possible form 
of indexing. One could instead effect a more moderate form of index-
ing that would put the CEO in-the-money even if she beats fewer 
than 50 percent of the other firms. In fact, one could easily design an 
indexed option that has the same probability of payout as a conven-
tional option.  
 Suppose, for example, that conventional ten-year options have 
an 80 percent likelihood of payout, and that one wished to design a 
ten-year sector-indexed option for ABC’s CEO with the same prob-
ability of payout. And suppose that there are ten firms in ABC’s sec-
tor. One could simply tie the exercise price of the CEO’s options to 
the stock price performance of the second worst performing firm in 
ABC’s sector. Thus ABC’s CEO will get a positive payout as long as 
ABC is one of the eight best performers in the ten-firm sector (and, 
of course, the better ABC performs, the higher the payout). The ad-
vantage of such an indexed option over a conventional option with 
the same payout probability is that it provides much better incentives 
than the conventional option by screening out market- and sector-
wide effects and thereby tying the CEO’s compensation much more 
closely to the firm-specific value he creates.  
Second, even if one wished to use standard indexed options, and 
moving from conventional to standard indexed options requires in-
creasing the expected value of the CEO’s compensation, there are 
likely to be at least some cases in which shareholders would prefer 
such a tradeoff. Shareholders would prefer such a tradeoff whenever 
the extra value generated by improving the CEO’s incentives exceeds 
the amount of additional compensation that must be paid to the CEO 
to offset the additional risk of nonpayment. It is highly unlikely that 
in almost every publicly traded firm the CEO is so risk-averse that 
the additional compensation that must be paid to the CEO in order to 
compensate him for the extra risk imposed by standard indexed op-
tions exceeds the additional value that would be created by improv-
ing the CEO’s incentives.  
h) Managers’ ability to undo indexing. It has been argued that 
indexing might be futile because managers can always make adjust-
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ments in their portfolios to offset the effect of indexing.142 According 
to this argument, managers’ outside investments generally are not re-
stricted. If a manager is given indexed options (which, for example, 
screen out market effects), she can use personal assets to invest in the 
market portfolio in such a way that the combination of (i) the indexed 
options and (ii) her market portfolio investment generates the returns 
of a conventional option on her firm’s stock.143 If such adjustments 
can be made, the argument goes, then there is no purpose incurring 
transaction costs to create indexed options in the first instance.  
To be sure, a manager given indexed options can invest her own 
funds in a portfolio that is designed to combine with her indexed op-
tions in a way that yields the returns of a conventional option on her 
firm’s stock. But the fact that the manager can buy such a portfolio 
with her own money hardly means that it would be optimal for the 
firm to buy this portfolio for her. Not doing so would save money 
that the firm could make available to shareholders directly or use to 
create more powerful incentives for the manager. 
The only reason to give the manager conventional options is if it 
is desirable for shareholders that the manager have such a portfolio. 
We have seen, however, that this is unlikely to be the case. In short, 
the ability of the manager to put together such a portfolio does not 
mean that the firm should use its limited compensation dollars to do 
that itself.  
5. Accounting considerations.  
A final and very commonly voiced explanation for the lack of 
indexing deserves special attention because it applies not only to in-
dexing but also to performance-conditioned vesting. Most practitio-
ners and many academics attribute the dearth of indexing at least in 
part to the unfavorable accounting treatment of these options.144 Under 
FASB rules, a company is not required to take a charge against earn-
ings when it issues an option with a predetermined exercise price and 
expiration date and that exercise price equals or exceeds the fair mar-
ket value of the stock on the date of the grant.145 Accordingly, conven-
tional at-the-money (or out-of-the-money) stock options never pro-
                                                                                                                           
142 See Li Jin, CEO Compensation, Diversification, and Incentives, working paper (2001), avail-
able online at <http://papers.ssrn.com/id=254260> (visited Apr 27, 2002). 
143 In principle, one could also design financial contracts that, in conjunction with options whose 
vesting is performance-conditioned, would replicate the return of a conventional option. 
144 See, for example, Murphy, Executive Compensation at 21 (cited in note 2); Hall and Liebman, 
Taxation of Executive Compensation at 6 (cited in note 57) (reporting practitioners’ assertion that option 
plans with “bad accounting” are not seriously considered). 
145 See APB Opinion No 25. See also Ronald L. Groves, Executive Compensation ¶ 214.04 at 498 
(CCH Tax Transactions Library 1992). 
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duce a corporate earnings charge. Indexed options, however, lack a 
fixed exercise price and therefore fall outside of this charge-free 
zone. Companies issuing indexed options must mark these options 
against the market on a regular basis and accrue an earnings charge 
reflecting the appreciation in the value of the option over the indexed 
exercise price. So, the argument runs, conventional options are pre-
ferred over indexed options because the former result in higher re-
ported earnings, which enhance share value.146 Options that do not 
vest unless performance conditions are met are subject to the same 
unfavorable accounting treatment as indexed options. 
a) Some firms already use reduced-windfall options. If account-
ing considerations were to preclude the use of reduced-windfall op-
tions, we would not expect any firms to be observed using them. 
However, as noted earlier, 5 percent of the largest 250 firms use op-
tions that do not vest unless executives meet certain performance tar-
gets. These options—like indexed options—must be charged against 
accounting earnings. This suggests that unfavorable accounting treat-
ment is unlikely to explain other firms’ failure to use reduced-
windfall options. Furthermore, in at least several cases, institutional 
investors have put forward shareholder resolutions calling for index-
ing, which they would not do if indexing were expected to hurt share 
value.  
b) If the stock market is efficient, accounting should be irrele-
vant. The accounting explanation assumes that the cost of conven-
tional options is hidden from the stock market if it is not charged to 
earnings. But firms not reporting the actual cost of conventional op-
tions as an accounting expense are required to disclose, in the foot-
notes to their financial statements, pro forma net income and earn-
ings-per-share figures that include an accounting adjustment for these 
options (based on the grant-date value).147 Thus, if market participants 
read the footnotes they should be able to figure out how the issuance 
of conventional options affects accounting earnings.  
To be sure, reduced-windfall options would require marking-to-
market and accruing an earnings charge every quarter in which the 
options become more in-the-money. Conventional options do not. 
Thus, the difference between conventional and reduced-windfall op-
tions is not only their location on the income statement, but also the 
frequency with which they appear on the income statement. How-
                                                                                                                           
146 To the extent that the managers’ bonuses are based on reported earnings, higher earnings also 
increase the bonuses. But presumably if the board were sophisticated enough to use indexed options, it 
would understand that the bonus formula would need to be adjusted to reflect the accounting effect of 
these options.  
147 See Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 14 (Oct 1995).  
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ever, the value of the option at the grant date should equal the ex-
pected value of the payoff of the option. Thus, the amounts reported 
as charges to earnings in the income statement should not, on aver-
age, exceed the amounts reported in footnotes. 
Given the pro forma disclosure requirement associated with 
conventional options, one may question whether the “unfavorable” 
treatment of reduced-windfall options affects the stock price of a 
company that adopts these options. Are stock prices affected differ-
ently if an earnings charge appears in the income statement rather 
than in the footnotes? If stock prices largely reflect publicly available 
information in accordance with the semi-strong form of the efficient 
capital markets hypothesis,148 the location of the disclosure does not 
matter and the unfavorable accounting treatment of reduced-windfall 
options would not adversely affect stock prices.149  
c) Even if markets are inefficient, the use of reduced-windfall op-
tions might still make shareholders better off. We accept the possibil-
ity that markets are not perfectly efficient and that the disclosure 
mechanism might therefore affect a company’s stock price. Even if 
this is the case, however, it does not follow that the lack of reduced-
windfall options reflects optimal contracting. It may be that execu-
tives of firms not using reduced-windfall options avoid them because 
the charges resulting from their use would have a negative impact on 
the firms’ stock prices. If so, avoiding indexing in these cases might 
be in shareholders’ interest. But this would be the case only if, with 
respect to the firms that do not use reduced-windfall options and that 
have not been asked by shareholders to institute them, (i) the market 
is inefficient; (ii) the market is sufficiently inefficient that there will 
be a substantial short-term decline in the price from moving to in-
dexed or performance-conditioned options (in the long run, presuma-
bly, the stock price will reflect the fundamental value of the firm);150 
and (iii) the cost of the short-term decline in share price to sharehold-
ers (who might sell in the interim for liquidity reasons) is greater than 
the benefit of using reduced-windfall options. It is far from clear that 
all these propositions hold for firms in general and that accounting 
                                                                                                                           
148 See Richard A. Brealey and Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 369 (Irwin 
McGraw-Hill 6th ed 2000). 
149 Responding to the concern that investors may be misled by the company disclosing options ex-
pense only by footnote, Microsoft’s CFO noted, “[T]he Street figures it out pretty fast.” Laura Jereski, 
Share the Wealth: As Options Proliferate, Investors Question Effect on Bottom Line, Wall St J A1 (Jan 
14, 1999). See also Rappaport, New Thinking, Harv Bus Rev at 94 (cited in note 113) (arguing that op-
tion disclosure has the same effect on stock price whether the information appears in the income state-
ment or in its footnotes). 
 150 There is considerable evidence that the market sees through obvious accounting manipulations, 
which suggests that many in the market would ignore the change in accounting earnings due to a one-
time move to reduced-windfall options.  
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considerations can thus provide a complete explanation for the al-
most complete absence of reduced-windfall options.  
6. The managerial power explanation.  
Although optimal contracting considerations cannot easily ex-
plain why the overwhelming majority of firms do not use any form of 
reduced-windfall options, the managerial power approach offers a 
number of compelling reasons for the almost complete absence of 
these mechanisms. 
Most importantly, for the same reasons that reduced-windfall op-
tions would be better for shareholders, these options would be less 
favorable to managers: reduced-windfall options would provide man-
agers with less money or would require them to cut managerial slack, 
or both. Thus, as long as managers can get away with the use of con-
ventional options, they will do so.  
As we explained above, the expected value of a conventional op-
tion is substantially greater than that of a reduced-windfall option. 
Specifically, the return on the conventional option is equal to the 
windfall-reduced return plus the windfall portion of the return that is 
screened out by, for example, indexing. Consider, for example, an op-
tion indexed to the firm’s sector. Since the market return has a sub-
stantial expected value for any given period, the value of a conven-
tional option is much greater than that of the indexed option. An ex-
ecutive of a company that performs worse than all of the other firms 
in its sector might receive no gains from an indexed option, but 
would receive substantial gains from a non-indexed option in any 
case in which the firm’s stock price increases over time.  
The prospect of gains arising from market and sector movements 
does not have any incentive effect on managers. As we explained ear-
lier, from the shareholders’ perspective these gains represent wasted 
money. By tying the options to market or sector performance, the 
firm could create the same incentives at a lower price, saving share-
holders money. Alternatively, the firm could use the same amount of 
money it currently spends on conventional options to give managers 
a larger number of reduced-windfall options, which would create 
more powerful incentives. In either case, shareholders would benefit.  
But in either case, managers would be worse off. If the firm pro-
vides them with the same amount of incentives at a lower cost to 
shareholders, the managers will earn less. If, on the other hand, the 
firm provides them with more incentives at the same cost to share-
holders, the managers will not earn less but will need to work harder 
and smarter for the same compensation. For example, the managers 
might need to downsize their empires, fire loyal but unproductive 
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subordinates, and take other steps that might be personally unpleasant 
but are necessary to boost shareholder value. Thus, for the same rea-
sons that reduced-windfall options are better for shareholders, they 
are worse for managers.  
Furthermore, indexing the exercise price (or conditioning vest-
ing on the firm outperforming a certain number of other companies) 
might be undesirable for many managers because it would shine a 
spotlight on their performance relative to their peers. Sector indexing, 
for example, would explicitly reveal the ranking of each manager 
against other managers in the same industry. This, in turn, would ex-
pose 50 percent of all managers as being below average. To the ex-
tent that managers do not know where they would rank, the fear of 
being ranked below average might lead all of the managers in a sec-
tor—even those who are fairly confident in their abilities—to oppose 
indexing.  
Note that the fear of being exposed as relatively mediocre is 
completely distinct from the risk of nonpayment under an indexing 
regime. Suppose, for example, that managers were guaranteed a 
minimum payment even if their firm performs worse than all other 
firms in their sector. These managers would still be embarrassed if 
the board or the compensation committee were forced to report that 
the reason the managers earned what they did was that the firm was 
the worst-performing in its sector. Thus, the fear of embarrassment 
would arise even if the firm adopted a soft form of indexing that pro-
vided a greater likelihood of payout than conventional options.  
There is a third possible reason why managers might oppose re-
duced-windfall options—the desire to keep option compensation 
more camouflaged. Suppose that, as some have claimed, the market 
is more likely to notice the cost of managers’ options when they ap-
pear as charges against earnings rather than in the footnotes of their 
financial statements. In that case, executives may oppose reduced-
windfall options also because they believe the increased salience of 
the charge to earnings will draw additional negative attention to their 
option compensation.  
Indeed, this fear of exposure may explain managers’ fierce resis-
tance to the FASB’s attempt to rationalize options accounting. Finan-
cially, there is no plausible justification for the disparate treatment of 
conventional and indexed or performance-conditioned options. The 
FASB attempted several years ago to impose a requirement, essen-
tially in line with the current treatment of indexed and performance-
conditioned options, that all stock-based compensation be accounted 
for on a rational and consistent basis.151 Encountering heated resis-
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tance, the FASB stopped short of requiring firms to adopt its “fair 
value” method of option accounting.152 Instead, FASB decided to re-
quire companies that fail to adopt the new standards voluntarily and 
instead continue to employ the traditional accounting methods (al-
most all firms) to disclose the information in footnotes.153 Thus, to the 
extent the market does not fully notice the cost of options reported in 
footnotes, conventional options enable managers to better camou-
flage rent extraction. 
Of course, in certain situations one type of reduced-windfall op-
tion—indexed options—makes executives better off. In particular, if 
the index declines from the issue date to the exercise date, the exer-
cise price will fall, increasing the profits from exercise of the option. 
As explained earlier, the amount by which executives would be made 
better off in such cases is likely to be less, on average, than the 
amount by which they would be made worse off when the index in-
creases. However, executives are risk averse, and thus might be will-
ing to make such a tradeoff. One might ask, therefore, why managers 
do not find this aspect of indexing sufficiently appealing.  
The answer, we believe, is quite simple. As will be explained in 
Part III.C, when the stock price declines, executives might be able to 
get their options repriced at a lower exercise price. In such a case, 
they have ex post indexing on the downside. However, when the 
stock price increases for reasons unrelated to the CEO’s performance, 
the options are not repriced at a higher price and the CEO gets to 
benefit fully. Thus the CEO is in the position of “heads I win, tails I 
don’t lose.” And this is better for the CEO than indexing, where there 
is a favorable adjustment on the downside but also an unfavorable 
adjustment on the upside.  
We are not claiming that the practice of using conventional 
rather than reduced-windfall options arose because managers con-
sciously preferred and pushed for the use of such options when they 
were first introduced on a large scale. It may well be the case that 
those who initially advocated the use of options—whether they were 
academics, compensation consultants, institutional investors, or even 
the managers themselves—had not thought much about the benefits 
of designing options in a way that prevents or reduces rewards for 
general market or sector rises. However, for some years now academ-
ics, leading investors, and business commentators have understood 
the advantages of such option designs, and in a number of firms such 
designs (for example, vesting conditional on performance) have been 
implemented. Thus, the puzzle for the optimal contracting view is not 
                                                                                                                           
152 See Crystal, In Search of Excess at 234 (cited in note 6). 
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why the practice of rewarding managers for general or sector in-
creases arose in the first place. Rather the challenge for this view is to 
explain why this practice has persisted for so long and why designs 
aimed at reducing such rewards have been introduced so sparingly.154  
7. Is non-option compensation adjusted to reduce windfalls? 
It is difficult to reconcile firms’ failure to adopt reduced-windfall 
options with optimal contracting. Before moving on, however, we 
should consider whether managers’ non-option compensation is ad-
justed to offset any windfall managers receive through the option 
component of their compensation so as to better tie total compensa-
tion to the value created by the managers’ own efforts. That is, com-
panies can take the managers’ performance and the managers’ option 
profits into account ex post in adjusting bonuses and future salary, 
and in deciding whether to retain an executive. For example, the 
board could reduce the cash compensation of a relatively poorly per-
forming manager who has profited heavily from his options because 
of sector-wide increases in demand for the industry’s product. Con-
versely, the board could increase the cash salary of a manager who 
has added value for shareholders but who has not been able to profit 
from his options because of a stock price decline due to bad industry 
conditions.  
If there is such an adjustment, one would expect cash compensa-
tion to be negatively related to industry and market performance. 
There is some evidence suggesting that changes in cash salary and 
bonus are negatively linked to industry and market performance. Gib-
bons and Murphy found that the size of CEO pay raises is negatively 
correlated with industry and broader market performance.155 However, 
there is apparently no evidence that the absolute amount of cash 
                                                                                                                           
154 One might be inclined to think that the practice of using conventional options persists not be-
cause of managerial power but simply because of inertia. Indeed, we acknowledged earlier in our dis-
cussion of norms that the desire of boards to conform to “the norm” (and avoid the possible risks associ-
ated with change) is likely to introduce “stickiness” into executive compensation and slow movement 
from one equilibrium to another. However, it is unlikely that such inertia can explain the almost univer-
sal use of conventional options. First, stickiness has not stopped compensation consultants from rapidly 
introducing and “selling” to clients new option features that make managers better off—such as reload-
ing and accelerated vesting. Second, a number of the largest and most prestigious firms in the U.S. have 
already adopted windfall-reducing features such as performance-conditioned option vesting. Thus, 
boards of other firms that are interested in linking compensation more closely to the managers’ contribu-
tion to shareholder value can, if they wish, easily follow the model created by these early-adopting 
firms.  
155 See Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy, Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Execu-
tive Officers, 43 Indus Labor Rel Rev 30, 36 (1990) (examining 1974–1986 data). A study by Murphy 
looking at later data determined that the size of increases in cash compensation was negatively related 
only to broader market performance. See Murphy, Executive Compensation at 2535 (cited in note 2). 
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compensation (rather than changes in cash compensation) decreases 
with sector or market increases.  
Indeed, there is evidence that CEO cash compensation increases 
with market returns.156 There is also evidence—presented in two stud-
ies—that managers’ cash compensation also increases in response to 
sector-wide and firm-specific windfalls. The first study, by Blanch-
ard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer,157 examines what eleven firms did 
with windfalls they received in connection with won or settled law-
suits, most of which had nothing to do with the current business ac-
tivities of the firms and thus were unlikely to reflect the efforts of 
current executives. Most of the cash was retained by the firm. Those 
firms distributing cash did so either to give a significant dividend to a 
large controlling shareholder or to repurchase the shares of large out-
side shareholders that could pose a threat to managers. The study 
found that 16 percent of the net award was given to the top three ex-
ecutives over three years following the award, boosting median cash 
compensation to these executives by 84 percent. Some firms also 
gave more stock and option grants to managers. 
The second study, by Bertrand and Mullainathan,158 finds that 
managers are rewarded for sector-related luck. The authors examine 
the compensation of managers when, because of changes beyond 
their control, their sector does exceptionally well. The authors study 
three such situations: (1) when oil price increases boost the perform-
ance of the oil industry; (2) when a change in exchange rates benefits 
import-affected industries; and (3) when, for whatever reason, all 
other firms in the industry perform well. The authors find that in all 
of these situations managers are paid the same for a “lucky” dollar as 
for a “general” dollar. 
These findings are clearly more consistent with the managerial 
power approach than with optimal contracting.159 Under optimal con-
tracting, there is no need to compensate or penalize managers for 
changes that are beyond their control. Indeed, making compensation 
depend on such changes is considered undesirable because it adds 
riskiness to the compensation package and thereby reduces the value 
of the package to managers. Under the managerial power approach, 
                                                                                                                           
156 See Himmelberg and Hubbard, Incentive Pay and the Market for CEOs at 17, 24 (cited in note 
9). 
157 See Olivier Jean Blanchard, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, What Do Firms 
Do with Cash Windfalls?, 36 J Fin Econ 337, 358–59 (1994). 
158 See Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, Do CEO’s Set Their Own Pay? The Ones 
without Principals Do at 37, NBER Working Paper No 7604 (2000), available online at 
<http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7604.pdf> (visited Apr 27, 2002). We discuss this study further in Part 
III.G. 
159 The authors of these studies did in fact interpret their results as evidence of “skimming.” 
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however, managers are expected to take as much as their power al-
lows, consistent with not triggering too much outrage. Because the 
windfall increases earnings and makes shareholders as a group better 
off, managers can increase their compensation at a lower outrage 
cost. Thus when the firm gains a windfall, managers can be expected 
to boost their pay. 
B. Near-Uniform Use of At-the-Money Options 
An analysis of options granted to the CEOs of one thousand 
large companies in 1992 determined that 95 percent of the options 
were granted at-the-money, that is, with an exercise price equal to the 
company’s stock price on the date of the grant.160 No one has provided 
a convincing explanation for this phenomenon, which Hall and Mur-
phy call “striking.”161 
1. The puzzle of one-size-fits-all. 
There is a debate in the literature as to the optimal exercise price 
for executive stock options, and researchers have identified various 
factors that might be relevant for this question.162 It is highly unlikely, 
however, that a single design would be optimal for nearly all compa-
                                                                                                                           
160 See Murphy, Executive Compensation at 70, Table 5 (cited in note 2). 
161 Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives at 19, NBER 
Working Paper No 8052 (2001), available online at <http://papers.nber.org/papers/ 
w8052.pdf> (visited Apr 27, 2002). 
162 Options ordinarily encourage executives to take on additional risk. See, for example, Kevin J. 
Murphy, Performance Standards in Incentive Contracts, 30 J Acct Econ 245, 273 (2001). Because most 
managers are underdiversified and risk averse, it generally is assumed that encouraging executives to 
take on additional risk is positive for shareholders. See DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn, 45 J Fin at 617 
(cited in note 111). But certain option designs might cause executives to take on too much or too little 
risk. While it is possible to show, under certain assumptions about managerial risk aversion, managers’ 
reservation utility, and project choices, that at-the-money options are optimal, see Nohel and Todd, Op-
timal Compensation at 4 (cited in note 109), under other assumptions one can show that they are not. 
See Nohel and Todd, Executive Compensation, Managerial Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Risky Pro-
jects at 4 (cited in note 109) (finding that out-of-the-money options may dominate both in- and at-the-
money options). See also Nohel and Todd, Executive Compensation, Reputation, and Risk-Taking Incen-
tives at 4 (cited in note 109) (showing that in-, at-, or out-of-the-money options can align incentives de-
pending on the circumstances); Tom Nohel and Steven Todd, Stock Options and Managerial Incentives 
to Invest, working paper (2001), available online at <http://www.sba.luc.edu/research/ 
wpapers/011109.pdf> (visited Apr 27, 2002) (describing circumstances in which out-of-the-money op-
tions best align managerial and shareholder interests); Brian J. Hall, A Better Way to Pay CEOs?, in Jen-
nifer Carpenter and David Yermack, eds, Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value: Theory and 
Evidence 35, 42 (Kluwer Academic 1999) (arguing that some firms could improve their executive com-
pensation practices by adopting out-of-the-money and indexed options, which provide greater sensitivity 
to performance than at-the-money options); Johnson and Tian, 57 J Fin Econ at 25–26 (cited in note 
116) (arguing that out-of-the-money options create more powerful incentives than at-the-money options 
of equal value); Richard A. Lambert, David F. Larcker, and Robert E. Verrecchia, Portfolio Considera-
tions in Valuing Executive Compensation, 29 J Acct Rsrch 129, 144 (1991) (arguing that options that are 
very likely to wind up in-the-money undesirably reduce managers’ willingness to take risks). 
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nies and all executives. Option values and the incentives they create 
depend on a stock’s volatility, the grantee’s stock holdings, and the 
grantee’s general level of risk aversion.163 Moreover, the shape of the 
desired incentive will depend on a firm’s growth opportunities, debt 
load, and other factors.164 These variables will differ from firm to 
firm, and even among executives within the same firm. Thus, there is 
no reason for the optimal exercise price to be the same for almost all 
companies. 165 
There is, however, a possible tax explanation for the almost 
complete absence of in-the-money options. In particular, in-the-
money options are not considered “performance-based compensa-
tion” under Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code and are 
therefore not deductible if an executive’s total non-performance-
based compensation exceeds $1 million per year. In addition, options 
that are granted in-the-money must be taken into earnings, whereas 
at-the-money and out-of-the-money options need not. Thus, although 
we are somewhat skeptical of accounting explanations for firm be-
havior, one might argue that accounting considerations can also ex-
plain the absence of in-the-money options.  
However, neither the tax nor the accounting explanation can ex-
plain the near complete absence of out-of-the-money options. The 
only possible optimal contracting explanation for this phenomenon is 
that out-of-the-money options are almost never optimal. 166 However, 
                                                                                                                           
163 See Nohel and Todd, Executive Compensation, Managerial Risk Aversion, and the Choice of 
Risky Projects at 7 (cited in note 109).  
164 See Chongwoo Choe, Executive Stock Options and Investment Choice at 3, La Trobe Univer-
sity School of Business working paper (1999), available online at 
<http://www.latrobe.edu.au/business/dps/pdfs/dps99/A99.11.pdf> (visited Apr 27, 2002) (arguing that 
the exercise price of managerial stock options should be adjusted when the firm has debt in its capital 
structure). Compare Harley E. Ryan Jr. and Roy A. Wiggins III, The Influence of Firm- and Manager-
Specific Characteristics on the Structure of Executive Compensation, 7 J Corp Fin 101, 101–05 (2001) 
(finding that CEO compensation is affected by firm-specific factors such as research and development 
and capital expenditure intensities and by manager-specific factors such as the CEO’s age).  
165 See Tian, Optimal Contracting, Incentive Effects and the Valuation of Executive Stock Options 
at 40 (cited in note 109) (arguing that the optimal exercise price depends in part on the level of risk 
aversion and could be in-, at-, or out-of-the-money depending on the executive and concluding that the 
uniform practice of granting at-the-money options is not supported by principal-agent theory). 
166 In recent work, Hall and Murphy use numerical simulations in an attempt to derive optimal ex-
ercise prices under various assumptions about the shape of managerial utility functions, managerial 
wealth, stock market returns, and the volatility of the firm’s stock. See Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Mur-
phy, Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options, 90 Am Econ Assoc Proceedings 209, 213 
(2000). Under a range of parameters, they show that the exercise price that maximizes pay-for-
performance sensitivity is usually in a range that includes the current market price. Id. See also Hall and 
Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives at 20–22 (cited in note 161) (“[S]etting exercise 
prices at (or near) the grant-date market price maximizes pay/performance incentives for risk-averse, 
undiversified executives.”). However, their analysis cannot explain why, as they report, 94 percent of 
option grants are at-the-money. First, there is no evidence that the utility functions they use—which are 
designed to make their calculations tractable—correspond to those of actual managers. Second, the 
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as Brian Hall has argued, out-of-the-money options offer much 
higher pay-for-performance sensitivity per dollar of expected value 
than conventional options. And there is empirical evidence suggest-
ing that giving managers out-of-the-money options rather than at-the-
money options would, on average, boost firm value.167 Thus, it is ex-
tremely unlikely that out-of-the-money options are almost never op-
timal. According to Hall, the “almost complete absence of premium 
or indexed options seems puzzling given their striking advantages in 
terms of pay to performance.”168  
While many have noticed that there is near-uniformity among 
the exercise price of options, little attention has been given to the fact 
that there are actually two dimensions along which this uniformity 
occurs: (1) any given firm will use the same exercise price for op-
tions regardless of the vesting period of the option—for example, an 
option that vests in a year has the same exercise price as an option 
that vests in five years; and (2) almost all firms use the same formula 
for determining this exercise price, namely, the current market price.  
As we saw earlier, the literature has focused on the second pat-
tern. But it has not fully considered the first—that exercise prices are 
uniform across vesting periods. Note that because prices on average 
go up, an option that is issued at the current market price is likely to 
be in-the-money in the future. The effect of such an option on effort 
then would be equivalent to the effect on effort today of an option 
that is currently in-the-money. As Warren Buffett has observed, get-
ting rich with at-the-money options vesting over a ten-year period 
does not require much effort. If the CEO buys government bonds 
with the firm’s earnings instead of paying them out in dividends, the 
share price is likely to rise over time. As Buffett puts it, “these [at-
the-money] plans are really a royalty on the passage of time.”169 
We certainly do not attempt to analyze here what would be the 
optimal exercise price of options that are going to vest a number of 
years from now. This might depend on the time value of money and 
the rate of inflation. An option exercisable at the current market price 
that vests in five years will have in real terms an exercise price much 
lower than the current market price. The important point is that there 
is little reason to think that the optimal exercise price would not only 
                                                                                                                           
analysis does not take into account the incentive effects of the options on managerial behavior and the 
stock price. Third, even if their parameters corresponded to the situations of actual CEOs and incentive 
effects could be ignored, their parameters generate a range of optimal exercise prices, some of which 
(under certain conditions) are out-of-the-money. Yet, almost all option grants are at-the-money.  
167 See Habib and Ljungqvist, Firm Value and Managerial Incentives at 17 (cited in note 110). 
168 Hall, A Better Way to Pay CEOs? at 43 (cited in note 162). 
169 Tully, Raising the Bar, Fortune at 272 (cited in note 6). 
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be uniform across sectors, companies, and executives but also be uni-
form across vesting periods.  
2. The managerial power explanation.  
Under optimal contracting, the exercise price of options should 
be set to maximize shareholder value and, since there is reason to be-
lieve that the value-maximizing exercise price might differ across 
vesting periods and across firms, the uniformity along both dimen-
sions poses a puzzle. Under the managerial power approach, how-
ever, the nearly uniform use of at-the-money executive stock option 
plans can be easily explained. Under that approach, managers are not 
seeking exercise prices that are value-maximizing for shareholders. 
Rather, managers are interested in exercise prices that are value-
maximizing for managers—namely, the lowest possible exercise 
price consistent with other constraints.  
At-the-money options might well provide the best combination 
of high rents and low outrage. Holding the number of options granted 
constant, executives prefer the lowest possible exercise price. Each 
dollar of strike price reduction is a dollar gained once the option is 
in-the-money. Thus, executives prefer an option that bears the lowest 
possible strike price without causing too much outrage.  
Granting in-the-money options might appear to provide a gift to 
the executives—“incentive” compensation that requires no improve-
ment in performance—and thus might spark some outrage. In addi-
tion, as we explained above, a grant of in-the-money options would 
force the firm to reduce accounting earnings by the amount by which 
the options are in-the-money.170 To the extent that firms refuse to issue 
options that reduce accounting earnings, this requirement sets a floor 
for the exercise price at the current market price. We are a bit skepti-
cal about the force of the accounting explanation for the lack of in-
dexing, as we noted earlier. Rather, we think that firms might be us-
ing accounting effects as an excuse for not using reduced-windfall 
options. If this is in fact the case, firms could not use in-the-money 
options with their adverse accounting effects, because this would re-
move the excuse that adverse accounting effects prevent them from 
using reduced-windfall options.  
The above discussion explains why plan designers might be re-
luctant to use in-the-money options. This leaves, however, a range of 
possible exercise prices at or above the grant-date market price. 
Within this range, the lowest possible exercise price is the grant-date 
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pensation under IRC § 162(m). 
2002] Managerial Power and Executive Compensation 821 
market price. And this exercise price can plausibly be justified be-
cause managers profit if and only if the stock price increases above 
its current level. And there may well be some situations in which at-
the-money options are indeed optimal. Thus, in any given firm, at-
the-money options are unlikely to generate any outrage. The empiri-
cal observation that exercise prices are almost uniformly set to the 
company’s stock price on the date of the grant, regardless of the vest-
ing period, the type of company, and the stage of the executive’s ca-
reer—all factors relevant for economic optimization—is thus consis-
tent with rent extraction constrained by the possibility of outrage. 
C. Resetting of Option Exercise Prices 
In many cases, corporations have lowered the strike prices of op-
tions when their stock prices fell below the original exercise prices, 
but firms have rarely raised strike prices in a rising market. This one-
sided practice of resetting is yet another feature of option practice 
that is puzzling from an optimal contracting perspective, but consis-
tent with the managerial power approach. 
Although not universal, the practice of resetting was fairly com-
mon in the 1990s, even though the market as a whole was performing 
well. Examining the S&P ExecuComp database for 1992–1995, 
Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack found that on average 1.3 percent 
of executives had options reset each year.171 Of 806 individual option 
resets, they found that the strike price was increased in only two 
cases, and they calculated an average reduction in exercise price of 
39 percent.172 It is worth noting that the S&P 500 Index rose by about 
50 percent during the period studied by the authors, with no signifi-
cant downturns. The frequency of resetting is likely to be much 
higher in falling markets.173  
                                                                                                                           
171 See Menachem Brenner, Rangarajan K. Sundaram, and David Yermack, Altering the Terms of 
Executive Stock Options, 57 J Fin Econ 103, 110 (2000). See also Kathy B. Ruxton, Executive Pay, 
1998: Chief Executive Officer Compensation at S&P Super 1,500 Companies as Reported in 1998 2 
(Investor Responsibility Research Center 1999) (finding that 3 percent of 1189 firms surveyed by the 
IRRC repriced options in 1998). 
172 See Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack, 57 J Fin Econ at 112 (cited in note 171).  
173 The FASB has issued new guidelines that impose unfavorable accounting requirements on 
companies that reset the exercise price of outstanding options. One might therefore believe that even if 
stock prices fall, firms will be more reluctant to reprice options. However, no such requirements are im-
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1. The resetting puzzle. 
Ex post adjustments to compensation contracts have troubling 
implications that make them difficult to explain within an optimal 
contracting framework. Clearly, the expectation that firms will adjust 
ex post for adverse stock price movements undermines ex ante incen-
tives. Thus, the practice of ex post resetting undermines the goal that 
underlies the very use of stock option plans.174 Indeed, if executives 
anticipate that the exercise price will be reset if the stock price falls, 
they might have an incentive to take steps to reduce the share price in 
the short run in order to lower the exercise price. 
Companies claim that these adjustments are necessary to retain 
and motivate executives when prices fall to levels that make existing 
options far out-of-the-money. Although ex post resetting undermines 
ex ante incentives to some extent, so the argument goes, companies 
might determine that on balance these ex post retention and incentive 
benefits outweigh the ex ante costs.  
However, when stock options have a long maturity and the stock 
is highly volatile, even a steep fall in the share price might not sub-
stantially change the value of, and the incentives provided by, the op-
tions.175 Thus, the retention and incentive justifications for repricing 
options do not always apply. 
Even when a fall in stock market price does eliminate incentives, 
optimal contracting suggests that companies should adjust option 
terms to provide better incentives going forward, not merely to trans-
fer value to recipients. If exercise prices are reset, for example, vest-
ing periods should be reset as though the options were granted on the 
date of the repricing. There is no incentive or retention reason to give 
executives any benefit from fully or partially vested options that have 
lost their value. Any such benefit would therefore constitute a wind-
fall. 
It has been argued that, even if resetting is undesirable following 
a company-specific price decline, it might be appropriate after a gen-
eral market downturn, because such an event is outside of the execu-
tives’ control and executives will demand a large risk premium if 
there is no adjustment for general market corrections.176 But repricing 
conventional options in the wake of a market downturn appears to be 
                                                                                                                           
174 See Viral V. Acharya, Kose John, and Rangarajan K. Sundaram, On the Optimality of Resetting 
Executive Stock Options, 57 J Fin Econ 65, 67 (2000). 
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a second-best result compared with indexing the options against mar-
ket movements in the first place. Ex post adjustment of the terms of 
indexed options that automatically correct for sector-wide (or at least 
market-wide) shocks will generally be less necessary, and will cer-
tainly be more difficult to justify.  
Consider two regimes. In the first, executives receive conven-
tional options and fall back on resetting when the market moves 
against them. This arrangement allows the executives to reap the 
gains that come with a market-wide rally, even if the rally simply off-
sets an earlier market slide. So resetting provides much more than 
downward price protection—resetting lets executives “buy” on major 
market dips. Moreover, because the determinants of share prices are 
complex, executives can justify resetting when only a fraction of the 
decline in their firm’s share price is actually attributable to a market 
correction. 
In the second regime, executives hold standard indexed options, 
whose exercise price is tied to the sector or market average. The ex-
ecutives are insulated from sector or broad market swings. Resetting 
becomes difficult, if not impossible, to justify, and market slides do 
not become opportunities for profit taking on the rebound. Thus, even 
if the executives receive more indexed options to reflect their reduced 
expected value, as they should, the loss of the resetting advantage 
leaves them worse off overall. 
Optimal contracting explanations for resetting are further un-
dermined by empirical analyses concerning the use of this device. 
Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack find that resetting does not occur as 
a result of industry-wide shocks, as one would expect if the process 
were used to avoid penalizing executives for larger trends beyond 
their control.177 Rather, resetting is associated with poor firm-specific 
stock price performance, which might reward the management of 
poorly performing firms.178 Similarly, Chance, Kumar, and Todd find 
that repricing decisions are not driven by market or industry factors.179  
                                                                                                                           
177 See Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack, 57 J Fin Econ at 121 (cited in note 171). 
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2. The managerial power explanation. 
From the managerial power perspective, however, the resetting 
arrangement makes sense. Executives’ enjoyment of large option 
gains when market prices increase across the board can easily be jus-
tified to observers in this fashion: There was a contract; it provided 
incentives; all parties to the contract—shareholders and executives—
enjoyed large gains; the firm sticks by its contracts. When the stock 
price drops, resetting can be justified based on the need to retain and 
motivate executives as the firm moves forward. If the company is 
still nervous about public reaction, it can reduce the exercise price 
somewhat, but leave it above market to show investors that the ex-
ecutives are not getting a free ride.180 
The practice of resetting must also be considered in light of the 
failure of companies to index options. As noted above, the combina-
tion of effects seems to enhance executive rent extraction. Executives 
appear to be much better off with conventional options that may be 
reset than they would be with indexed options. Finally, empirical data 
also support the managerial power explanation. For example, 
Chance, Kumar, and Todd find that repricing is more likely among 
smaller firms with boards that are dominated by insiders and other-
wise suffer from greater agency problems.181 And Callaghan, Saly, and 
Subramaniam report that executives release bad news shortly before 
the date on which the options are repriced and delay the release of 
good news until after that date in order to reduce the exercise price of 
the repriced options.182 
D. Executives’ Broad Freedom to Unwind Incentives 
Companies claim that they use equity-based compensation as a 
means of aligning incentives and increasing executive shareholding.183 
But firms take surprisingly few steps to prevent or regulate the un-
winding of the incentives provided by the grant of options and re-
stricted stock.184 Executives generally are left free to hedge away eq-
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uity exposure before these instruments vest, and typically are permit-
ted to choose the amount and timing of unwinding once vesting has 
occurred. The permissive attitude of firms toward managers deter-
mining the extent and the timing of incentive-unwinding presents an 
additional puzzle for the optimal contracting approach. 
1. Freedom to determine the amount of unwinding.  
Options and restricted shares are awarded in order to provide ex-
ecutives with stronger incentives to generate shareholder value. Be-
cause executives are risk-averse, they would prefer to receive the ex-
pected value of these incentive instruments in cash. Indeed, they 
might prefer to receive an amount in cash that is significantly less 
than the expected value of the incentives. Thus, once the options and 
restricted shares have vested, executives might wish to convert them 
into cash. But such an unwinding would eliminate the incentive bene-
fits that come from the executive holding these instruments. As a re-
sult, an optimal contract would be expected to restrict executives’ 
freedom to unwind vested options and stock in a way that balances 
risk-averse executives’ desire to cash out these equity-based instru-
ments against the need to provide them with the proper amount of in-
centives.  
 It should be noted that the rationale for restricting executives’ 
freedom to unwind vested incentives is not necessarily the same as 
the rationale for vesting periods. The purpose of a vesting period is to 
prevent an executive who has just been given options from immedi-
ately resigning and walking away with the options (or underlying 
shares) without having contributed any value to the firm. Once the 
options have vested, they are considered to have been earned by the 
executive and can no longer be taken away. But the fact that the op-
tions belong to the executive once they have vested does not neces-
sarily imply that the executive should be permitted to exercise the op-
tions and sell the shares acquired thereby immediately upon the op-
tions’ vesting. 
It is possible that the optimal design of option compensation in 
certain cases would be to prohibit the unwinding of the option for a 
specified period after the options have vested. For example, it might 
be desirable to give to a particular executive options that vest in three 
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years but cannot be cashed out during the two-year period beginning 
with the vesting date. If the executive continues to work for the com-
pany during those two years, the options (or, if he has exercised the 
options, the underlying shares) would provide desirable incentives 
during that period.  
Compare this restricted-unwinding arrangement to the situation 
in which such options can be exercised immediately on the vesting 
date, and the executive in fact exercises the options and sells the un-
derlying shares at that time. In this situation, shareholders must either 
(a) provide the executive with new options to maintain the same 
amount of incentives, which costs the shareholders more money than 
under the restricted-unwinding arrangement; or (b) indirectly bear the 
costs associated with the executive having weaker incentives during 
the two years following the vesting date than under the restricted-
unwinding arrangement.  
Furthermore, the restricted-unwinding arrangement is also likely 
to have an advantage over an unrestricted unwinding arrangement 
even when the executive does not expect to remain for two years af-
ter the vesting date. Even if the executive expects to leave on or 
shortly after the vesting date, the restricted-unwinding arrangement is 
likely to provide better incentives to maximize long-term shareholder 
value than one in which the executive can cash out the options on the 
vesting date. 
To be sure, restrictions on executives’ ability to cash out vested 
incentive instruments would impose some liquidity and diversifica-
tion costs on executives. These costs must be balanced against the in-
centive benefits of restricting the unwinding of these instruments. 
Thus, we are not claiming that in all cases such restrictions would be 
desirable. Moreover, in those cases where such restrictions on un-
winding vested options and stock are desirable, we are not claiming 
that there is a single optimal length for the restriction period. This is 
likely to vary from case to case, and would depend, among other 
things, on the expected length of the executive’s tenure at the firm 
and the executive’s diversification and consumption needs.  
What is clear, however, is that there is no reason to assume that 
the optimal contract would always give the executive the ability to 
unwind options and restricted stock as soon as they vest. Neverthe-
less, we observe virtually no attempts by firms to prevent executives 
from unwinding options and restricted shares immediately after they 
have vested.  
Not surprisingly, executives exercise many of their options well 
before expiration.185 A recent study examining ten-year options 
                                                                                                                           
185 See David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive 
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granted to the executives of forty large companies determined that 
the options were exercised after an average of 5.8 years.186 Moreover, 
despite the pressure that boards supposedly put on executives to in-
crease their shareholdings, executives sell all or almost all of the 
shares that are acquired through option exercise, far in excess of the 
level of sales required to satisfy the taxes due.187 Shares that are not 
sold after option exercise are often hedged in transactions that do not 
generate taxable income and which are not reported to the SEC.188 For 
example, executives often utilize collars and equity swaps to lock in 
gains on their shareholdings following a stock price increase, which, 
of course reduces their incentive to boost the price further.189 
A similarly puzzling practice is the lack of restrictions on the use 
of financial instruments to eliminate or weaken the incentive effects 
of unvested options and restricted shares. Executives generally are 
not barred from hedging away their equity exposure before these in-
struments vest. At the moment, several serendipitous features of the 
federal income tax code reduce the attractiveness of hedging un-
vested options and (to a lesser extent) restricted stock through the de-
rivatives market.190 But even modest changes in tax rules could elimi-
nate this disincentive. Thus, there is little reason not to include con-
tractual prohibitions on such unwinding.  
Finally, when managers are granted options to align their inter-
ests with those of shareholders, it would seem optimal—at least 
sometimes—for the firms granting those options to require that man-
agers not offset the desirable effect created by these incentives by 
selling shares they already hold. Yet, such restrictions are generally 
                                                                                                                           
Compatibility, 100 Colum L Rev 440, 468–72 (2000).  
186 See Jennifer N. Carpenter, The Exercise and Valuation of Executive Stock Options, 48 J Fin 
Econ 127, 139 (1998). Because executives are taxed when they exercise most options, the deferral of 
taxes provides executives with some incentive to delay exercise. See Schizer, 100 Colum L Rev at 468–
72 (cited in note 185). Thus, many options are not exercised immediately upon vesting. In a recent sur-
vey, the IRRC reported that in 1998 the median S&P 500 CEO held unexercised in-the-money options 
worth $10.9 million and that two-thirds of these options were vested. In 1997, the median CEO had held 
unexercised options worth $5.6 million. See Ruxton, Executive Pay, 1998 at 16 (cited in note 171).  
187 See Ofek and Yermack, 55 J Fin at 1376–77 (cited in note 183) (finding that “when executives 
exercise options to acquire stock, nearly all of the shares are sold”).  
188 See Ellen E. Schultz and Theo Francis, Fair Shares?: Why Company Stock Is a Burden for 
Many and Less So for a Few, Wall St J A1 (Nov 27, 2001). 
189 See J. Carr Bettis, John M. Bizjak, and Michael L. Lemmon, Insider Trading in Derivative Se-
curities: An Empirical Examination of the Use of Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate In-
siders at 2–3, working paper (1999), available online at <http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
id=167189> (visited Apr 27, 2002). See also Paul U Ali and Geof Stapledon, Having Your Options and 
Eating Them Too: Fences, Zero-Cost Collars and Executive Share Options, 18 Co & Sec L J 277, 277–
78 (2000) (describing the use of hedging devices by managers as an “alarming development” that sub-
verts the economic purpose of stock options).  
190 See Schizer, 100 Colum L Rev at 442–43 (cited in note 185). 
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not used. As a result, executives often sell stock they already hold 
when options (or restricted shares) are granted.191 
We want to stress that we are sympathetic to the possibility that 
in many cases the consumption and diversification needs of managers 
would require permitting some unwinding of positions before the 
managers leave the firm. Thus, in certain cases an optimal contract 
might permit a specified amount of unwinding after option vesting as 
well as when new options are granted. It might be desirable to write 
into compensation contracts provisions that authorize the compensa-
tion committee to expand the scope of unwinding in case of unantici-
pated increases in liquidity needs. All that said, however, it would be 
difficult to explain under the optimal contracting approach the almost 
universal absence of restrictions on the unwinding of vested options 
and shares, on the hedging of unvested options and restricted shares, 
and on the sale of existing shares when new options are granted.  
Once again, we believe that the absence of such restrictions can 
be explained under the managerial power approach to executive 
compensation. Broad freedom to unwind incentives benefits manag-
ers in a way that is not particularly conspicuous. Because plan de-
signers are seeking to benefit managers, even at the expense of public 
shareholders, the designers are not particularly concerned by the fact 
that the broad freedom to unwind incentives dilutes the strength of 
these incentives. Indeed, managers’ freedom to unwind incentives 
and their practice of doing so conveniently serves as a justification 
for providing the managers with new options and restricted stock to 
restore incentives. The puzzling absence of any contractual restric-
tions, even on the hedging of unvested shares and restricted stock, 
can thus be better understood under the managerial power approach 
than under the optimal contracting approach.  
2. Freedom to determine the time of unwinding. 
The previous discussion makes clear that managers are essen-
tially free to choose the extent to which they unwind their incentives. 
We now focus on another important freedom managers enjoy with re-
spect to the incentive features of their compensation contracts: that 
managers are permitted to choose the timing of the unwinding of 
their incentives.  
 Consider a situation in which—under an optimal contract—it 
would be desirable to allow an executive to sell a certain number of 
                                                                                                                           
191 See Ofek and Yermack, 55 J Fin at 1376 (cited in note 183) (finding that managers who already 
owned shares in excess of the number of options (or restricted shares) granted sold approximately 680 
shares for every one thousand options granted and 940 shares for every one thousand restricted shares 
granted). 
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shares in a given year, even though the executive is expected to con-
tinue to serve the firm for many more years. Suppose, for example, 
that the executive has liquidity or diversification needs that can be 
met only by these sales, and that the cost to him from being forced to 
hold onto these shares exceeds the marginal incentive benefit these 
shares provide.  
The fact that it is desirable for the executive to sell a certain 
number of shares per year does not imply that the executive should 
choose the exact timing of the sales. After all, most of these liquidity 
and diversification needs are unlikely to arise unexpectedly one 
morning. Rather, most of these needs can be anticipated and planned 
for. Accordingly, one could adopt a variety of restrictions on the tim-
ing of sales without hindering the executive’s ability to satisfy his le-
gitimate liquidity and diversification needs. For example, one could 
require that sales be carried out gradually over a specified period, 
perhaps pursuant to a prearranged plan. One could require the execu-
tive to receive advance permission from the compensation committee 
(or another committee) before trading. Or, the executive could be 
asked to sell the shares directly to the company for the average share 
price over a specified (and sufficiently long) period (say, the prior six 
months).  
The advantage of preventing managers from controlling the ex-
act timing of their sales is that it would reduce the amount of profits 
they can make trading on their inside information. Although it is ille-
gal for executives to trade on “material” inside information, the “ma-
teriality” standard is sufficiently high that executives can still make 
significant profits trading on inside information that is valuable but 
not considered legally “material.”192 These profits are unlikely to be 
an efficient mechanism for compensating executives. Indeed, the 
prospect of being able to control the timing of trades and make such 
profits might not only fail to provide useful incentives to executive, 
but also distort their behavior in a way that hurts shareholders.193 For 
example, the ability to time their sales might enable managers to 
benefit from transient rises in the stock price that do not reflect the 
creation of long-term shareholder value. This, in turn, would unde-
sirably increase managers’ focus on short-term price movements.  
Surprisingly, however, most firms impose few restrictions on ex-
ecutives’ ability to time the unwinding of their incentives. To be sure, 
                                                                                                                           
192 See Fried, 71 S Cal L Rev at 334–37 (cited in note 5). For more recent evidence, see Jennifer 
N. Carpenter and Barbara Remmers, Executive Stock Option Exercises and Inside Information, 74 J Bus 
513–34 (2001) (finding evidence that senior managers of small publicly traded companies exercise their 
options and sell the underlying stock shortly before the price of the stock exhibits negative abnormal re-
turns). 
193 See Fried, 71 S Cal L Rev at 313–16 (cited in note 5).  
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in the past fifteen years many firms have adopted trading windows 
and blackout periods which prevent executives from trading during 
periods when they are likely to know “material” inside information—
for example, a large, unexpected change in quarterly earnings—on 
which it is illegal to trade. But the impetus for these restrictions came 
not from a desire to improve pay arrangements but rather from the 
adoption of tough insider trading laws in the 1980s that made firms 
liable for illegal insider trading by their employees if they had not 
taken reasonable steps to prevent such trading.194 Moreover, these 
trading windows and blackout periods frequently fail to prevent ex-
ecutives with important but not legally “material” inside information 
from selling their shares before large stock price declines, thereby 
avoiding large losses.195 
Whether or not the board restricts the timing of sales, the board 
could require enhanced disclosure of these trades. Currently, Section 
16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that executives 
disclose their trades to the Securities and Exchange Commission by 
the tenth day of the month following the trade. Under the optimal 
contracting approach, one might expect firms to require their execu-
tives to provide much earlier disclosure.  
For example, the board could, as one of us has proposed in an 
earlier work, require executives to publicly disclose publicly in ad-
vance their intended trades.196 Under such a pretrading disclosure 
scheme, announcement of an unusually large sale would signal the 
possibility that the executive knows bad news about the firm, driving 
the price down. The market’s reaction would reduce executives’ abil-
ity to make profits trading on their inside information.  
Alternatively, the board could require real-time disclosure or 
disclosure the day after the sale. But even firms that use trading win-
dows or similar restrictions make no attempt to require managers to 
provide timely disclosure of sales. Indeed, many firms have moved in 
the opposite direction and taken steps to reduce transparency. These 
firms permit or even facilitate transactions that are economically 
equivalent to sales but which allow the executives to avoid making 
the usual post-trade disclosure to the SEC. For example, more than 
                                                                                                                           
194 Id at 331, 345. 
195 See, for example, Bridget O’Brian, Insider Selling of a Stock Headed South May Mean Others 
Should Also Bail Out, Wall St J C14 (July 17, 1996) (reporting that an executive of Micro Warehouse 
Inc., which permits executives to trade only during a nine-day period that begins five days after each 
quarterly earnings announcement, sold $2.4 million of stock in late-April/early-May, a month before an 
announcement about disappointing second quarter earnings drove the share price down by more than 60 
percent). For an explanation for why trading windows do not completely prevent executives from trad-
ing on inside information, see Fried, 71 S Cal L Rev at 346 (cited in note 5). 
196 See Fried, 71 S Cal L Rev at 348 (cited in note 5). 
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25 percent of large companies give their executives multi-million-
dollar loans, which executives often repay with company stock. Al-
though the use of stock to repay these loans is economically equiva-
lent to a sale of the stock to shareholders, these transactions are not 
covered by Section 16(a) and thus need not be reported to the SEC by 
the tenth day of the following month. Instead, firms are required to 
disclose these transactions only once per year, within forty-five days 
of the end of the fiscal year.197  
Not surprisingly, executives exploit their broad freedom to time 
their sales of shares and camouflage these transactions to make sub-
stantial profits trading on private information. In fact, there is evi-
dence indicating that executives make at least several billion dollars 
per year in profits (and avoided losses) because of their access to in-
side information.198 Although the broad freedom to make such profits 
is difficult to explain from an optimal contacting perspective, it is 
easily explained under the managerial power approach. These profits, 
which ultimately come at the expense of public shareholders, provide 
extra value to executives that does not show up in any of the firm’s 
accounting information or compensation figures disclosed to share-
holders. These insider trading profits are also not usually remarked 
on by the media, except in notorious cases involving large sales of 
stock that precede dramatic declines in the stock price.199 Thus, the 
cost of these hidden insider trading profits to shareholders is likely to 
go unnoticed. 
E. Reload Options 
A significant number of firms grant new, or “reload,” options to 
executives who exercise options by surrendering stock. This practice 
is yet another twist to conventional options plans that we think is bet-
ter explained by the managerial power approach than by the optimal 
contracting approach.200 Basic reload options work as follows: The 
holder of an option with a reload provision exercises that option be-
fore expiration and pays the exercise price with stock that he already 
owns. In return, he receives the underlying shares optioned, plus a 
new option for each share tendered in exercising the options. The 
new reload options carry the same expiration date as the original op-
tions, but the exercise price is set at market. For example, a CEO who 
                                                                                                                           
197 David Leonhardt, It’s Called a ‘Loan’, But It’s Far Sweeter, NY Times § 3 at 1 (Feb 3, 2002).  
198 See Fried, 71 S Cal L Rev at 332, 323 (cited in note 5). 
199 For example, the media have recently focused their attention on the fact that Enron executives 
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held ten reloadable options with a $20 strike price would surrender 
five shares of stock to exercise the options if the market price at ex-
ercise stood at $40/share. He would receive the ten shares optioned 
plus five new reload options with a $40 strike price.201  
Options with a reload provision are worth more to the holder 
than are conventional options. By exercising the first generation op-
tions after a price spike, the recipient locks in a portion of the gain 
against a subsequent share price decline, and the reload options allow 
him to do so without giving up all of the upside potential.202 Thus, re-
load options enable executives to profit more from share price vola-
tility—even if long-term share performance is flat. The incremental 
value of the reload feature depends on the volatility of the firm’s 
stock price and other factors. Examining one executive at one firm by 
way of example, Saly, Jagannathan and Huddart estimated that basic 
reload options in that case were worth about 15 percent more than 
conventional options.203 
Reloads are difficult to explain under the optimal contracting 
approach. Proponents argue that the reload feature encourages execu-
tives to exercise options earlier and therefore to hold more shares.204 
However, if the executives sell the shares they receive on exercise, as 
is generally the case,205 the reloads do not result in executives holding 
more shares unless there are additional constraints on the reload pro-
gram. For example, a reload plan might place minimum holding 
times on the stock surrendered on exercise or on the stock received 
through exercise, and thereby indirectly or directly cause executives 
to hold more stock. However, there is a cheaper and more direct way 
to achieve the same result: the executive could be required to own a 
minimum number of shares. In some cases, the reload feature might 
actually reduce an executive’s shareholdings by giving him an incen-
                                                                                                                           
201 As will be explained, there are several variations on the reload theme. For example, some re-
load plans provide additional reload options to replace shares that would have to be sold to pay the tax 
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tive to “pay” for his reload options with existing shares rather than 
with cash raised.  
Although reloads are not easily explained by the optimal con-
tracting approach to executive compensation, the reload feature is 
quite consistent with the managerial power approach. The reload fea-
ture makes the options more valuable for the executives, but it does 
so in a way that is complex and hard to evaluate. Despite their added 
cost, reloads can plausibly be justified to investors. Even better, re-
loads can be tweaked to provide even more value with little or no in-
vestor reaction. We have already seen that options with the basic re-
load feature are more valuable to their recipients, and we have sug-
gested that their justification—increasing executive stock owner-
ship—is facially plausible, but that the benefit is illusory unless the 
executives are required to hold shares for some period prior to or fol-
lowing option exercise. These are constraints that have little or noth-
ing to do with reloads per se. We will now turn to the variations in re-
loads that add even more value. 
An executive who exercises nonqualified stock options owes or-
dinary income tax on the gain. Many firms with reload programs is-
sue additional reload options to cover the shares that must be set 
aside to pay the executive’s taxes.206 This practice is justified as nec-
essary to maintain the executive’s total share price exposure.207 This 
sounds plausible at first blush, but in fact the tax reload provision (as 
it is known) is the equivalent of making a larger conventional option 
grant in the first place—a grant that is more valuable to the executive 
and more costly for the shareholders.208 
One might ask, what is so special about the tax that is due on the 
exercise of options? Most executives own a fair number of shares of 
company stock and owe taxes each year on their salary, bonus, exer-
cised options, and restricted stock that becomes unrestricted. One 
could just as plausibly argue that the company should issue options to 
                                                                                                                           
206 See Gay, Hard to Lose, Wall St J at R6 (cited in note 204) (reporting that twenty-one of forty 
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834 The University of Chicago Law Review [69:751 
replace hypothetical stock sales made by an executive to cover the 
taxes due on any of these sources of income.  
F. Gratuitous Acquisition-Related Payments 
Another compensation practice that is more easily explained un-
der the managerial power approach is the practice of giving the CEO 
of an acquired firm a “gratuitous” payment for facilitating the acqui-
sition—a payment that is not required under the terms of his contract.  
It is no secret that executives are often paid large amounts when 
their firms are acquired.209 In many cases, these payments are made 
pursuant to the terms of the executive’s compensation contract. One 
common way for the compensation contract to provide for an acquisi-
tion-related payment to the executive is through what is called a 
“golden parachute.”210 Under such an arrangement, the executive is 
paid a specified amount in the event that the firm is acquired and cer-
tain other conditions are met. 
There is a debate over whether the use of golden parachutes and 
similar arrangements is driven by optimal contracting or managerial 
opportunism. Some researchers have argued that golden parachutes 
encourage managers to take desirable risks; others have argued that 
golden parachutes reduce the disciplining effect on managers of the 
market for corporate control.211  
                                                                                                                           
209 See Jay Hartzell, Eli Ofek, and David Yermack, What’s in It for Me?: Personal Benefits Ob-
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Our focus, however, is on situations where executives receive 
payments in connection with acquisitions that are not required under 
the terms of the executives’ compensation contracts. These gratuitous 
acquisition payments, which are often made in addition to golden 
parachute payments, can take a variety of forms. For example, target 
boards sometimes augment the value of a previously negotiated 
golden parachute.212 At other times, target boards make special cash 
payments to the CEO.213  
 Gratuitous payments, by definition, are not negotiated in ad-
vance. Because managers do not know whether they will receive a 
gratuitous payment if there is an acquisition (and the amount of such 
payment, if any), the prospect of such a payment is unlikely to have 
much effect—good or bad—on managerial behavior ex ante. Thus, 
even if it could be shown conclusively that golden parachutes gener-
ate desirable ex ante incentives, it would still be difficult to explain 
how these gratuitous payments reflect optimal contracting.  
However, gratuitous payments can easily be explained under the 
managerial power approach. That approach suggests two reasons why 
boards might agree to make these payments. First, given a CEO’s 
power to delay or prevent desirable acquisitions, the board might find 
it necessary to “bribe” the CEO to allow the acquisition to go forward 
smoothly. Second, the CEO might be able to convince the board to 
give him a parting gift (using shareholders’ money). In each case, the 
CEO is using his power to extract rents.  
Consider the first situation: the board determines it must bribe 
the CEO to allow the acquisition to go forward. Managers enjoy pri-
vate benefits of control (including rent extraction through formal sal-
ary arrangements, which is the focus of this Article) because of their 
positions in the firm. Therefore, they have an incentive to resist take-
overs, even if the takeover would benefit shareholders. Under current 
law, managers have the power to resist a takeover and substantially 
delay the completion of any acquisition. Given managers’ ability to 
impede the acquisition, it might be necessary to bribe them not to. 
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To be more concrete, let B denote the (present value of the) pri-
vate benefits that managers will lose in the event their firm is ac-
quired. Let Ga denote the acquisition-related payment, if any, to 
which managers are contractually entitled by virtue of a golden para-
chute or similar ex ante arrangement. Let Gp denote the gratuitous 
acquisition-related payment. If Ga < B, the managers will have an in-
centive to resist the acquisition unless the board provides the manag-
ers with an (additional) payment, Gp, such that Ga + Gp > B. And, 
even if Ga > B, managers might threaten to hold up the deal unless 
they receive more compensation. 
It may well be the case that, given managers’ power to defend 
their positions and the private benefits of control they enjoy as a re-
sult of their positions, it is a desirable “second-best” strategy for 
boards to reward managers with gratuitous payments for allowing 
acquisitions to take place.214 If so, these arrangements should not be 
restricted or substantially curtailed. Although such restrictions might 
make shareholders better off in cases where they do not prevent an 
acquisition, such restrictions would leave shareholders in a worse po-
sition overall by reducing the number of value-increasing acquisi-
tions.215 For our purposes, however, it is irrelevant whether the prac-
tice of giving CEOs gratuitous payments to facilitate transactions is 
desirable. The important point, for our purposes, is that the practice 
of making such payments is an indication that managers use their 
power to extract rents.  
The second reason a board might give a CEO a gratuitous pay-
ment in connection with an acquisition is to bestow a gift on the 
CEO. That is, the payment is not necessary to secure the CEO’s co-
operation in connection with the acquisition. The board might agree 
to make this payment out of affection for the CEO, because of per-
sonal gratitude, or to curry favor with the CEO (who might be in a 
position to help them in the future). This payment, made with share-
holders’ money, provides no benefit to shareholders—unlike the bribe 
in the first situation.  
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215 But see Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack, What’s in It for Me? at 20 (cited in note 209) (finding 
evidence that in transactions where CEOs get direct or indirect gratuitous transfers, they negotiate lower 
acquisition premia for shareholders). For evidence of the effect of ex ante compensation agreements on 
the likelihood of acquisition, compare Machlin, Choe, and Miles, 36 J L & Econ at 869 (cited in note 
211) (reporting that golden parachute contracts increase the likelihood of an acquisition), with Cotter 
and Zenner, 35 J Fin Econ at 92 (cited in note 211) (finding no significant effect of golden parachutes on 
likelihood of acquisition). 
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There are a number of reasons why an acquisition might facili-
tate the extraction of these additional rents. The acquisition might en-
able such rent-extraction because the CEO and the board need not 
fear any repercussions from shareholders. Alternatively, the acquisi-
tion might provide camouflage by distracting shareholders from the 
payment or tying the payment to a transaction that benefits share-
holders overall. In any event, the gift reflects managers’ use of 
power—specifically, their close relationship with the board—to ex-
tract rents. 
G. Differences between Executives with More and Less Power 
The managerial power approach focuses upon the connection be-
tween managerial power and the rents that managers can extract. In 
all companies with dispersed shareholders and no controlling share-
holder, executives will have power and will be able to extract at least 
some rents. Management power, however, is not uniform in all com-
panies with dispersed shareholding. Managers will have more or less 
power depending upon the presence of effective takeover impedi-
ments, the structure of the board, the presence of large shareholders 
(even if they are not controlling shareholders), and the fraction of 
shares held by institutional investors. All else being equal, the mana-
gerial power approach predicts that managers will extract more rents 
in situations and structures in which they have more power. There is 
substantial evidence consistent with this position. 
1. Relationship between power and pay. 
There are several factors whose presence would tend to make 
managers more powerful. Other things being equal, managers would 
tend to have more power when (a) the managers are protected by an-
titakeover arrangements, (b) the board is relatively weak or ineffec-
tual, (c) the managers have a large ownership stake, (d) there are 
fewer institutional shareholders, or (e) there is no large outside share-
holder. As described below, empirical examinations of each of these 
factors have found that they affect managerial pay arrangements in 
the way predicted by the managerial power approach. 
(a) Antitakeover protection. There is evidence that CEOs of 
firms that adopt antitakeover provisions get higher salaries, receive 
more options, and are more likely to have a golden parachute ar-
rangement.216 The mean level of above-market compensation in-
                                                                                                                           
216 See Kenneth A. Borokhovich, Kelly R. Brunarski, and Robert Parrino, CEO Contracting and 
Anti-Takeover Amendments, 52 J Fin 1495, 1503–13 (1997). Optimal contracting might predict the op-
posite—that if managers’ jobs are more secure, shareholders need not pay managers as high a risk pre-
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creases significantly after the provisions are adopted—that is, after 
the CEOs have become less vulnerable to a hostile takeover.217 
(b) Strength and independence of boards. In addition, there is 
evidence that executive compensation is higher when the CEO is 
more powerful vis-à-vis the board. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 
find that CEO compensation is higher when the board is larger (and 
thus less cohesive), when more of the outside directors have been ap-
pointed by the CEO (and thus might feel a sense of gratitude and ob-
ligation to the CEO), when the outside directors are older, and when 
outsiders serve on five or more boards (and thus are likely to be rela-
tively distracted).218 Cyert, et al, report that CEO pay is negatively re-
lated to the share ownership of the board of directors, is positively re-
lated to the CEO’s tenure, and is higher if the CEO is the chairman of 
the board.219 Relatedly, Wade, O’Reilly, and Chandratat find that as 
the percentage of the board composed of outsiders appointed after the 
                                                                                                                           
mium. See Anup Agrawal and Charles R. Knoeber, Managerial Compensation and the Threat of Take-
over, 47 J Fin Econ 219 (1998) (finding that CEOs of firms in industries with a higher rate of takeovers 
and CEOs of firms that are eventually taken over are paid slightly more than other CEOs, and attributing 
this differential to a risk-premium paid to CEOs more likely to lose their jobs).  
217 See Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Parrino, 52 J Fin at 1515 (cited in note 216). Managers who 
have become less vulnerable to a hostile takeover take advantage of their power in other ways as well. 
For example, CEOs of firms incorporated in states that adopt antitakeover statutes reduce their use of 
debt in order to reduce the risk of financial distress and constraints on their use of the firms’ cash, even 
though the debt is likely to have provided useful tax and agency benefits. See Gerald T. Garvey and 
Gordon Hanka, Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm 
Leverage, 54 J Fin 519, 521 (1999) (finding that, overall, impediments to takeovers induce a shift from 
debt to equity financing). See also Shjun Cheng, Venky Nagar, and Madhar V. Rajan, Control versus 
Risk in Stock-Based Incentives: Evidence from Antitakeover Regulation at 30, working paper (2001), 
available online at <http://papers.ssrn.com/id=288738> (visited May 3, 2002) (finding that CEOs of 
firms that become protected by new takeover legislation sell a large portion of their shares because the 
shares are not as necessary for maintaining control). 
218 See John E. Core, Robert W. Holthausen, and David E. Larcker, Corporate Governance, Chief 
Executive Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J Fin Econ 371, 372–73 (1999). CEO pay also in-
creases when a board contains interlocking directors. See Kevin Hallock, Reciprocally Interlocking 
Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation, 32 J Fin & Quant Anal 331, 332 (1997) (finding that 
the pay gap between interlocked and non-interlocked firms is as high as 17 percent after adjusting for all 
variables). This might not be as rare as one would imagine: in approximately one out of twelve firms, 
the board is current CEO-interlocked: the CEO of Firm A sits on the board of Firm B, and the CEO of 
Firm B sits on the board of Firm A. See Kevin Hallock, Dual Agency: Corporate Boards with Recipro-
cally Interlocking Relationships, in Jennifer Carpenter and David Yermack, eds, Executive Compensa-
tion and Shareholder Value: Theory and Evidence 55, 58 (Kluwer Academic 1999) (reporting that 8 per-
cent of a sample of 773 large publicly-traded firms had CEO-interlocked boards and 12 percent had em-
ployee-interlocked boards). For an examination of the factors that make reciprocal CEO board member-
ship more likely, see Eliezer M. Fich and Lawrence J White, Why Do CEO’s Reciprocally Sit on Each 
Other’s Boards? at 1–3, working paper (2001), available online at <http://www.stern.nyu.edu/clb/01-
002.pdf> (visited Apr 27, 2002).  
219  See Cyert, et al, Corporate Governance at 17–20 (cited in note 37). They also find that CEO 
pay is positively related to the percentage of outsiders on the board. They surmise that many of the out-
side directors are handpicked friends of the CEO. 
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CEO takes office increases, the more likely it is that the CEO will be 
able to secure a golden parachute.220 
 (c) CEO share ownership. The managerial power approach pre-
dicts that as the CEO’s share ownership increases, thereby making 
the CEO more powerful vis-à-vis other shareholders, his compensa-
tion will increase. In fact, the amount of CEO compensation is posi-
tively related to CEO stock ownership.221 Not surprisingly, executives 
owning majority blocks receive higher salaries than executives in 
similar firms that do not have a lock on control.222 
(d) Presence of institutional investors. In a study of S&P firms 
from 1991 through 1997, Hartzell and Starks find that the more con-
centrated institutional ownership is, the lower executive compensa-
tion is. They also find that a larger institutional presence results in 
more performance-sensitive compensation.223 This study suggests that 
the presence of institutions serves to reduce the power of manage-
ment to extract rents through compensation.  
(e) Presence of a large blockholder. Moreover, there is evidence 
that the presence of a large shareholder is significant. Even when 
such a shareholder does not have a controlling or dominant position, 
its monitoring can reduce the extraction of rents. Richard Cyert and 
his colleagues found a negative relationship between the equity own-
ership of the largest shareholder and the amount of CEO compensa-
tion.224 In an analysis of manufacturing firms, Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 
determined that CEO incentive alignment is superior, and that the 
CEO exercises less influence over his own compensation, when the 
company has a 5-percent external shareholder.225  
                                                                                                                           
220 See James Wade, Charles A. O’Reilly, III, and Ike Chandratat, Golden Parachutes, CEOs and 
the Exercise of Social Influence, 35 Admin Sci Q 587, 592–93 (1990) There is also evidence that the 
structure of CEO pay is affected by the composition of the compensation committee. When at least one 
member of the compensation committee is an insider, the sensitivity of pay to performance is lower. See 
Harry A. Newman and Haim A. Mozes, Does the Composition of the Compensation Committee Influ-
ence CEO Compensation Practices?, 28 Fin Mgmt 41–53 (1999).  
221 See Cyert, et al, Corporate Governance at 3 (cited in note 37).  
222  Clifford Holderness and Dennis Sheehan, The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held 
Corporations, 20 J Fin Econ 317 (1988) (finding that top executives owning majority blocks receive 
larger salaries than top executives in similar firms in which shareholding is diffuse). 
223 See Jay C. Hartzell and Laura T. Starks, Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation at 
32, working paper (2002), available online at <http://www.bus.utexas.edu/AIMCenter/ 
Working%20Papers/Hartzell8.pdf> (visited Apr 27, 2002) (finding a significant negative relationship 
between CEO compensation and the concentration of institutional ownership).  
224 See Cyert, et al, Corporate Governance at 18 (cited in note 37) (finding that a CEO who is not 
also the largest shareholder receives, on average, about 5 percent less in total compensation). 
225 See Henry L. Tosi Jr. and Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, The Decoupling of CEO Pay and Perform-
ance: An Agency Theory Perspective, 34 Admin Sci Q 169, 181 (1989). Relatedly, Benz, Kucher, and 
Stutzer find that in S&P 500 firms a higher concentration of shareholders results in a significantly re-
duced number of options granted to top executives. See Matthias Benz, Marcel Kucher, and Alois 
Stutzer, Stock Options: The Managers’ Blessing: Institutional Restrictions and Executive Compensation 
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In two recent creative empirical studies, Bertrand and Mullaina-
than present findings indicating that the absence of shareholders 
owning more than 5 percent of the shares is associated with signifi-
cant deviations from optimal contracting. In the first study, Bertrand 
and Mullainathan examine companies with and without a large share-
holder to determine if there is a difference in the extent to which 
CEOs are rewarded for changes in company performance outside of 
their control (in other words, for luck).226 The study finds that CEOs 
in firms that lacked large external shareholders tended to receive 
more “luck-based” pay. Furthermore, this study finds that CEOs in 
firms that lack large shareholders have their cash compensation re-
duced less when their options-based compensation is increased.227  
The second study by Bertrand and Mullainathan compares com-
panies with and without a 5-percent shareholder in terms of how the 
performance sensitivity of compensation relates to the volatility of 
the company’s stock price.228 Under optimal contracting, pay-
performance sensitivity should decrease with increasing variance. 
However, the study finds that such a relationship is present only 
among companies that have a 5-percent outside shareholder. 
2. Inferences and objections. 
From the various empirical studies described above, there 
emerges a clear picture of a link between managerial power and pay 
arrangements—a link that is predicted by the managerial power ap-
proach. Interestingly, the financial economists who conducted the 
above studies, unlike most academics working in this area, came to 
the view that some appropriation of wealth might be taking place in 
those situations in which managers are especially powerful. Bertrand 
and Mullainathan, for example, concluded that some “skimming” 
takes place in companies without a 5-percent shareholder.229 However, 
these researchers appear to believe that rent extraction occurs only in 
situations in which managers are relatively more powerful.  
In our view, once the connection between power and rents is 
recognized, there is reason to believe that managerial rent extraction 
might occur to some extent in all companies without a controlling or 
dominant shareholder. To be sure, managers will have less power, and 
                                                                                                                           
at 21, University of Zurich Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper No 61 (2001), 
available online at <http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp061.pdf> (visited Apr 8, 2002). 
226 See Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck?: The Ones 
without Principals Are, 116 Q J Econ 901, 929 (2001). 
227 See Bertrand and Mullainathan, Do CEO’s Set Their Own Pay? at 34 (cited in note 158). 
228 See Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, Agents with and without Principals, 90 Am 
Econ Assoc Papers & Proceedings 203 (2000). 
229 See id at 205. 
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thus be able to extract less rents, in circumstances in which a large 
external shareholder is present or more shares are in the hands of in-
stitutions. As we have explained, however, even in such circum-
stances managers still have considerable power and thus can be ex-
pected to extract rents.230 Indeed, the compensation practices we have 
described in the preceding sections of Part III (such as the absence of 
reduced-windfall options and the lack of unwinding restrictions) oc-
cur also at companies which have large shareholders or concentrated 
institutional share ownership. This indicates that rent extraction 
might well take place, even if to a reduced extent, in companies 
where managers are less powerful.  
Finally, we wish to discuss the recent finding Kevin Murphy has 
put forward as evidence inconsistent with our managerial power ap-
proach.231 Murphy provides evidence that newly hired CEOs coming 
from outside of the firm receive in their first year almost twice the to-
tal compensation of newly hired CEOs coming from inside the firm. 
Suggesting that CEOs coming from outside of the firm do not yet 
have power to influence their pay, Murphy argues that their higher 
pay is inconsistent with the managerial power hypothesis.232  
We think that such an inference cannot be drawn. To begin with, 
while the managerial power approach suggests that managers with 
more power are paid more, all else being equal, it does not suggest 
that more power is the only reason why some managers are paid 
more than others. Inside candidates usually have an advantage over 
outsiders because of their familiarity with the firm and their existing 
ties to the board. Thus, in those instances in which the board turns to 
the outsiders, the outside hires are likely to be, on average, a stronger 
group. Furthermore, outside hires are often CEOs already (which in-
side candidates by definition are not), and thus have higher reserva-
tion values. 
Indeed, for those outside hires who are already CEOs, the mana-
gerial power approach would predict higher pay, even assuming hy-
pothetically (and, we believe, counterfactually) that they were not a 
                                                                                                                           
230 Consider cases in which a 5- or 10-percent external shareholder is present. Given the power 
that managers have to issue poison pills and to control the proxy machinery, such a shareholder might 
have influence but usually not anything close to controlling power. Thus, executives in such cases are 
likely to have still a great deal of power. 
231 See Murphy, 69 U Chi L Rev at 853 (cited in note 141). 
232 It is not clear that the boards’ bargaining with a soon-to-be-hired CEO is arm’s length bargain-
ing. The directors will recognize that the person on the other side will in the future have influence over 
director nominations and compensation. If one of us had the chance to bargain with his soon-to-be hired 
dean over the dean’s compensation terms, we doubt that the bargaining would be at arm’s length. In any 
event, the critical point for Murphy’s argument, and one with which we agree, is that while bargaining 
with soon-to-be-hired CEOs might differ from arm’s length bargaining, soon-to-be-hired CEOs coming 
from outside should not be expected to have more power than those coming from inside. 
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stronger group on average than inside hires. CEOs hired from the 
outside who at the time of their hiring are CEOs of other firms are 
likely to be using their power at those firms to extract rents. Thus, the 
hiring firm cannot attract them without compensating them for what-
ever rents they currently enjoy and must give up to take the new posi-
tions. In contrast, no such compensation need be given when the 
company can find and hire an appropriate candidate in-house because 
that in-house candidate does not give up the rents and private benefits 
associated with being a CEO in order to take the CEO position.  
H. Differences between U.S. and Non-U.S. Companies 
U.S. CEOs are paid considerably more than their non-U.S. coun-
terparts,233 but lower-level managers are not. U.S. CEOs receive both 
more option- and equity-based pay234 and more cash compensation 
than their non-U.S. counterparts.235 U.S. human resources directors, 
by comparison, receive no more compensation than their interna-
tional counterparts.236 The U.S./international CEO pay gap provides 
yet another puzzle for students of executive compensation to ex-
plain.237  
Can the optimal contracting approach provide a persuasive ex-
planation for this pattern? First, it might be argued that U.S. CEOs 
are simply more important to the success of the business. The skills 
of the CEO might be more important in the U.S. if our corporate cul-
ture gives CEOs more decisionmaking power than others. Undoubt-
edly, the CEO is the major factor in the success of many U.S. compa-
nies. However, there is no reason to think that CEOs are, on average, 
less of a factor in the success of many foreign companies. CEOs 
might also be more important in the U.S. because markets in the U.S. 
are more competitive and therefore more “demanding,” which makes 
a CEO’s skills more critical to the company’s performance. In 
economies with much government regulation and intervention, how-
ever, a company’s performance might also depend critically on the 
                                                                                                                           
233 See Abowd and Bognanno, International Differences at 70–72 (cited in note 58); Murphy, Ex-
ecutive Compensation at 7 (cited in note 2).  
234 See Abowd and Bognanno, International Differences at 70–72 (cited in note 58); Murphy, Ex-
ecutive Compensation at 7 (cited in note 2). 
235 See Mark J. Lowenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 Wake Forest L Rev 1, 
5 (2000). 
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skills of the CEO (though, in this case, on different skills) in dealing 
with political and regulatory constraints.  
Second, it could be argued that in the U.S. CEOs are relatively 
scarce. However, the scarcity argument is also not persuasive. Al-
though U.S. firms employ a particularly large number of CEOs, they 
employ an even larger number of junior executives. It is unclear why 
qualified CEOs would be relatively more scarce than qualified junior 
executives.  
Third, it might be that the tournament model of executive com-
pensation is more applicable in the U.S. than it is in other countries. 
According to this theory of compensation, junior executives accept 
lower pay in their present jobs in exchange for the chance of winning 
the tournament, becoming CEO, and capturing the big prize.238 It is 
possible that this extremely competitive, survival-of-the-fittest model 
simply works better in our highly laissez-faire corporate culture than 
it does abroad. There are theoretical problems with the tournament 
explanation,239 however, and there is no real evidence that it applies to 
executive pay. 
Fourth, it might be argued that U.S. firms are at the front of the 
learning curve when it comes to CEO pay. It has been suggested that 
other countries have not caught up to the U.S. with regard to stock-
based compensation.240 However, the typical CEO in over half of the 
foreign countries surveyed by Towers Perrin in 1997 did receive op-
tions or other long-term performance units; they simply received 
fewer.241 Moreover, the learning curve hypothesis fails to explain why 
U.S. CEOs are better paid than their foreign counterparts but junior 
executives in the U.S are not. 
While the pattern of cross-country differences is difficult to ex-
plain under the optimal contracting approach, the managerial power 
approach can make sense of it. As we have discussed, rent extraction 
depends on managers having power. In the U.S., managers have con-
siderable power, especially, as we have seen, when ownership is very 
dispersed and there is no large shareholder to provide discipline. U.S. 
CEOs rarely have other business interests that could enable them to 
extract rents through favorable contractual arrangements. Thus, U.S. 
                                                                                                                           
238 See Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Con-
tracts, 89 J Polit Econ 841, 841–42 (1981). 
239 For example, tournaments might provide poor incentives when it is apparent that one player is 
likely to win and others likely to lose the competition (due to differences in skills or other qualities) or 
even encourage collusion or sabotage. See Ronald A. Dye, The Trouble with Tournaments, 22 Econ Inq 
147, 148 (1984). 
240 See Abowd and Bognanno, International Differences at 70 (cited in note 58). 
241 See Murphy, Executive Compensation at 7 (cited in note 2).  
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managers use their power to extract rents through their executive 
compensation. 
In other countries, there are relatively fewer companies with dis-
persed ownership and relatively more companies with controlling 
shareholders. 242 And in those countries with dispersed ownership, 
such as the United Kingdom, ownership tends to be much more con-
centrated than in the U.S.243 When share ownership is more concen-
trated, the CEO will have less power (unless, in firms with a control-
ling shareholder, the CEO is related to the controlling shareholder). 
Professional CEOs hired by companies with more concentrated own-
ership and companies controlled by a large shareholder will therefore 
extract less rents than the CEOs of U.S. firms, whose shareholders 
are likely to be more dispersed and therefore less able to closely 
monitor the CEOs.  
In some companies controlled by a large shareholder or family, 
however, those controlling the firm will not hire professional manag-
ers but rather install themselves in those positions. CEOs of these 
companies might well have more power than U.S. CEOs. And they 
could use this power to extract rents through their executive compen-
sation. But the controlling group or family is likely to control other 
significant assets that might often offer more important avenues for 
extracting rents—namely, through self-dealing and the taking of 
business opportunities.244  
In such a case, although the CEO could extract additional rents 
through executive compensation, refraining from doing so might be a 
cost-effective means of camouflaging the overall amount of rents that 
is being extracted. By paying himself reasonable compensation, the 
controlling shareholder might be able to create the impression that he 
is being loyal to minority shareholders. And because compensation is 
not that large a source of rents relative to the other sources that are 
available, the cost to the controlling shareholder of not paying him-
                                                                                                                           
242 See Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership 
around the World, 54 J Fin 471, 491–96 (1999). 
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244 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier H. Kraakman, and George G. Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-
Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control From Cash 
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2002] Managerial Power and Executive Compensation 845 
self a larger salary is relatively small.245 In sum, CEO pay tends to be 
lower in other countries because the CEO either has less power to ex-
tract rents or the CEO generally has other avenues for rent extraction 
(because the CEO is affiliated with the controller, who is likely to 
have other business interests).  
The managerial power approach is consistent with the observa-
tion that the cross-country difference in pay is concentrated at the 
top, while much lower-level U.S. executives do not receive more pay 
than their foreign counterparts. We have noted that sometimes power 
will be concentrated in the hands of the CEO, and at other times it 
will be shared by two or more top officers. As a result, rents will be 
received either by the CEO or the CEO and one or more other top-
ranking executives. This would suggest that at times there will be a 
compensation differential only at the CEO level, and at other times 
there will be such a differential with respect to the CEO and one or 
two other top executives. Thus, it is not surprising that human re-
sources directors and other lower-level executives who do not have a 
significant share of corporate power do not enjoy higher compensa-
tion than their non-U.S. peers.246 The managerial power explanation 
that we have put forward here is also consistent with our explanation 
of the finding that, in the U.S., CEOs of companies that have large 
shareholders are paid less than CEOs of companies that do not.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has examined two alternative approaches to the 
study and analysis of executive compensation: the optimal contract-
ing approach, which has dominated academic research on the subject, 
and the managerial power approach, which focuses on the role of 
managerial power in explaining deviations from optimal contracting. 
The former approach views executive compensation as an instrument 
for combating the agency problem between managers and dispersed 
shareholders; the latter approach regards compensation arrangements 
as partly a product of the agency problem.  
Analyzing the processes that set executive compensation, we 
have identified reasons to believe that their outcomes might well de-
viate significantly from optimal contracting. Whatever the appear-
ances, executive compensation is not generally the product of arm’s 
length bargaining, but is the result of a process that executives can 
                                                                                                                           
245 In some countries, minority shareholder rights are so weak that there is no need for the control-
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substantially influence. Moreover, although executive compensation 
is set against a background of market forces, these forces are hardly 
strong enough to compel optimal contracting outcomes. As a result, 
executives can use their power to influence compensation arrange-
ments and to extract rent.  
The forces that limit rent extraction are affected by how com-
pensation arrangements are perceived by outsiders. This, in turn, pro-
vides incentives for structuring compensation arrangements in a way 
that camouflages the presence and extent of rent extraction. Conse-
quently, the desire to extract rents might lead to the use of inefficient 
pay structures and produce suboptimal incentives. 
Analyzing the large body of empirical evidence on executive 
compensation, we have concluded that the evidence supports the 
view that managerial power plays a significant role. Indeed, this ap-
proach can explain various puzzling features and practices that have 
long occupied researchers operating under the optimal contracting 
approach. Among other things, this approach can explain the conven-
tional use of options that make no attempt to filter out rewards for 
general market or sector factors, the almost uniform use of at-the-
money options, the broad freedom given to executive to unwind in-
centives and to choose the time of unwinding, and the systematic cor-
relation between managerial power and pay. 
The role that managerial power plays in executive compensation 
has implications for the study, practice, and regulation of corporate 
governance. For these implications to receive the attention they de-
serve, the role of managerial power must first be recognized and ap-
preciated. We hope that this Article will contribute to such recogni-
tion and that it will provide a useful framework for subsequent study 
of how managerial power influences executive compensation. 
 
